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Abstract
Refusing Interpretation: Waste Ecologies in Victorian Fiction and Prose
This dissertation examines the waste ecologies that appear in Victorian literature, from the
canonical realist novel, to the Irish Imperial Gothic ghost story, and to practical prose works
on garden designs and amateur horticulture. Specifically, I discuss two of Dickens’s novels,
Our Mutual Friend (1865) and Bleak House (1853), alongside Joseph Sheridan Le Fanu’s
“Green Tea” (1869) and a selection of William Robinson’s horticultural prose and journalism
that appeared between 1869 and 1892. The primary texts examined in this dissertation all
suggest a profound fascination with and awe of emergent and complex ecological structures
over self-contained, ordered systems. My chapters can be grouped conceptually into two
halves: the first dealing with Dickens’s representation of social structures that function as
large and small waste ecologies; the second, with the individual interactions with waste
ecologies that in Le Fanu’s and Robinson’s works manifest as both occult and apocalyptic.
Chapter 1 reads Our Mutual Friend for the strange material entanglements surrounding the
Harmon dust-heaps and the Thames, offering a portrait of waste that is uncontainable, is
uncategorizable, and develops agency. Chapter 2 takes up Bleak House’s depiction of three
social systems that function as waste ecologies—Krook’s rag-and-bottle shop, the High
Court of Chancery, and Tom-all-Alone’s—as loci of excessive accumulated material that in
their rampant proliferation objectify, devalue, and homogenize everything within. Chapter 3
examines “Green Tea,” which depicts the human body’s spectral reaction when it itself is the
intersection of the indigestible waste ecologies involving the contaminated tea panic, the
counterfeit tea trade, and the mingled nationalism and Orientalism orbiting a product of
imperial trade that was both prized and held in suspicion. Chapter 4 takes up Robinson’s
prose and follows the logic of his aesthetic to the inevitable conclusion that human life
cannot truly join the garden ecology except in death. Moving from broad ecosystems that
influence all of Victorian London down to the individual British subject, tea-drinker, or plant,
this project situates waste ecologies at the rich analytical intersections of Victorian literary
criticism, the new materialisms, and the environmental humanities.
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Summary for Lay Audience
This dissertation begins with the problem of waste in Victorian England (1837-1901). The
rapid and large-scale urbanization and industrialization of cities like London led to massive
challenges relating to the containment and disposition of waste in all its forms: human
sewage, animal excrement, discarded household effects, industrial equipment, and the
continual smoke and soot from coal fires kept up in homes and in factories. Waste affected
English society at virtually every level and in every location. My project analyses how waste
and its complex impacts are imagined in Victorian English fiction and non-fiction, focusing
on two novels by Charles Dickens, a ghost story by Joseph Sheridan Le Fanu, and the books
and journalism of the Irish-born horticulturist William Robinson. My analysis reveals in
these authors’ work an unexpectedly complex understanding of waste and of our social and
environmental relationships to waste. I offer the term “waste ecology” to define and assess
these understandings of waste that so profoundly shaped these written works. The
dissertation ends, like the beginning, with the problem of waste, but with this difference:
waste is a concept that challenges us to revisit how we determine value, how we relate to our
environment, and how the things that we reject as waste can lead to new growth.
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Introduction
In “The Decay of Lying” (1889), Oscar Wilde claims that, “people see fogs, not because
there are fogs, but because poets and painters have taught them the mysterious loveliness of
such effects” (41). This image of Victorian London drowned in smoke and fog is, it is worth
noting, first and foremost an image of waste, emanating from Londoners’ daily practices of
consumption. The same fog that “poets and painters” admired for its melancholic beauty was
produced by the Thames, which by the mid-nineteenth century was effectively an open
cesspool. This vaporized filth in turn compounded the effects of other waste, often fusing
with chimney soot to further pollute the city’s atmosphere. According to Michelle Allen,
while the filth of London was not a new phenomenon, by the nineteenth century, the
combination of the city’s unprecedented population growth, a series of cholera, typhoid, and
typhus outbreaks, and the miasmic theory of disease—which held that the poisonous air of
waste-filled environments were behind those outbreaks—all imbued the problems posed by
urban waste with a new urgency for Victorians (9-10). Nor were Victorian Londoners under
any illusions about the waste deposited into the river, air, and streets after the Great Stink of
1858, in which unusually hot, still summer weather intensified the stench of the raw sewage
that mingled with the Thames. And yet this waste-filled topography held an irresistible
attraction. Pip’s first impression of London in Great Expectations (1861) involves a similar
warring of attraction and repulsion: “We Britons had at that time particularly settled that it
was treasonable to doubt our having and our being the best of everything: otherwise, while I
was scared by the immensity of London, I think I might have had some faint doubts whether
it was not rather ugly, crooked, narrow, and dirty” (457). Later in the century, in Arthur
Conan Doyle’s A Study in Scarlet (1887), Dr. Watson expresses a similar ambivalence,
describing London as “that great cesspool into which all loungers and idlers of the Empire
are irresistibly drained” (7). Crowning it the origin of growth, development, and
accomplishment, Doyle views London as a place of stagnation, of festering waste, that has
nonetheless an irresistible draw. Victorians had, as we still do, a fraught relationship with
waste. It is on this complex interrelation—among waste, environment, activity, attachments,
and aesthetics—that this project will focus.
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Waste oscillates between the quaint and the repulsive, the reusable and the stubbornly
useless. The complex, contradictory relationships that this dissertation considers as waste
cannot be reduced to filth, refuse, and debris alone. Rather, I read waste as a situation—as a
relationship between objects that might defile, as a productive disorganization. Victorian
urban waste-spaces were not simply containers of filth and refuse; they gave rise to
ecosystems and economies of waste. Dustmen and watermen could earn a subsistence
income for clearing away rubbish or sewage, respectively, and for selling these wares as
agricultural fertilizers (Maidment 10). The central London sewage system also afforded some
scanty means to “sewer-hunters,” or scavenging groups who braved the floods, biohazards,
and rats of the sewer system in search of discarded valuables (Mayhew 137). The entire city
was covered in and characterized by this waste, whether the ash and soot of domestic hearths,
or the noxious mists that rose from the heavily polluted Thames. Victorians did not simply
live amongst waste; they engaged with waste and some even relied on or thrived upon waste.
Defining these waste environments is the core interest of this dissertation. This dissertation’s
central concern lies in exploring waste ecologies—constructs that necessarily resist
systematization and clear boundaries.
Defining a waste environment poses some unique challenges, due partly to the plentiful and
dispersed discourses that current cultural studies have brought to bear upon waste. Waste sits
at the centre of a definitional ecology as complex as the organic and inorganic structures it
evokes. In 1966, Mary Douglas famously defined dirt as “matter out of place,” a phrase that
launched the long subsequent tradition that conceives of waste as marginal, as categorically
rebellious, and as antithetical to order and to classification (2). Michael Thompson’s
anthropological study, Rubbish Theory (1979), relies on this characterization of waste when
he casts the rubbish object as a liminal category of commodity culture. Thompson’s rubbish
is an object that wavers between transient and enduring social value. Julia Kristeva’s theory
of the abject in Powers of Horror (1982) marks another milestone in the conceptualization of
waste and is responsible for the use of “abject” as a household word within critical theory
almost forty years after its emergence. Kristeva’s definition of the abject as a loathsome,
“jettisoned object” (2)—or even “a reality that, if I acknowledge it, annihilates me” (2)—
functions essentially as a description of waste: “what is abject . . . is radically excluded and
draws me toward the place where meaning collapses” (2). Peter Schwenger’s Tears of Things
x

(2006) would later build upon Kristeva’s formulation and cement its relation to waste in his
reading of the human corpse as a liminal boundary between subject and object, still
“bear[ing] the imprint of a residual subjectivity, residue within residue” (157). In the same
year, Gay Hawkins’s The Ethics of Waste (2006)—which reframes human-waste relations as
a global and environmental problem and is still influential for its central claim of “the mutual
constitution of human subjects and inanimate wasted objects” (2-3)—examines such diverse
wastes as discarded plastics, feces, empty bottles, and worms.
More recently, scholars have delved deeper into this awareness of our material and culturally
mediated relations to waste. In the last ten years, scholarly work in both the new materialisms
and ecocriticism have seized upon the dynamic analytical potential of waste. Mel Chen and
Maurizia Boscagli, for instance, developed respective theories for navigating the complex
materialist relations enabled by cultural narratives of toxins and garbage. The developing
field of what some call waste studies has responded in kind, bringing a material ecocritical
attention to complexes of commercial, organic, industrial, and chemical wastes. In a 2008
issue of PMLA, Patricia Yaeger proposed a theory of “rubbish ecology” that carries forward a
conservationist approach to garbage and aesthetics, and which she defines “as the act of
saving and savouring debris” (329). Heather Sullivan’s “dirt theory” casts waste as a problem
1

of material ecocriticism, highlighting the mobile and unmanageable processes of dirt and its
entanglements with “small-scale ecological processes that are themselves integrated into
larger niches of other assemblages” (516). Also in the past decade, waste studies has steadily
permeated literary criticism, from Susan Morrison’s Chaucerian “fecopoetics” (2), to Patrick
Chappell’s reading of the Victorian realist novel through Thompson’s rubbish theory, and
Jesse Oak Taylor’s mapping of the history of atmospheric pollution through British novels
from the mid-nineteenth- to twentieth-century in The Sky of Our Manufacture (2016).
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Serenella Iovino and Serpil Oppermann coined the term “material ecocriticism” in their 2012 article,
“Theorizing Material Ecocriticism: A Diptych,” which champions the methodological compatibility of two
bodies of critical theory—the environmental humanities and the new materialisms—that had already begun to
emerge in the scholarship of both fields. Iovino and Oppermann would soon afterward release their edited
collection of material ecocritical scholarship, Material Ecocriticism, in 2014.
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These scholars, with their diverse contributions to waste studies, serve as the foundation for
this dissertation. The ways in which theorists like Kristeva or literary critics like Sullivan
explore the abject or dirt external to systems of value, for instance, are integral to my own
interest in the limits of such systems. However, we may also measure the extent of the
uncertainty and lack of definition by the diversity of these critics’ approaches to waste. That
these critical approaches to waste form an ecology of complex, overlapping, contradictory,
and yet mutually constitutive discourses is suggestive. There is no coherent, comprehensive
understanding of waste. The scholarship of waste has a long history that includes everything
from dirt, debris, bodies, and excrement to garbage, chemical toxins, and atmospheric
pollution—all distinct categories that nonetheless seem to bleed into one another and are
freely interrelated by the scholars who take them up. As Morrison writes, “[i]nherent to
waste’s identity (indeed, waste could be said to be that which has no identity) is its ability to
slip away from one single, clearly articulated designation” (9). The language of waste was as
polysemic, as fragmented, in the nineteenth century as it is in cultural studies today. Waste
was part of a broad discursive nexus in the Victorian period and sat at the fraught interstices
of several historical reforms and debates. Of the major connotations of waste throughout the
nineteenth century, however, the four most relevant to this dissertation are sewage waste,
vital waste, moral waste, and entropic waste.
Perhaps the nineteenth century’s most intuitive use of “waste,” at least for the modern reader,
was in reference to sewage.2 Without a standardized waste disposal system, London faced a
crisis of sanitation by the mid-nineteenth century. The inevitable and unprecedented
consequence of London’s rampant urban densification was that waste became intolerably
ubiquitous over the course of the nineteenth century. The combination of poorly maintained
private cesspools, the city’s haphazard, flood-prone sewers, and a rapidly increasing
population all led to a threat to public health as well as a growing frustration across social
classes. In London Labour and the London Poor (1851), Henry Mayhew bemoans the
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Indeed, waste was a variable term and inconsistent in its usage. The OED suggests that “waste” in this context
applied primarily to water waste without excrement (“waste, n. 12c”). However, the OED cites The New
Sydenham Society’s Lexicon (1882), which uses the term “waste matter” specifically in order to define fecal
matter (“excrement,” 309).
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tendency to deposit human waste into the Thames, first, because of the loss of potential
manure that may be “loathsome to man, but demanded by vegetation,” and, second, because
the river served as the city’s primary source of potable water and all of central London was
ingesting water “impregnated over and over again with our own animal offal” (386).
Mayhew describes here two dysfunctional relations between waste and food—waste as
agricultural fertilizer, and waste as contaminant and carrier of disease. For Mayhew,
Victorian Londoners were foolishly disrupting a productive relation to waste as fertilizer in
exchange for one that allowed filth to mingle with food and drink, as well as to spread
disease (by miasma, if not yet by what would turn out to be bacteria).3 Mayhew’s indignant
passage recognizes implicitly a shift from one set of waste relations to another—from one
that was productive of food to another in which food deteriorates into a deadly agent of
disease. This crisis of urban sanitation worsened over the first half of the nineteenth century,
giving rise to several deadly cholera outbreaks. It culminated in the summer of 1858, during
which the toxic smell of raw sewage deposited into the Thames was exacerbated by
unusually hot summer weather. According to Lee Jackson, the Parliament building was
particularly engulfed by this smell during the Great Stink in “a kind of poetic justice” after
having so long delayed approval for a new sewer system (97). The spirit of rebellion that
Jackson playfully ascribes to the river waste is entirely appropriate to the disruptive character
of waste more generally. Not to be contained or conveniently carried out of sight by the river,
an unprecedented quantity of sewage intruded upon the senses and asserted its material
presence with a force worthy of the name “the Great Stink.”
Victorians’ horror of human waste worsened when that waste proved too unmanageable for
the engineering, medical, and bureaucratic systems then available. Major proponents of
sanitation reform, including Edwin Chadwick and Mayhew, enthusiastically took to the
challenge of systematizing unruly urban waste throughout the 1840s and 1850s, but with
imperfect results. The Great Stink motivated a series of sanitary reforms throughout the
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In the introduction to Cleansing the City, Allen notes that Victorians recognized (if to a limited extent) the
link between sewage and fatal diseases like cholera and typhoid. Three major cholera outbreaks in London took
place during 1848–49, 1853–54, and 1866–67 (Allen 10), the first of which Mayhew would have been aware by
the time he wrote London Labour and the London Poor.
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1860s, including Joseph W. Bazalgette’s plans for a metropolitan sewage network in 1865
and for the Thames Embankment in 1870. According to Efraim Sicher, the discourses
surrounding Chadwick’s campaign and the 1848 Public Health Act couched sanitation
reform within a utopic vision of the technological modernization of Victorian London. Sicher
argues that the waste management systems, technologies, and policies that emerged in the
1860s were as much ideological as practical renovations, central to beautifying and visually
emphasizing the modernity of the mid-Victorian city (“Bleak Homes and Symbolic
Houses”). The elaborate wrought iron embellishments of the Crossness Pumping Station
embody this intersection of the technologically innovative and the lavishly decorative (see
fig. 1). In essence, waste incited systematization and offered an opportunity to vaunt the
British Empire’s feats of engineering.

Figure 1: Photograph © Peter Scrimshaw 2012, taken of the Crossness Pumping
Station, which was restored in 1987 and has since been maintained as a museum by the
Crossness Engines Trust. Reproduced with the permission of the artist.
In spite of these early efforts to systematize waste disposal, however, sewage waste still
proved unmanageable. As Jackson observes, Bazalgette’s sewage network offered only a
xiv

temporary and topographically limited solution: “[t]he newer sewer system removed filth and
stink from central London, only to shift it upstream[4] to Beckton and Crossness. When
sewage was discharged, twice a day, the river seemed to revolt against the imposition,
‘hissing like soda-water with baneful gases, so black that the water is stained for miles, and
discharging a corrupt charnel-house odour’” (5).5 Combined with Victorians’ limited
knowledge of disease contagion, sewage waste persistently exceeded the systems of policy
and engineering that were designed to contain it. On the one hand, then, waste management
systems were expressions of Victorian ideologies of sanitation and urban modernity. On the
other hand, living with waste was unbearable because of its intrusive, disorderly materiality.
Victorian sewage waste was disruptive in its associative potential, as well as in its physical
accumulation. Allen argues that the massive amounts of sewage intruding upon Victorian
Londoners’ daily lives was a medical, moral, and social problem as far as the bourgeoisie
were concerned: “the problem of filth was at once a physical danger . . . a demoralizing
influence, and a social threat; moreover, it was inextricably tied to perceptions and anxieties
about the urban poor, who were themselves insufficiently contained” (9). Unmanageable
urban waste freely transgressed distinctions of topography and of social classification. Waste
systems attempting to address this “challenge of excremental accumulation” (11), as Allen
calls the Victorian sewage problem, were made more urgent by this spatial and social
unruliness. Excrement was necessary to fertilize soil, as Mayhew points out, but it also
fouled the drinking water of the most expensive and desirable neighbourhoods in London.6
Even Queen Victoria and Prince Albert were not exempt from its intrusive presence; in the

4

Both Beckton and Crossness are technically located downstream from central London. However, because the
flow of water reverses during the rising flood tide, they might be considered upstream effectively. The pumping
stations held sewage in a reservoir. At the ebb tide, it released this sewage to be carried downstream toward the
ocean. Part of the challenge of developing a sewage network for the city, then, involved navigating the volatile
tidal activity of the Thames, which could see a difference of up to 7 metres in its water levels.
5

Jackson quotes a comment reported to The Times by “A Pharmaceutical Chemist” (8) and which appeared in
the September 6th, 1878 issue.
6

John Wright, editor of Hansard, published a pamphlet in 1827 exposing the Grand Junction Water Company
for supplying its aristocratic West End customers with drinking water drawn from a source along the Thames
located immediately next to a sewage outfall. As Jackson wryly observes, “[t]he elite of the metropolis were
receiving diluted excrement for drinking, cooking and laundering – and paying handsomely for the privilege”
(51).
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summer of the Great Stink, they were driven back to shore shortly after starting a pleasure
cruise on the Thames, unable to bear the smell (Ackroyd, London Under 87). For better or
for worse, waste transforms its environment, and this transformative power threatened
Victorian urban spaces. Beyond waste’s transformative capacity, moreover, waste’s threat
lay in its ubiquity—its pervasive and diffuse influence. While waste ecologies were distinct
from social and engineering systems, they nevertheless drew impetus from the structures that
sought to contain them. Class structure and urban planning, human disgust and medical
intervention, all funnelled sewage into the river, ironically expanding its reach as an
emergent and threatening ecology.
Alongside these more literal, fecal forms of waste, the action of wasting was also an
ambivalent concept, denoting both consuming resources to excess and not consuming
enough. For instance, the moral imperative of the proverb, “willful waste makes woeful
want,” applies to the individual about to discard useful scrap materials as much as to the
individual neglecting to save an immediate resource in case of possible want in the future.
While iterations of this proverb date back at least to the mid-seventeenth century, this phrase
and its variants had a particular currency throughout the nineteenth century, especially in the
context of domestic management.7 In an 1856 article of the Morning Post, the writer praises
Sir Walter Scott for having the maxim, “Waste not, want not,” inscribed over the kitchen fire
of Abbotsford, and exhorts readers to “Let no master, how high soever his social position, or
however great his wealth, think that he can, as a Christian, be absolved from enforcing this
rule in his household” (4). Yet, Victorians were somewhat skeptical of this simplistic
presentation of waste as the antithesis to moral duty. Dickens’s novels in particular appear
more interested in those characters that waste not and yet continue to want much. The
Hexams in Our Mutual Friend (1865), for instance, struggle to live on what Gaffer Hexam
can scavenge from the river. Though they are actively engaged in a practice of recuperating
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The OED attributes the earliest published mention of the “willful waste” proverb to an anonymous 1642 tract
on the English response to the Irish Rebellion of 1641: “Now if famine punish excesse, if wofull want follow
wilfull waste, if others mete the same measure againe into their bosomes, pressed downe and running over, if
condemnation mercilesse light on those that shewed not mercy, whom can they condemne?” (Great Expedition
11). It is this ambivalent connection to excess and waste, as well as the moral component that emerges in the
latter half of the sentence, that concerns my project here.
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scavenged waste, they can only maintain the barest subsistence. Bleak House (1853) offers a
more parodic extreme of this failed maxim in Krook, whose rag-and-bottle shop is a place
where “[e]verything seemed to be bought, and nothing to be sold” (67). Krook wastes
nothing. He buys and preserves the potential waste that sellers bring into his shop. But in
keeping those wares from serving any economic purpose and by allowing them to decay, he
also wastes everything. As we shall see in Chapter 2, both the meaningless systematization
rendered in the novel’s Court of Chancery and Krook’s rag-and-bottle shop over-systematize
that which comes under their purview, mechanically following a mandate of accumulation to
the point of producing new waste, whether decaying wares, spontaneously combusted bodies,
or ruined and dying legal suitors. Waste, in other words, proves too complex to be managed
by the single maxim of “waste not.” Indeed, Krook’s rag-and-bottle shop enacts a literal
waste ecology, becoming a topography of waste in which cast-off objects and cast-out
characters come to reside and to interrelate over the course of the novel.
The “waste not” maxim had surprisingly versatile uses as a result of waste’s propensity to
porously absorb meaning. An unnamed contributor to the November 16, 1867 issue of
Saturday Review applies the expression—or the “old school lessons about . . . willful waste
being the source of woful [sic] want”—to literary composition (627). This contributor, whose
article is titled “Literary Waste,” treats literary composition as a kind of scrap work, insisting
that writing quality literature depends on authors’ ability “to use up all the material of every
sort that ever comes into their hands, and to gather up all the fragments that are left” (627).
This writing-by-scavenging method tries to eliminate waste by repurposing it. The minutiae
of Dickens’s realism might offer some instances of this advice in practice. Again, however,
Victorian authors did not all share in this denial of waste—even so-called literary waste—by
repurposing “material of every sort.” In my third chapter, I discuss one Victorian fantasy of
such an omnivorous digestion of information. J. S. Sheridan Le Fanu’s “Green Tea” (1872)8
casts indiscriminate consumption—of knowledge and of food—as an unwholesome
engagement. As my chapter will suggest, the character Reverend Jennings devours both

8

“Green Tea” was first serialized in All the Year Round between October 23rd and November 13th, 1869. It
was later published as part of the three-volume collection of Le Fanu’s Martin Hesselius stories, In A Glass
Darkly (1872).
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green tea and ancient pagan texts to excess, with the result that his body transforms into a
waste ecology. Contrary to the advice of the Saturday Review contributor, these Victorian
narratives problematize the unquestioning negation of waste. Where Dickens’s realism
fulfills to an extent the wisdom of avoiding “literary waste” with its extensive descriptions
and catalogues of minutiae, Le Fanu’s short story is more circumspect regarding the
exhaustive digestion and production of literature.
At the same time that waste was cast as an antagonist to human systems and order, an
alternative view was gaining traction among nineteenth-century natural philosophers that
held waste as the foundation of human subsistence. Charles Darwin’s The Formation of
Vegetable Mould through the Action of Worms with Observations on their Habits (1881)
binds the highest forms of human culture and artifice to the material, the contingent, and the
seemingly insignificant. In this work, Darwin expresses his fascination with the numbers,
power, intelligence, and global impact of earthworms. Worms not only are “extraordinarily
numerous, and for their size possess great muscular power,” but the feats they accomplish
appear astonishingly out of proportion to their size and range of mobility (305). Worms have
the power both to preserve and to destroy ancient buildings and ruins; they protect
archaeological ruins by covering them with their castings, as well as being capable of
literally undermining buildings with shallow foundations. They demonstrate intelligence in
strategically covering the openings to their burrows by drawing stray leaves and dirt behind
them. Worms are also immensely productive, annually swallowing and excreting several tons
of dirt; Darwin applauds their wondrous industry when he points to the “marvellous
reflection that the whole of the superficial mould over any such expanse has passed, and will
again pass, every few years through the bodies of worms” (313). Most importantly, however,
worms’ relentless aeration of soil enables the growth and flourishing of the plant ecologies
on which humans rely for survival. Worms, which Victorian natural philosophers had
classified as uncomplicated organisms or “lowly organised creatures” (313), combine
through their excretory processes animal decay, vegetable decay, minerals, and air,
“mingl[ing] the whole intimately together, like a gardener who prepares fine soil for his
choicest plants” (309-310). Darwin figures worms as the agricultural predecessors to
humans, especially as he writes that “[t]he plough is one of the most ancient and most
valuable of man’s inventions; but long before he existed the land was in fact regularly
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ploughed, and still continues to be thus ploughed by earth-worms” (313). These “lowly
organised creatures,” in other words, occupy an all-important role within massive geological
ecologies through their interaction with and intermingling of refuse—a role that has been
overlooked and should be recognized by humans.
Donald Ulin was the first to forward this idea that Darwin’s late work imbues organic waste
(worms, soil, and excrement) with a vitality that secures the growth and flourishing of more
complex organisms and cultures (humans, art, and beauty):
the main value of worms, according to any farmer or gardener,
lies in the way they aerate, sift, and enrich the soil . . . The
message is clear: ‘a vast number of worms live unseen by us
beneath our feet’, where they carry on a full complement of
cultural activities, largely through the agency of their excrement.
And furthermore, they have a longer lineage than even the most
eminent English families. (304-305)
Ulin traces a subversive undercurrent to Darwin’s cultural criticism that situates waste at the
centre of all organic life and culture. This subversion appears briefly in earlier works
including On the Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent of Man (1871). It is most visible,
however, in The Formation of Vegetable Mould, which rhetorically links high culture—i.e.,
aesthetics, taste, social behaviour—to the material conditions in which that culture appears.
For Ulin, Darwin’s meticulous and even reverential attention to worm behaviour and worm
castings effectively enacts Bakhtin’s carnivalesque. Worms are not simply unsophisticated
organisms—that “live unseen by us beneath our feet”—within a hierarchy of organisms
evolving continuously toward complexity. Rather, Darwin dwells upon the importance of
worm castings to sites and objects of aesthetic value, from archeological ruins and artefacts
to the smooth beauty of a meadow or lawn, drawing a grotesque connection between high
aesthetic culture and abject material excrement. The waste of these worms forms the basis of
life for other, more complex organisms. Stranger still, the mobility that worms gain through
their digestive and excretory processes allows them access to a unique material existence—
one involving ancient ruins and archaeological treasures. Excrement is not simply the abject;
it is a source of agency, culture, and even beauty. Ulin thus reads Darwin’s worms as
collapsing the Arnoldian nature-culture divide—as challenging the Victorian distinction
between intellectual, aesthetic, and social cultures, on the one hand, and physical, biological,
and material cultures, on the other, all “through the agency of their excrement.” Though
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Ulin’s focus on the Bakhtinian carnivalesque differs from that of this dissertation, we can
find in his argument, however indirectly, the suggestion that worm excrement provides a
means by which human ruins can be preserved through integration into a waste ecology. This
notion of reintegrating waste back into a productive, non-anthropocentric ecology is the
driving logic behind William Robinson’s horticultural aesthetic. As we will see in my fourth
chapter, where I discuss Robinson’s horticultural writings in more detail, Robinson looks to
waste ecologies as sites of renewal and vitality in a manner that recalls the agency afforded
by Darwin’s worm castings.
Darwin’s fascination with the ecological impacts of worm waste falls within a larger
tendency in Victorian scientific discourses to associate waste with redistributions of energy.
Waste, for instance, was a significant term within Victorian thermodynamics and referred to
the excess heat generated by the process of harnessing some form of energy. Victorian
natural philosophers defined “waste” in opposition to “work”—a binary that M. Norton Wise
and Crosbie Smith link to the developing understanding of thermodynamics in the nineteenth
century. Where “work” referred to the output of productive, usable energy, “waste” was the
dissipation of that energy or its transformation into unproductive, useless energy. Wise and
Smith base these definitions of “work” and “waste” on Victorian natural philosopher William
Thomson’s uses of the terms: “‘[w]ork’ to him was not an abstract concept, nor merely the
capacity of an engine; it was a motivation, a goal of action, the source of value and progress
in the modern world, both material and moral. ‘Waste’ was its opposite, the source of
decadence and decline” (265). Waste’s complex history of undermining systems, in other
words, includes its use in the history of physics as a force of counter-productivity or of
entropy, as Allen MacDuffie has shown. MacDuffie expands upon Wise and Smith’s
connection of waste and entropy, noting that, before the term “entropy” was popularized in
Britain during the early twentieth century, Victorians used descriptive approximations of the
process of energy dispersal such as “waste heat,” “dissipated energy,” and “lost energy”
(“Victorian Thermodynamics” 211).9 The concept of a continuous and unchangeable waste
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Though entropy would by the twentieth century accrue its parallel meaning of informational chaos and “the
tendency of any system to grow randomized and disorganized,” MacDuffie is clear that Victorians understood
entropy solely as the dissipation of energy (“Victorian Thermodynamics” 212). Indeed, MacDuffie maintains
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of energy “led to extrapolated visions of a down-running cosmos” (“Victorian
Thermodynamics” 211). Balfour Stewart sums up this view in his 1873 treatise,
Conservation of Energy, when he remarks that “[u]niversally diffused heat forms what we
may call the great waste-heap of the universe” (153). Waste was at the centre of a pessimistic
discourse of inexorable dissolution, death, and the feeble insignificance of humanity. Nor
were these discourses exclusive to scientific publications. The impending loss implied by
“waste heat” is immortalized by Alfred, Lord Tennyson’s In Memoriam, in which the
speaker’s sorrow takes the shape of the heat death of the universe: “From out waste places
comes a cry, / And murmurs from the dying sun” (III.3-4). In a 2002 issue of PMLA, Barri J.
Gold reads these “waste places” and the “dying sun” as references to thermodynamics.
“[H]eat in technical parlance,” Gold suggests, “as often evokes the heat sink, ‘waste places’
that form the repositories of energy that is past its usefulness” (452). In both Victorian
literature and natural philosophy, waste was discursively linked with loss and death on both
local and cosmic scales.10
Wise and Smith’s account of the Victorian work-waste binary created an important opening
for humanities scholarship to integrate key shifts in the history of scientific nomenclature, as
MacDuffie argues. In adapting Wise and Smith’s binary to cultural and literary analyses,
however, one risks simplifying Victorians’ shifting and indecisive orientations toward waste.
For instance, Victorians’ view of waste-heat was contingent on dilations of scale. From a
cosmic perspective, waste-heat signified the inexorable end of the universe. From a localized

that to apply the informational analogy of entropy to Victorian texts risks an anachronism at the expense of
Victorian discourses of energy, resource depletion, and waste.
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It is worth noting that all of these historical definitions of waste are anthropocentric, even entropy, which
technically stands opposed to all of the ecologies that I discuss here, but is unerringly imagined in its
anthropocentric ramifications, such as how Tennyson discusses it. Tennyson’s metaphor of the “dying sun,” for
instance, casts waste-heat as a permanent loss. This invocation of entropy, in other words, assumes that entropy
involves the negation or the disappearance of heat. Entropy, however, is only a loss as far as human interests
and needs for energy are concerned; entropy involves a conversion or transformation of energy that results in
energy that is unusable by and unproductive for humans. The difference between imagining waste-heat as
absence and waste-heat as transformative is the difference of an anthropocentric and teleological thinking that
does not fully acknowledge the complexity of thermal energy, on one hand, and an ecological thinking that
recognizes structures of energy beyond anthropocentric interests, on the other.
xxi

perspective, waste-heat was a problem of productivity that could be remedied to some degree
and even recuperated. Robert Stirling’s hot-air engine and Edward Green’s economizer, for
instance, were both attempts to reintegrate waste-heat into a system of work. Victorians may
have viewed counter-productivity and waste-heat with disgust and even horror, but not
necessarily with pessimism. They sought methods to recuperate that loss of productive
energy. A shift in perspectival scale offered alternative engagements with entropic waste—
one that could serve rather than overwhelm anthropocentric interests—and innovators like
Stirling and Green were quick to seize upon these opportunities. Even Tennyson’s In
Memoriam, as Gold argues, begins with a despairing emphasis on the second law of
thermodynamics and yet ends with a hopeful recognition that the dissipated waste-heat of the
sun is nonetheless the cause of life. And Darwin, as we have seen, more openly celebrates the
paradox that the waste of the lowest class of organisms is vital to botanical and animal
ecologies alike. Victorians’ ambivalent responses to the implications of thermodynamics
allow us to realize that waste at once stood for a troubling form of counter-productivity, feats
of technological innovation, and organic vitality.
Solar energy is the ultimate example of the ambiguities presented by Victorian waste-heat.
Late-nineteenth-century authors used their fiction to imagine ways in which the death of the
sun could redefine the Earth’s ecologies—a positioning of the present and the future of the
Earth in a cosmic waste ecology. The time traveller of H. G. Wells’s The Time Machine
(1895) witnesses the final stages of the dying sun—“red and very large, halted motionless
upon the horizon, a vast dome glowing with a dull heat” (194)—in a nightmarish vision of
the logical conclusion of the second law of thermodynamics and the eventual depletion of the
life-giving waste-heat of the sun. For Victorians, solar energy, the source of all organic life,
was simply another form of waste. By implication, then, the Earth’s biosphere springs from a
larger, cosmic waste ecology. According to Kate Neilsen, Victorians had a tendency to
conflate natural and industrial sources of pollution, as well as to cast solar energy as
“industrial contaminants” (6). In an attempt to describe Angelo Secchi’s and Warren de la
Rue’s documentation of solar prominences during the June 1860 solar eclipse, Richard A.
Proctor reported in 1871 that some of these prominences “resemble[d] smoke from chimneys
or from the craters of volcanoes” (263). Proctor’s comparison of solar energy to industrial
pollutants is telling; the vital sunlight on which they relied was waste heat—a chemical
xxii

product of excess energy. As with so many forms of waste, Victorians were caught between
an anxious desire to curb this inefficient excess of heat and an awareness that human
existence depended on entropic waste-heat.
In the four Victorian understandings of waste above, waste moves nimbly in association from
abject toxins, to moral imperative, to vital matter, to entropic excess. These diverse and
fluctuating Victorian associations reflect our current critical struggles to find consensus in
conceptualizing waste. The absence of a perfectly coherent, totalizing definition of waste,
however, can be turned to analytical advantage. The complexity of wastes brought together
in a diverse set of interdependent relations is best represented by ecologies—that is,
ecologies in Timothy Morton’s sense of structural interrelations rather than in its ties to a
given ideology of nature. Morton describes his ecological thinking as a consideration of
“‘mesh’. . . the holes in a network and threading between them” (Ecological Thought 28).
This form of ecocriticism is defined, often, more by its focus on interconnection and relation
than by a specifically green critique. Morton’s thinking, for his part, attempts to describe “a
vast, sprawling mesh of interconnection without a definite center or edge” (Ecological
Thought 8). These complex denotations and connotations of waste reveal the extent to which
waste resists systems—whether systems of waste disposal or our own systems of knowing.
My project therefore imagines a method for examining the structural relations of waste in
which human agency and human systematization recede. In doing so, I use the term
“ecologies” much in the spirit of Morton’s Ecology Without Nature; that is, I consider
ecologies as a set of structural characteristics that are not restricted to biological life and
ecosystems. Morton’s work continues to play a significant role in what is now a generally
accepted practice of using the term ecologies to refer to a variety of social and material
systems not typically associated with nature—a dissociation that Morton actively cultivates
and encourages in Ecology Without Nature.11 Like Morton’s work, this dissertation
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In this work, Morton interrogates the concept of nature, which he suggests is a cultural artefact that
potentially limits a fuller development of ecological thinking. He further considers “ecology” to refer to an
infinity of sociobiological systems that may or may not encompass what was hitherto understood as “nature.”
Morton also offers a close reading method for literary ecocriticism that he calls “ambient poetics” or “a
materialist way of reading texts with a view to how they encode the literal space of their inscription—if there is
such a thing—the spaces between the words, the margins of the page, the physical and social environment of the
reader” (Ecology Without Nature 3).
xxiii

approaches ecologies as integrated, complex systems that freely incorporate and interrelate
living and non-living things.
Waste ecologies are a subset of this dynamic definition of ecological structures and forms—
one that embraces the rich tensions that manifest between waste and ecologies. In opting for
“ecology,” as opposed to “systems,” this dissertation highlights the transformative and
disruptive potential of masses of waste. Systems imply a certain order based on functionality
or some form of underlying authority; an ecology, however, makes room for interrelations
that shift, with nodes subtly influencing other nodes, outside of any established hierarchy or
utility. This dissertation finds its waste ecologies across Victorian literature, from the
canonical realist novel, to the Irish Imperial Gothic ghost story, and to practical prose works
on garden designs and amateur horticulture. Specifically, I discuss two of Dickens’s novels,
Our Mutual Friend and Bleak House, alongside Le Fanu’s “Green Tea” and a selection of
Robinson’s horticultural prose and journalism that appeared between 1869 and 1892. My
chapters can be grouped conceptually into two halves: the first dealing with Dickens’s
representation of social structures that function as large and small waste ecologies; the
second, with the individual interactions with waste ecologies that in Le Fanu’s and
Robinson’s works manifest as both occult and apocalyptic. Organized in this way, my project
relies upon shifting scales of thought; it moves from broad ecosystems of matter that
influence all of Victorian London down to the individual British subject, tea-drinker, or plant.
This dissertation imagines waste ecologies as a density of material relations that are
continuously interrelating and growing through the agency enabled by disruptive,
transformative waste. For Dickens, Le Fanu, and Robinson, waste ecologies emerge as a site
of social, corporeal, and botanical interrelation. In Our Mutual Friend, for instance, Gaffer
Hexam and Roger Riderhood scavenge river pollution and drowned bodies within a waste
ecology of the Thames, attempting by honest and by criminal means, respectively, to
reinstate such wastes back into human systems of value. Le Fanu explores a human subject’s
horrific, bodily encounters with a waste ecology that compromises both body and mind.
Finally, Robinson integrates waste into a botanical ecology that eventually exceeds human
designs and interests. My focus allows for broad definitions of trash, refuse, and filth because
I read waste as that which grows in the cracks of Victorian systems. Waste ecologies become
defined as much by their interconnectedness and transformative tendencies as by their
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inclusion of waste, per se. This project therefore posits a distinction between the specific
substances or forces that we designate as waste and the organizing (or disorganizing)
principles behind that waste. And as the opening example of the waste environment that is
Victorian London suggests, we are already familiar with representations of waste ecologies—
environs of waste that involve and shape their habitants—though we are not in the habit of
naming them as such. My subsequent chapters explore the sites of radical material
interrelations that emerge when we look past waste products as discrete material items and
reorient ourselves to the complex associations surrounding that waste. For instance, waste
ecologies have less to do with sewage itself than with crisscrossing sewage lines, industrious
sewer-hunters, and the bio-hazardous drinking waters of aristocratic neighborhoods. Waste
ecologies refer to the material complexity of smog, which, without regard for topographical
or social boundaries, can comprise many substances, can disperse dust, soot, and ashes, and
is absorbed relentlessly by porous human tissue.
In examining waste ecologies in mid- to late-Victorian fiction and prose, this dissertation
makes no claims to developing an archaeology of waste in the nineteenth century. The
disruptive potential of waste—its polysemic wildness—makes it an attractive analytical
subject for both Victorian literary studies and recent theoretical movements like the new
materialisms and ecocriticism. Morrison notes that the canon of Western literature is a rich
site of analysis for “a ‘waste-oriented’ material ecocritical perspective” (Literature of Waste,
3). Reading literary wastes, Morrison claims:
. . . can help us to understand how we theorize, manage, and are
implicated in waste. Literature reflects the ways in which humans
commonly perceive waste, yet can also offer complexly textured
models for individual and communal behavior and relationships
with the world around us. Not always negatively charged, waste
contains the potential to charge, catalyzing ethical behavior and
profound insights, even compassion. (Literature of Waste, 3)
Morrison rightly supposes that literary representations of waste provide critical analyses of
our broader cultural relationships to waste with “complexly textured models.” This comment
on the analytical value of waste-literature, moreover, can be developed further. The literature
of waste lends itself to criticism by foregrounding cultural orientations to certain types of
waste—and it does so precisely because waste-literature does not document perfectly the
physical construction of that waste. Waste-literature is therefore less valuable as a dataset
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delineating the exact types of and properties of waste that existed in the nineteenth century
than it is as the cultural orientations and perceived relationships surrounding that waste. My
project takes cues from Morrison’s work. I similarly use a material ecocritical methodology
and I am also concerned with depictions of waste. This project, however, is founded upon a
form of variety distinct from that which concerns Morrison. If to invoke waste is to invoke a
definitional variety, Morrison examines waste as a discrete material category across the
entire Western canon. My project, by contrast, focuses on a highly specific period in order to
examine the variety of potentials, influences, relations, and reactions that emanate from
waste in situ.
While many critics view waste as a site of resistance to anthropocentric systems of control,
others find in it a confirmation of that control. David Trotter, for instance, claims that
“[w]aste is the measure of an organism’s ability to renew itself by excluding whatever it does
not require for its own immediate purposes. . . . It testifies, in its very dereliction, to the
power which cast it down and out” (20). For Trotter, waste has always the potential to be
recycled or repurposed and therefore reintegrated into the systems from which it came. While
Trotter’s observation of the anthropocentrism fundamental to the term “waste” is well worth
noting, the chapters that follow and the texts they consider resist his suggestion that waste
“gleams with efficiency” (20). Indeed, the very existence of waste suggests a miscalculation
in consumption or production, an inefficiency in a system that could not avoid producing
some form of excess. Further complicating critical approaches to waste are instances like
Ulin’s analysis, which implies a radical, post-evolutionary waste that challenges the view that
humans have always repudiated waste out of hand. Academic discourses of waste over the
past twenty years, in other words, are as various and ambivalent as those of the nineteenth
century. Even Morrison has recently acknowledged the contradictions inherent in any
attempts to describe waste, which is a dynamic agent couched in both the material and the
figurative: “[w]aste necessarily implicates history, and implies materiality, metaphor, and
emotional affect. . . . Without the material that is discarded, we cannot enter the realm of the
metaphoric, of literature, and of the imagination. Waste is literal and literary” (8). It is that
same categorical fluidity of waste that Boscagli emphasizes while observing that: “[g]arbage,
a full affront to ordered materiality, is stuff at its most uncertain, vulnerable, and wild” (227).
Just as waste matter continually threatens to burst out of its containers and sully, disarrange,
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or damage our systems of organization, the concept of waste spills out of our semantic
systems across our carefully arranged conventions, distinctions, and terminology.
Though waste ecologies are not relevant to the nineteenth century alone, they are particularly
worth analyzing in this context because of Victorians’ persistent preoccupation with and
investment in systems. Waste encompasses that which has no place within, and which gets
actively expelled from, systems, making it the ideal site for imagining profuse interrelations
free of order or systematization. The nineteenth century saw massive and coordinated efforts
toward systemization, from the slum clearances that preceded the Thames Embankment to
the forms, rituals, and microscopic documentation of its legal administration. Chadwick’s
sanitarian movement, Victorians’ profound distrust of contaminated imperial trade products,
and the geometric horticultural arrangements of the gardenesque all privileged hierarchical
organization. Victorians wanted to identify with, and be identified by, systems. Confronted
with waste, however—confronted with unsystematizable profusion—Victorians’ relationship
to systems became ambivalent. In Dickens’s Bleak House, Gridley’s compulsive repetition of
“the system” (251) levels a reproach to those systems that supersede, organize, and
effectively make waste of the individual. What was so troublesome about waste was that it
revealed the fault lines of Victorians’ carefully crafted systems. Waste revealed systems as
ecological in structure, and these disorienting structural conditions forced Victorians to
recognize the limitations of systematic organization more broadly.
This undesirable reckoning—this disorienting set of structural conditions enabled by waste—
is what I term waste ecologies and is of particular moment to our cultural analyses of the
Victorian period. Victorian studies have already begun adopting and adapting ecologies as a
conceptual model freed from a specific, natural implication. This year Devin Griffiths and
Deanna Kreisel edited a special issue of Victorian Literature and Culture on the topic of
“Open Ecologies.” With its nimble approach to permeable systems and assemblages, this
special issue comes closest to describing the chaotic, holistic, and infinite structural growth
that I discuss: “open ecology does not resurrect the benign unities of natural theological or
organic discourse; rather, it turns to those messy, contested, and often violent histories
through which cultural and natural systems continue to produce each other, those conflicted
formations Bruno Latour describes as ‘nature-cultures’” (6-7). New materialisms, ecocriticism, and Victorian new historicism have cross-pollinated in fruitful and productive
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ways—giving rise, for instance, to the Vcologies collective, which highlights the rich
methodologies that the environmental humanities can offer Victorian literary studies. Like
open ecologies, waste ecologies suggest an overwhelming possibility of coherence, of
subsuming new additions into their interrelations. Ecologies, as Morton suggests, also offer a
form of structural organization involving radical interrelation as opposed to ordered
hierarchies and classifications. Brought together, waste ecologies emerge as the productive
interrelations of waste.
Waste is a provokingly fluid, capricious term that encompasses equally elusive subcategories as dirt, debris, garbage, and decay. Waste’s potential for variety suggests its
dynamic structure as a concept—one that promises and threatens. As Boscagli observes,
there is a latent power to waste’s categorical nebulousness: “[g]arbage’s fluidity may be seen
as a threat to be contained, or as a force synonymous with the fluid enticements of
consumerism itself. Garbage is the most characteristic object-hoard of consumer culture, and
its outlaw underside. Thus it occupies a dangerous, potentially disruptive position” (228).12
Whether the discarded products of a twenty-first-century consumer culture, or the open
sewage behind the Great Stink, waste opens a space for new ecologies of meaning. As Allen
aptly observes, “[f]ilth signified urban disease in its widest sense—a failure of the urban
system” (15). Waste not only encompasses interrelations that are aesthetic, cultural,
economic, and biohazardous; it also foregrounds those material things that fall out of human
systems of classification and order. Waste ecologies upend human classifications, human
systems of value, and the centrality of the human subject. The fog in both Bleak House and
Our Mutual Friend is unpredictable and uncontainable, creeping unwanted into buildings
regardless of social and topographical boundaries, gaining in atmospheric density, and
creating a set of conditions that might disguise or blind passersby to all manner of evils. This
fog-waste is set apart by its freedom from the usual constraints of solid waste matter like dust
and debris; it spreads freely across neighborhoods and districts, permeates indoor and
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Here, Boscagli positions garbage as the necessary other to those still-desirable commodities, which have not
yet lost their novelty or perceived value. Although Boscagli is chiefly concerned with waste in the context of
twenty-first century consumer culture, her conception of waste as a radical, de-structuring agent has been
central to my own approach to wastes and waste ecologies in Victorian literature.
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outdoor spaces, and clogs the pores and lungs of the city’s inhabitants. Waste ecologies, as a
focus for reading, highlights the strange structural conditions through which this occurs.
Waste may be an anthropocentric term—implying excess, or the lack of utility relative to
humans. However, by examining how human will and agency recede within waste ecologies,
this dissertation embraces waste as an opportunity to challenge that very anthropocentrism.
The waste ecologies in my first chapter feature dust, for instance, due to its intrusive,
imposing, and insistently present quality. Contrary to the productive potential implicit in
systems of energy, ecologies of waste scatter and transform the discarded remnants of
production. Waste, moreover, is visible specifically because it denies any possibility of
equilibrium; it is an open system, continually accruing more material at a rate too fast for
either decomposition or recycling to compete. The animacy (to use Chen’s term) of these
waste ecologies forms the foundation for a complex struggle between humans and material
things. Throughout my chapters, waste transgresses the narrow categorical controls that
humans have attempted to maintain: product and waste, human agent and inanimate object.
The urbanization of London grew organically and in countless fragmented developments; the
sewage system had to accommodate and to adhere to that ecology, which is why it continues
to resemble that visual organicism. Chapter 1 examines two literal examples of waste
ecologies in Dickens’s Our Mutual Friend—the Harmon dust-heaps and the Thames, and the
strange material entanglements that surround them. These two massive ecologies of waste—
of dust and debris, of sewage and corpses—form the centre of a complex struggle for agency
between the living and the nonliving. The human characters of the novel exist at the mercy of
one or both of these waste ecologies. Silas Wegg oscillates between an anxiety to keep the
bone of his amputated leg out of Venus’s miscellaneous wares, and his desire to dig up
valuable documents in the Harmon dust-heaps. Gathered into immense quantities that
threaten and overwhelm the human characters by turn, these two major waste ecologies
image a form of waste that routinely bleeds outward—that is uncontainable, that is
uncategorizable, and that has accrued its own potential for agency.
Where the waste ecologies of Our Mutual Friend involve more direct examples of waste and
ecologies, Chapter 2 takes up Bleak House for its depiction of three social systems that
function as waste ecologies: Krook’s rag-and-bottle shop, the High Court of Chancery in
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Lincoln’s Inn, and the crowded London slums called Tom-all-Alone’s. The novel presents all
three as loci of excessive accumulated material that in their rampant proliferation objectify,
devalue, and homogenize everything within. Krook’s body is vaporized by spontaneous
human combustion and covers everything in the shop with his greasy remains, as if
determined to become part of his own wares. The Court of Chancery does not exist for legal
adjudication so much as for the relentless, cancerous proliferation of paper, much to the
detriment of the legal subjects that the Court is supposed to serve. In the collapsed buildings
of Tom-all-Alone’s, we witness the categorical collapse of wasted bodies, wasted buildings,
and waste water alongside the exponential proliferation of debris, new tenants, crevicesturned-lodgings, insect larvae, plant mould, and viruses. The same logic of material
accumulation prevails in all three spaces, devaluing all categories of matter indiscriminately;
accumulation decreases—rather than increases—value.
Bleak House is rich with possible examples of what Jane Bennett has termed “thing-power”
(20). For example, the indecipherable legal copies of the Jarndyce and Jarndyce suit gain
astonishing power over the novel’s human characters. Because these papers are so void of
human meaning, and so counter-productive to the judicial system that they are meant to
advance, they acquire what seems like a mesmeric influence over suitors like Richard
Carstone and the late Tom Jarndyce, with the result that both men are driven to their
respective forms of self-destruction. Even more relevant to the waste ecologies of this
dissertation is Chen’s Animacies, which focuses more particularly on the biopolitical power
dynamics couched within “the animateness or inanimateness of entities that are considered
either ‘live’ or ‘dead’” (10). By teasing apart the political ramifications of bodies represented
along varying degrees of physical liveliness and animation, Chen draws attention to the
“relationality and intersubjective exchange” that can exist between material entities beyond a
simple life-nonlife binary (11). Like Bennett, who considers the affects of inanimate,
inhuman material entities, Chen places pressure on biopolitical theory “to consider how
matter that is considered insensate, immobile, deathly, or otherwise ‘wrong’ animates
cultural life”—particularly “how the fragile division between animate and inanimate—that is,
beyond human and animal—is relentlessly produced and policed and maps important
political consequences of that distinction” (2). Both Chapters 1 and 2 focus on “insensate,”
“deathly,” and “wrong” matter—like the “spoiling influences” (172) of the Thames, or the
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“tainting sort of weather” that turns out to be Krook’s combusted remains (507). The novels’
characters repudiate both “wrong” matter and those who freely engage with such matter;
Pleasant Riderhood rejects Venus’s suit because he regards the living and nonliving equally,
in the same “bony light” (84).13
Chen’s theory in particular not only accounts for the material porousness that appears in both
of these Dickens novels; Animacies also paves the way for comprehending the complex
ecological structures behind the many instances of waste in the two texts. In a passing remark
on how readily animacies applies to ecological studies, Chen describes ecologies as “the
constant interabsorption of animate and inanimate bodies”—as “the physical nonintegrity of
individual bodies and the merging of forms of ‘life’ and ‘nonlife’” (11). Though a strikingly
different complex, as we shall see, Dickens’s Court of Chancery is more than an apparatus of
state power; it slips beyond the control of its human originators, functioning as a waste
ecology that radically reshapes the material relations of the people and things that it enfolds.
The culminating point of Animacies is that “animacy has the capacity to rewrite conditions of
intimacy, engendering different communalisms and revising biopolitical spheres, or, at least,
how we might theorize them” (3). This radical reordering applies particularly well to
Chapters 3 and 4, which as we shall see imagine strange material intimacies as an occult
nightmare, on the one hand, and as a botanical celebration of death on the other.
Dickens was not the only Victorian author to imbue his work with waste’s organic and
diffuse relations. The peculiar forms of waste ecologies that I am concerned with in this
project appear across disparate genres and forms of Victorian literature. In my first two
chapters I begin with two canonical texts; my latter two chapters then open up to texts that
offer increasingly complex literary realizations of waste ecologies. Chapter 3 is like Chapters
1 and 2 in its concern with waste ecologies as imaginative constructs that are chaotic, that are
intensely connected, and that in their interrelatedness are continuously accruing new
materials. Where it departs is in the type of waste ecology at its centre—the indigestible
ecologies of Le Fanu’s “Green Tea.” The waste ecology in “Green Tea” begins with
Jennings’s excessive consumption of green tea, develops in an irrevocable series of spectral
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In the 1865 first collected edition of Our Mutual Friend, “bony” is spelled “boney” (64; 1st ed.).
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events involving a monkey demon, and ends with Jennings’s suicide. The chapter argues not
only that spectres can be read as waste but that, as waste, spectres also form a shifting and
creative ecology. Le Fanu’s tale engages the indigestible food-waste ecologies involving the
contaminated tea panic, the counterfeit tea trade, and the mingled nationalism and
Orientalism orbiting a product of imperial trade that was both prized and held in suspicion.
The text further complicates this through an indigestible ecology of occult knowledge.
Ultimately, “Green Tea” depicts the human body’s spectral reaction when it is at the
intersection of competing ecologies. These ecologies and resonances coalesce in Jennings’s
body, which transforms into a crossroads of colonialism and of the occult that only ends with
his suicide—a final, desperate attempt to assert some control over these waste ecologies.
Jennings’s suicide is a bleak if strange example of how human agency in waste ecologies
necessarily takes the shape of death. In Bleak House, Richard Carstone’s release from the
Jarndyce and Jarndyce suit is timed with the culmination of his final illness, when his mouth
is too full of blood to address his outrage to the Court. These vivid scenes, however fictional,
remind us that the role of humans in waste ecologies is fulfilled in death. Chapter 4 takes a
final shift, then, toward the waste ecologies that get naturalized in the garden, the
horticultural designs that promote botanical self-sufficiency, and an aesthetic philosophy that
embraces the death of the human in the prose works of Victorian garden designer and
horticultural author Robinson.
Robinson was a leading figure in the development and popularization of the English cottage
garden aesthetic in the late-nineteenth century. Robinson’s horticultural books remain in print
today, and, in the subtitle of her 1982 biography of Robinson, Mea Allan refers to him as the
“Father of the English Flower Garden.” In spite of his charismatic prose style and enduring
horticultural influence, Robinson’s prose and journalism have received little attention from
Victorian literary scholars. I devote the fourth chapter of this dissertation to selections of
Robinson’s prose that develop his wild garden aesthetic and that offer the most vivid
instances of his idiosyncratic discussions of waste ecologies. Robinson’s books naturalize
biological waste in the garden and offer strategies for circulating and distributing that waste
to the benefit of the plant life and to the beauty of the garden landscape. As far as the
ecosystems of a given biosphere are concerned, there is no waste in the sense of the
valueless, the purposeless, or the unimportant. Only when the garden is given over to
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incompatible or competing ecologies does Robinson recognize waste. Robinson considers
abandoned sheds and cart-loads of horse manure to represent potential mushroom beds and
plant fertilizers, all while decrying horticultural wastefulness in forms as various as excessive
lawn-mowing, impractical ceramic tiling, expensive sub-tropical annuals, and geometric lines
and mathematic spacing between plants. Robinson’s work also expresses waste as the
lingering agency of the past. Old building ruins and mouldered walls beautify and
acclimatize alpine flowers from distant countries; meadows left un-mown naturalize hardy
flowers and recall the poetic beauty of Elizabethan mixed-border gardens; an urn cemetery is
the most beautiful flower garden. In short, I argue that Robinson’s horticultural aesthetic is a
waste ecology—one that defines economic, aesthetic, and ecological wastes upon the
premise that aestheticized botanical life is more valuable than an aestheticized human
experience.14 Human labour is a transitory necessity during the garden’s early arrangement,
and Chapter 4 takes up Robinson’s God’s Acre Beautiful (1880) and follows the logic of his
aesthetic to the inevitable conclusion that human life cannot truly join the garden ecology
except in death, or as decay. In his plans to use the urn-cemetery as a flower garden,
Robinson envisions effectively a way in which human remains cease to be “waste” or to be
wasted by joining the garden-cemetery ecology.
Ultimately, this dissertation examines Victorians’ engagement with the waste that slips from
systems conceived of as controlled, comprehensive, and beautifully ordered, but which, in
their realization, revealed themselves to be complex, unruly ecologies. The texts that I
explore in these chapters all express a simultaneous longing for and disenchantment with
systems—whether social, legal, digestive, colonial, waste disposal, or horticultural—that
cannot repress their organicism. Though they arrive at different conclusions, these works
consider the structural fault lines of Victorian systems as they are revealed in waste. Texts
like Bleak House and God’s Acre Beautiful engage, foreground, and even embrace the waste
that has yet to be or resists being incorporated within a variety of Victorian systems. Waste
ecologies concern those things that—however much we may deem them waste or wasteful—

14

Though the subject matter of Robinson’s work includes ecologies in nature, the waste ecologies that I
observe in his horticultural designs are still ecologies in Morton’s sense—i.e., are not ecologies within nature.
Rather, I suggest that Morton’s waste ecologies are ecologies of cultivation and redistribution.
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become enfolded into and can even reorder complex ecologies. The Thames appears in Our
Mutual Friend as a massive repository of debris, sewage, and drowned bodies that courses
through Victorian London with eco-poetic intensity, organizing and disorganizing material
relations in its wake. A similar structural disorganization appears in Bleak House’s depiction
of the Court of Chancery, which, with its over-structured and overdeveloped administrative
branches, thoroughly undermines all purposes other than its own endless growth. Reverend
Jennings’s own body becomes the site of indigestible ecologies in “Green Tea,” which links
his physiological and spiritual torment to both his tea-drinking and colonial cosmopolitanism.
Finally, Robinson champions a vision of garden design that embraces waste. For Robinson,
the ideal wild or cottage garden should promote the self-sufficiency of its plants such that the
garden could survive and flourish even after a ten years’ absence of the gardener. His
horticultural designs anticipate the inevitable de-structuring of gardens for which the only
impetus is further growth. The primary texts examined in this dissertation all suggest a
profound fascination with and, perhaps, awe of emergent and complex structures over
simpler, forced, artificial human structures. Dickens’s Thames, dust-heaps, pawn shops, and
legal papers are formidable entities. Le Fanu’s short story follows the transformation of a
scholar’s nightmarish immersion within competing indigestible ecologies. Where Robinson’s
vision of a wild garden ecology is characterized by a complex structure, the two aesthetics
against which he defines that vision—the gardenesque and the architectural garden—speak to
a tendency toward simplifying and structuring the garden. Taken together, the four chapters
of this dissertation suggest that a literary analysis of Victorian waste ecologies is as elusive
and as ungovernable as the ecologies themselves.
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Chapter 1

1

Heaps and Flows: Agentic Wastes in Our Mutual Friend

Debris, refuse, dirt, fog—all manner of waste—are rarely allowed to pass from our
attention in Dickens’s Our Mutual Friend. Their presence, certainly, is central to the
affect of the novel as a whole but they do not appear solely as set-dressing. Rather, the
most notable instances of the novel’s waste centre on scrupulous and strategic acts of
repurposing waste, ones that in turn affect characters’ agency and quality of life. At the
heart of the plot sit the Harmon dust-heaps, which generate the pernicious wealth that
endangers or corrupts its beneficiaries. These dust-heaps are valuable as a trove of
potential recyclables—even more so than for the treasures or numerous wills buried
therein. Similarly, the Thames’s slow progress through the city carries with it a vast bulk
of refuse, debris, and abject material. Attending on this recurring tidal flow is a small
population dealing in repurposed waste. Fanny Cleaver (or Jenny Wren) buys scrap
materials or the “damage and waste of Pubsey and Co.” for her dolls’ dressmaking work
(717). Others take waste repurposing to an extreme, finding value in corpses fished from
the Thames or in amputated limbs purchased in bulk from hospital porters. Whether a
background detail or the centre of a character’s livelihood, the novel’s vast catalogue of
urban waste products is gradually revealed to have a fundamental relation to the existence
and identities of the novel’s population of disparate characters.
Although waste is a result of human manufacture and industry, its presence in Our
Mutual Friend resists and thwarts anthropocentric control at every turn. Necessarily,
waste is matter that falls outside of our general categories and systems of utility. Its
problematic build-up, its nuisance existence, then, are not in and of themselves surprising
in an 1860s urban novel; rather, waste achieves a currency in the novel precisely in the
force of its ability to resist human ambition and in the agency it demonstrates when
threatening the identities of those human characters that must interact with its massive
presence. Even when waste appears passive, to serve only an atmospheric function, it
nonetheless inconveniences and unsettles the city’s inhabitants. Fog does not merely
obscure or muffle; it penetrates urban structures as a “burglarious stream of fog creeping
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in to strangle it [the sobbing gaslight] through the keyhole of the main door” (420). In
King’s Cross, giant mounds of dust, formerly owned by the late Harmon Sr. and
bequeathed to Mr. and Mrs. Boffin, are consistently sifted and worked over by a team of
dustmen. These heaps of debris are the defining feature of the Harmon estate; as Mr.
Boffin remarks, the grounds would “look but a poor dead flat without the Mounds” (185).
Made up of “[c]oal-dust, vegetable-dust, bone-dust, crockery-dust, rough dust, and sifted
dust—all manner of Dust” (13), the dust-heaps have substantial financial value because
they can be either sifted for recyclables or sold as fertilizer. The Thames, made swampy
and treacherous by its cargo of debris, silt, and sewage, is more mercurial, marking less
politely the convenient catch-all category of waste or “dust”. Indeed, the Thames is
featured as the convenient repository for the unwanted (sewage, waste, and refuse), a
hiding spot for the incriminating (George Radfoot’s body, Bradley Headstone’s
bargeman disguise), a dangerous trap for the near-dead (John Harmon, Roger Riderhood,
Eugene Wrayburn), and a resting place for the dead (Radfoot, Gaffer Hexam, Headstone,
Riderhood). In both spaces, the dust heaps and the river, waste retains a certain priority
over the landscape and the human characters of the novel in ways that suggest rich
ecologies of material relations.
This chapter explores the ways in which Our Mutual Friend invests a certain activity,
animation, and agency in waste. As massive quantities of waste that threaten and
overwhelm the human characters by turn, the Harmon dust-heaps and the Thames form
waste ecologies that resist human categories of meaning: both are repositories of waste,
and yet they house valuable resources; they inspire both indifference and reverence; they
facilitate human endeavour, and yet compromise—sometimes fatally—the same. The
Harmon dust-heaps exhibit a limitless capacity to involve, reorient, and incorporate. This
“geological formation” of dust provides ample work for dustmen because it demands
sifting, classification, and a breaking up of its ecological structure (13). The river is
suffused with a particularly menacing animacy. When the search party rows toward
Gaffer’s abandoned boat, everything in view seems “to be there with a fell intention”
(171). The fell intentions are the river’s threats to recategorize human life, to transform
living characters into nonliving corpses. Waste ecologies are ecosystems of
interdependent material entities. Humans may contribute material to these waste
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ecologies whether domestic, industrial, or bodily, and even adapt to those ecologies by
gathering and repurposing what waste materials they can, but the ecologies are the
aggregate of so many moving and unmoving materials that they cannot be reduced or
subordinated to the concerns of any one participant.
The animacy of these waste ecologies forms the foundation for a complex material and
biopolitical struggle between humans and material things. Jane Bennett wonders in
passing what would happen to us as consumers if we shifted our view of waste from
“litter, rubbish, trash, or ‘the recycling’” to “an accumulating pile of lively and
potentially dangerous matter?” (viii). This chapter takes these scholars, not to mention
Dickens, at their word. To read the waste of Our Mutual Friend for its agentive character
is to argue that a deep-seated fear of waste lay at the centre of the mid-Victorian urban
experience. Waste appears in Our Mutual Friend as animate, agentive,15 vibrant things.
There is an active, lifelike animation, for instance, to the narrator’s description of the
sawdust scattered in the streets, which “hangs on every bush, flutters in every tree, is
caught flying by the electric wires, haunts every enclosure, drinks at every pump, cowers
at every grating, shudders upon every plot of grass, seeks rest in vain behind the legions
of iron rails” (144). Like Bennett’s thing-power, the various and thing-like permutations
of waste in Dickens’s novel operate in excess of human meaning, arrangement, or will.
Like the object that looks back, inanimate things in this novel are frequently presented as
agents on par with human characters. A power struggle emerges between humans and
waste—a materialist struggle over the integrity or non-integrity of living and nonliving
bodies—in which waste is shown, ultimately, to have the upper hand. Sawdust is
“blinding and choking” (144); the “burglarious stream of fog creeping in to strangle [the
sobbing gaslight] through the keyhole of the main door” (420). This agency of
Dickensian waste resembles Mel Chen’s description of ecologies, which involve “the
constant interabsorption of animate and inanimate bodies,” “the physical nonintegrity of
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Throughout this chapter, I use the terms “agentive,” “agent,” and “agency” to evoke the notion of
animacy debated within linguistics, which Chen traces back to Michael Silverstein’s famous notion of
“animacy hierarchies” and describes as “a conceptual order of things, an animate hierarchy of possible
acts” (Chen 3).
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individual bodies[,] and the merging forms of ‘life’ and ‘nonlife’” (11). In Our Mutual
Friend, I tease out this “physical nonintegrity” between the human characters and various
objects, waste, or nonlife forms in the novel. New and old gentry live the life of leased
furniture: Twemlow is “an innocent piece of dinner-furniture that [goes] upon easy
castors and [is] kept over a livery stable-yard in Duke Street, Saint James’s, when not in
use” (6); the “bran-new” Veneerings live, like their furniture, their plate, and their
carriage, “in a state of high varnish and polish. And what was observable in the furniture,
was observable in the Veneerings—the surface smelt a little too much of the workshop
and was a trifle sticky” (6). Amputated limbs and skeletons assembled from a miscellany
of human bones are interchangeable with living human subjects; riverside scavengers are,
themselves, scavenged. This movement between animate and inanimate bodies, or tension
between living and nonliving forms, describes the power—biological or otherwise—that
waste exhibits in Our Mutual Friend.
Waste comes to accrue new meaning as we begin to consider the novel as a fictive power
struggle between the living and nonliving. Gathered into waste ecologies like the dustheaps or the Thames, this animacy becomes more apparent. The emerging field of waste
studies encompasses methodologies such as mine that combine a new-materialismsinformed attention to complex material relations with the approaches and broader
interests of ecocriticism. Gay Hawkins’s Ethics of Waste is still influential for its analysis
of our culturally mediated material relations to waste and “the mutual constitution of
human subjects and inanimate wasted objects” (2-3). In 2008, Patricia Yaeger proposed a
theory of “rubbish ecology” that carries forward a conservationist impulse into garbage,
and which she defines “as the act of saving and savouring debris” (329). Heather
Sullivan’s dirt theory considers the mobile and unmanageable processes of dirt and its
entanglements with “small-scale ecological processes that are themselves integrated into
larger niches of other assemblages” (516). More recently, Susan Morrison’s The
Literature of Waste threads together a massive array of material ecocriticism, critical
theories of waste, and examples across the entire western literary canon, developing a
kind of waste literacy. In threading together these powerful biopolitical discourses, we
may come to consider the ways in which Our Mutual Friend collapses the foregroundbackground distinction between humans and waste, emphasizing instead the intimate
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material relations of a world that stretches and reorients the animate hierarchy, that
imagines Victorian London as a space for inanimate agents and human objects. Dickens’s
work presents a unique opportunity to reimagine these relations. This chapter takes steps
in this direction by discussing Dickens’s imagining of urban waste ecologies that trouble
the biopolitical boundaries of life over nonlife. In this way, waste ecologies become a
means of reimagining the social and anthropocentric systems of Dickens’s novels for
their materialist and ecocritical significance. From here we will consider what I have
been referring to as the two waste ecologies of Our Mutual Friend, with an eye to
weighing the waste-human power dynamic latent in each.

1.1
Dickens characterizes Victorian London as a city with two distinct halves—one animate
and the other inanimate:
It was a foggy day in London, and the fog was heavy and
dark. Animate London, with smarting eyes and irritated
lungs, was blinking, wheezing, and choking; inanimate
London was a sooty spectre, divided in purpose between
being visible and invisible, and so being wholly neither.
(420)
Arranged in a subject-object binary relation, these two halves of the city sit in uneasy
relation with a clear imbalance of power between them. “Animate London” refers to the
human subjects of the city “blinking, wheezing, and choking” in the city smog, while
“inanimate London” encompasses the objects, or the goods, architecture, and landscape
of the city. Animate London has fallen ill in this “heavy and dark” climate, and can
neither see, smell, nor breathe properly; as a representation of subjecthood, animate
London’s only exercise of its privileges is to be weary, weather-beaten, and physically ill.
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The very animation of Animate London appears reduced, its capacity and agency
minimized to exhausted reaction.16
Meanwhile, Inanimate London steals into the eyes and lungs, infecting and elusive.
Inanimate London, “a sooty spectre,” haunts the animate like an abject, unknowable, and
yet omnipresent twin whose thing-like intractability provokes the city’s actions and
reactions. Inanimate London remains indistinct, seeming to refer to the streets, buildings,
material of the city, and above all to their common characteristic – a spectral dirtiness.
This filth, this dust, is the aggregate mass of interrelated waste matter spread throughout
the city, inconveniencing and disrupting Animate London. Inanimate London stands as
an ecology of waste in the novel, developing animacy through overwhelming amounts of
circulating matter, which, having hit a critical mass, far exceeds the control and
comprehension of the city’s population. Overwhelming in spatial and temporal scale,
waste ecologies reorient and restructure the living and nonliving entities that come into
contact with them.
The image of the two Londons, distinct and yet mutually constitutive, is a distilled
metaphor for the ambiguous relationship between human and nonhuman entities—a
relationship explored at some length in the branch of criticism that Serenella Iovino and
Serpil Oppermann call material ecocriticism, and which includes Timothy Morton’s
hyperobjects. The ecologies of waste in Our Mutual Friend similarly rest on the
foundational premise that humans are part of but by no means dominant in a broader
ecology of material entities, living and nonliving. By adapting material ecocritical
methodologies to Victorian representations of waste, we can begin to generate more
complex interpretations of the material relations latent in nineteenth-century literature.
Critics often read the waste in Our Mutual Friend by focusing on the economic impact of
Victorian practices of recycling, and for good reason. Catherine Gallagher makes a
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Peter Schwenger observes a fascinating paradox in Merleau-Ponty’s argument that a subject is defined
by its sensory abilities, suggesting that “the things of this world are ultimately distant from us” and so the
subject’s reliance on those abilities in fact disqualifies it from subjecthood (Tears of Things, p. 3).

7

thorough case, for instance, for reading the novel as a bioeconomic system centred on the
commodification of its characters. Brian Maidment, in his monograph on the historical
and cultural development of dustmen, points to the journalism of Household Words and
All the Year Round as evidence of Victorians’ fascination with recycling. According to
Maidment, the journalism of both magazines reflected a “sustained interest in the
reclamation and transformation of waste, as well as in the precise scientific description
and analysis of dust . . . entirely characteristic of the mid-Victorian period” (185–86).
Part of this sustained interest was the way in which Victorian social reformers linked
recycling to an ideal of the city as a utopia of modern efficiency and sanitation.
Cleanliness was not only a signifier of modernity, and of freedom from disease, but it
also became a form of social capital—a distinction from working classes who were still
required to repurpose and consequently work closely with human waste. A number of
critics link Dickens’s known interest in urban sanitation, as well as his depictions of
urban squalor, to Mayhew, who detailed the living conditions of the working classes and
the poor most notably in London Labour, was particularly invested in recycling as crucial
to his vision of a modern, efficient London. Sicher cautions against an unqualified
collapse of the two authors’ approach to waste and sanitation, observing that “Mayhew
had an ethnographic, as well as commercial, interest in showing the usefulness of
London’s ‘wild tribes,’ its street and river people, while Dickens was concerned with a
larger discourse about the decay of the city, which hinged on the literal as well as
metaphorical recycling of waste” (“Reanimation” 38). Sabine Schülting’s view of the
utilitarian thrust to Mayhew’s economy of recycling supports Sicher’s call for a greater
distinction between Mayhew’s and Dickens’s relation to waste. For Schülting, Mayhew’s
ideal city is one purged of waste: “On the streets or in the river, refuse, excrement, and
dust are ‘matter in the wrong place’ and, thus . . . synonymous with loss and waste, as it
is opposed to a providential economy of nature that is circular” (25). Where Mayhew
treats waste as abject and seeks instead what Schülting calls a “(textual) purification of
London” (25), Dickens’s prose bears a more complex orientation to waste. For Sicher,
Dickensian waste offers the possibility of rejuvenation, even redemption. Sicher argues
that this possibility manifests in Our Mutual Friend as a parallel renewal—the literal
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renewal that is the recycled dust-heaps, to the corresponding spiritual renewal in
characters like Bella Wilfer and Eugene Wrayburn.
The academic focus on literary practices of recycling is unsurprising considering its
historical and cultural significance throughout the Victorian period. Victorian texts, as
well as our cultural and academic memory of the period, frequently highlight momentous
sanitary reforms such as the embankment of the Thames, the London clearance schemes
and forced migration of the poor, and the clean water and sewage advocacy spearheaded
by Edwin Chadwick. In continuing to read strictly for recycling, however, we risk
oversimplifying the complexity of Victorians’ relationship with waste. Firstly, the
Victorian sanitary reforms were far from being universally welcome; Michelle Allen
urges us to consider the diverse responses among the Victorian middle-classes to the
impacts of such reforms, and to question scholars’ “widely held belief in the
unquestioned efficacy and desirability of sanitary reforms” (7). Indeed, Allen implicitly
highlights the Victorian logic that paralleled the urban poor and waste, noting that the
central London clearances beginning in the 1840s were largely seen as acts of Mayhewesque purification—rhetoric that conflates the unemployed with the unrecyclable.17
Secondly, recycling is a fundamentally anthropocentric practice; it describes a cycle in
which materials are reintegrated into a capitalist system of exchange in order to profit
those selling a product either that is already produced or that requires little to no
production cost. By Mayhew’s logic, “matter” only becomes “waste” when it moves
beyond the strict parameters of a closed circuit of recycling—when it no longer serves an
anthropocentric function by benefitting human economic systems. The demands of
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Allen, describing four articles in All the Year Round on the demolition of poor neighbourhoods in
London that were justified on grounds of sanitation and the need for railway construction, writes:
“Clearances of this sort had convulsed central London since the 1840s and were closely associated with
sanitary reform because they destroyed and thus ‘purified’ some of the most densely built, most densely
populated, and dirtiest areas of the city” (3). Allen further sums up the contentious notion that the sewage
system was for Victorians: “for some, the sewer seemed to jeopardize individual and local autonomy
because it took waste removal out of the hands of householders and parishes and invested it in a newly
consolidated drainage authority; for others, the sewer posed a threat to the ideals of domestic privacy and
enclosure because it connected the home to a vast drainage system; and for others still, the sewer seemed to
weaken the spatial and social barriers separating the healthy bourgeoisie from a corrupt working class”
(25).
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ecocriticism urge contemporary scholars beyond the anthropocentric limits of recycling,
which risks obscuring the nuance of texts like Our Mutual Friend that are surprisingly
ambivalent regarding the exact relations of humans and waste. We miss the full
strangeness of waste in certain Victorian texts, in other words, in our reuse of recycling
as a critical methodology.

1.2
When Mortimer Lightwood first introduces the dust-heaps that sit at the centre of Our
Mutual Friend, he presents their scale as a tectonic shift of the landscape. Lightwood
describes the late owner, Mr. Harmon Sr., who “‘lived in a hollow in a hilly country
entirely composed of Dust. On his own small estate the growling old vagabond threw up
his own mountain range, like an old volcano, and its geological formation was Dust.
Coal-dust, vegetable-dust, bone-dust, crockery-dust, rough dust, and sifted dust—all
manner of Dust’” (13). Even at this early stage, Lightwood’s language casts the Harmon
dust-heaps as an ecosystem—a mountain range with its own unique and interdependent
climate and inhabitants. The repeated images of monumental terrain—“mountain range,”
“old volcano,” “geological formation”—moreover suggests that this ecosystem operates
outside the anthropocentric scale, on geological time. Lightwood’s catalogue of the
materials that comprise the dust-heaps covers the gamut of mineral, vegetable, and
animal—“Coal-dust, vegetable-dust, bone-dust”—and the association of these varied
forms under the term “Dust” gives an early indication of waste’s capacity to involve and
incorporate.
There are contradictory forces encapsulated in the various forms of dust in Our Mutual
Friend. Victorian dust inhabited a unique position both as the untidy debris of urban
living and as a recyclable (and potentially profitable) resource. As Brian Maidment
observes, Dickens oversaw many journalistic pieces in Household Words and All the
Year Round that reflected this paradoxical character of dust. Dust profits us and imposes
upon us, sometimes even “blinding [us] and choking [us]” (144). Dust carves out its own
spaces in an already dense cityscape, and yet the repurposing of dust by humans is a
central conceit of the novel, posing a dilemma to the Victorian social systems that would
have dust occupying conflicting categories of value. Maidment sums up the baffling
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nature of this dilemma when he observes that Mr Boffin “remains the single most
powerfully imagined exposition of the complex interdependence between dust, wealth,
happiness, contamination, and redemption” (10).
The difficulty in reconciling these competing categorizations comes of dust operating on
the level of things, of vital quasi-agents. The persistent, intrusiveness of dust, coupled
with its elusive generality, recalls Bill Brown’s remark in his seminal essay, “Thing
Theory,” on the strange incomprehensibility of things: “On the one hand, then, the thing
baldly encountered. On the other, some thing not quite apprehended” (5). As with things,
dust asserts its presence suddenly and inconveniently, while, as a category, dust also
encompasses such a variable range of materials that it may constitute everything or
nothing and remains “some thing not quite apprehended.”18 Jane Bennett furthers this
approach in Vibrant Matter, in which she argues for the agentive vitality of nonliving and
inorganic matter and for the need “to present human and nonhuman actants on a less
vertical plane than is common” (ix). To this end, Bennett decisively “bracket[s] the
question of the human” and “elide[s] the rich and diverse literature on subjectivity and its
genesis, its conditions of possibility, and its boundaries” (ix). Chen, though allied to
Bennett’s interests in the subversive, affective potential of the nonliving and inorganic, is
less concerned with a strict focus on the nonhuman. Rooted in the contested notion of
animacy in linguistics, Chen uses animacy to “theorize current anxieties around the
production of humanness” and “rewrite conditions of intimacy”—i.e., the politicized,
racialized, and queered relations—among entities sorted into “stubborn binary systems of
difference, including dynamism/stasis, life/death, subject/object, speech/nonspeech,
human/animal, natural body/cyborg” (3). This chapter takes cues from Chen’s
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In the same article, Brown writes that “the story of objects asserting themselves as things, then, is the
story of a changed relation to the human subject and thus the story of how the thing really names less an
object than a particular subject-object relation” (4). Although this observation remains couched in terms of
a subject-object binary—the limits of which many new materialist thinkers, including Brown himself, have
long since recognized—his work nevertheless operates upon an attention to the richness of the material
relations between living and nonliving entities. Brown, in his later reflections upon and revisions of thing
theory, adjusts his defense of the “perennially demonized subject-object distinction” by conceding that
these relations should be assumed to be unstable categories (Other Things 20).
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methodology—in its revision of the fraught relations between human and nonhuman,
organic and inorganic, living and nonliving—in order to rethink the relations between the
human characters of Our Mutual Friend and waste, between gold and garbage, between
dust-heaps and ecology. Only when we consider dust in light of its animacy do we open
ourselves up to the full structural strangeness of dust in Our Mutual Friend.
The novel’s dust is assertively omnipresent. Every day on his way home from work,
Reginald Wilfer passes the Harmon dust-heaps, “a tract of suburban Sahara, where tiles
and bricks were burnt, bones were boiled, carpets were beat, rubbish was shot, dogs were
fought, and dust was heaped by contractors” (33). Dust intrudes upon our notice
throughout the novel’s spaces—not merely at the dust-heaps, where it is most
concentrated. The recyclable sawdust that is continually blown out of the sawpit near the
Thames is uncooperative at best and combative at worst, and omnipresent:
The grating wind sawed rather than blew; and as it sawed,
the sawdust whirled about the sawpit. Every street was a
sawpit, and there were no top-sawyers; every passenger was
an under-sawyer, with the sawdust blinding him and
choking him.
That mysterious paper currency which circulates in London
when the wind blows, gyrated here and there and
everywhere. Whence can it come, whither can it go? It
hangs on every bush, flutters in every tree, is caught flying
by the electric wires, haunts every enclosure, drinks at
every pump, cowers at every grating, shudders upon every
plot of grass, seeks rest in vain behind the legions of iron
rails. (144)
The sawdust is uncontainable and transformative, levelling all characters, in spite of
class, and all spaces to the condition of labourers and labouring sites. It gets “gyrated
here and there and everywhere,” and yet “hangs on,” gaining momentum and purpose as
the list of verbs approaches agency of movement—from the more passive “hangs,”
“flutters,” and “caught,” to “haunts,” “drinks,” “cowers,” “shudders,” and “seeks rest.”
As if imbued with the privileges of life, this non-life substance, though the discarded
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remains of industry and production, lays claim to the streets of London and disrupts the
lives of the characters that attempt to pass through them.
Dust in the novel exists in excess of human life or interest, at times cooperating with
human characters and at times overwhelming them. Nicodemus Boffin—alternately
called “The Golden Dustman,” “Dustman,” and “our dusty friend”—is, as a product of
his livelihood, “a pretty fair scholar in dust,” and has so profited by it that he is addressed
primarily by names that reinstate his relation to dust (134, 501, 656, 185). Boffin’s
identity, vocation, and domestic life all centre upon waste. Indeed, the absence of dust is
stranger in this world than its presence; when the Boffins first enter the Bower, their new
home, the lack of dust on the floor is linked with the house being “not sufficiently
imbued with life” (183). Dust, then, may be a potent equalizer of people and spaces or an
indicator of comfortable domesticity; it may exist on a geological scale or be collected,
sifted, and profitably repurposed. The inability of any one of these categories to describe
Dickensian dust marks its alien materiality and implies an easily missed animacy. This
categorical ambivalence is bolstered by dust’s persistent and inconvenient presence
throughout the city, which challenges any notions we might entertain of waste’s
passivity. When Chen teases out the mutually constitutive relations between humans and
nonhumans in Animacies, her primary concern is in reframing “the precise conditions of
the application of ‘life’ and ‘death,’ the working ontologies and hierarchicalized bodies
of interest” (1). The dust of Our Mutual Friend has no less agency and shows no less
animation for being “matter that is considered insensate, immobile, deathly, or otherwise
‘wrong’” (Chen 2). The novel’s characters are continually handling, covered in, choking
on, or brushing off dust in some form or other, and yet dust continues to cling to people,
places, and things with dogged tenacity. “A grey dusty withered evening in London city
has not a hopeful aspect,” particularly “when the City grit gets into the hair and eyes and
skin, and when the fallen leaves of the few unhappy City trees grind down in corners
under wheels of wind” (393). The proliferation of dust is insistent, demands notice.
Though omnipresent throughout Dickensian London, dust has been amassed in
mountainous quantities on the Harmon estate, providing a concentrated example of a
waste ecology. This concentration is artificial, being established by the labourers who
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have gathered and transported all of the dust on the estate, but is still linked to the
proliferation of dust, which is a necessary condition for its being gathered, sifted, and
sold. In discussing the dust-heaps as a waste ecology, this does not exclude the dust
beyond the Harmon estate and scattered throughout the city; yet, as a concentrated
accumulation of dust in one specific environment, the Harmon dust-heaps do stand as a
ready glimpse of a broader ecology of urban dust. Harmon’s is its own institution, wellknown by its nickname “Harmony Jail” under the former owner, and remains an
institution after the estate is conferred upon the Boffins, who rechristen the place
“Boffin’s Bower” (53). The residents of “the Bower district” identify the Boffins by their
legacy of dust, cheering whenever the couple come and go from the Bower “such
congratulations as ‘Nod-dy Bof-fin!’ ‘Bof-fin’s mon-ey!’ ‘Down with the Dust, Bof-fin!’
and other similar compliments” (103, 102). The broken syllables of these liberal
laudations suggest the fragmented identity that is part of Boffin’s inheritance—money,
the potential for a miserly corruption, and a dust-riddled title. And though Boffin turns
out to be proof against the miserliness of his benefactor, his role in the scheme to reform
Bella requires him to engage in play-acting for the first time. There is a sense, in other
words, that Boffin’s new association with the dust-heaps has fragmented his once
cohesive and uncomplicated social identity into multiple and conflicting personas,
however superficially or harmlessly.
Before detailing further the dust-heaps’ fragmentation of the characters’ identities, some
summary is due of the parameters of the Harmon legacy. The late Harmon Sr., made rich,
miserly, and vindictive by his success as a dust trader, leaves behind a will in which he
bequeaths the majority of his estate to his son, John, on condition that he marry a specific
woman of his father’s choice. That woman, Bella Wilfer, whom Harmon Sr. only saw
when she was a fastidious, tantrum-prone child, is evidently chosen as a double
punishment for his son—as a trap to bind his son into an unhappy as well as a mercenary
marriage. The same will bequeaths the entire estate to the honest, hard-working labourers
Mr. and Mrs. Boffin, should John decline the terms of his inheritance. The events of the
novel begin when John Harmon, en route to London to claim this inheritance, is believed
drowned—that is, a body is found in the river with papers identifying him as John
Harmon. The true John Harmon, drugged, impersonated, and almost murdered by a sailor
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named George Radfoot, narrowly escapes and his would-be impersonator is murdered
instead. John Harmon, meanwhile, lives under an assumed name, works as secretary to
the Boffins, and falls in love with Bella Wilfer. The Harmon will around which this
labyrinthine plot revolves, it turns out, is one of “many wills made by [John’s] unhappy
and self-tormenting father” (787). Another will, discovered by Wegg, bequeaths the
entire estate to the Crown. The final will, revealed by the end of the novel, reviles John
and his sister by name and bequeaths the whole estate unconditionally upon the Boffins.
Boffin, discovering that John is still living, produces and has legally instated the final
Harmon will but only on the condition that John accepts his rightful inheritance and
accepts the majority of the estate as a gift.
The story of the Harmon legacy is a story of fragmented identities. In writing and burying
several wills, Harmon Sr.’s legal agency19 is shattered into fragments and archived in the
dust-heaps. In burying his wills in dust, Harmon Sr. effectively entrusts his legacy to the
dust, forcing his heirs to interact with it if they are to reclaim their rightful identities. If
his daughter, John’s sister, is to claim her dues as a member of the Harmon family, she
must trade her current identity for one dominated by dust. His son, John, has his identity
held hostage by the dust-heaps in a stronger sense, having to go so far as to abandon his
name until he is finally willing to engage with the dust-heaps and his father’s legacy.
For the Harmon family, engaging with the dust-heaps requires exposing their identities to
the mercies of dust. We see this early in the novel when Mortimer Lightwood, lawyer to
the Harmon estate, first introduces the history of the Harmon estate at a dinner party. The
language that Lightwood uses to relate how Harmon Sr. cast off his daughter is telling of
the powerful influence of the dust-heaps. Miss Harmon refused her father’s plans for her
marriage—an arrangement that, in Lightwood’s words, “would make Dust of her heart
and Dust of her life—in short, would set her up, on a very extensive scale, in her father’s
business” (14). The ubiquitous power of the dust-heaps is immediately established by this
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Also, as Venus remarks, Harmon Sr.’s remains have been buried in the mounds; what is left of his
physical identity is also entrusted to the dust.
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rhetorical slippage into waste metaphors; dust not only gets physically scattered across
the city, but also seeps into the language and conversation of those directly or indirectly
concerned with it. “Dust,” capitalized as if a proper noun, is evocative enough that
Lightwood need not explicitly state his meaning that the marriage would break her heart
and bring misery to her life. Moreover, Lightwood’s remark illustrates the privileged
position that dust occupies over humans within the Harmon estate. The arranged
marriage, he facetiously suggests, was intended not for the growth of the Harmon family
but for the propagation of more Dust. The business of making dust of one’s heart and life
is the business of orienting every aspect of one’s life to dust, of surrendering one’s will to
dust. Harmon Sr.’s multiple wills are one of several ways in which the novel buries
human will within dust. Human will—whether agency or identities—waxes and wanes
within waste ecologies.
Lightwood’s remark speaks, ultimately, to the profound extent to which anyone who
enters into a relationship with waste risks having their identity fundamentally altered by
that association. Entering into a relationship with dust does not merely extend to shaping
the language of the text; dust splits, fragments, and reforms the characters’ identities.
Harmon Sr., a successful capitalist who profited enormously in trading dust, becomes a
miser who hoards his wealth—becomes, effectively, the exact opposite of a capitalist in
his obstruction of the economic circulation of goods and wealth. The waste that he
collects effectively goes to waste. Furthermore, each succession of Harmon Sr.’s many
wills negates the others, making wastepaper or trash of his own legacy. The multiple
wills can be seen to be miniature waste ecologies; in their multitude, they lose any value
for humans, while also attaining a certain animacy and currency of their own as a
destabilizing force in the novel.
Where the Harmons and their associates live in awe of the threats that the Harmon dust
ecology poses to their social identities, Silas Wegg is one character who actively seeks to
protect his physical identity—that is, his bodily integrity. Upon entering a relationship
with the dust-heaps, Wegg becomes a complex demonstration of the ways in which dust,
as a category of waste, expands to encompass all manner of matter. Having come into
better prospects, Wegg attempts to purchase his amputated leg bone from Mr. Venus,
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who had purchased the bone from a hospital porter that he might use it in a human
skeleton composite. Wegg explains his wish to reclaim his lost leg bone, saying, “I
shouldn’t like . . . under such circumstances, to be what I may call dispersed, a part of me
here, and a part of me there, but should wish to collect myself like a genteel person” (82).
This impulse to “collect” himself—to be the sole custodian of his fragmented body—
originates from Wegg’s new association with Boffin and the dust-heaps. It is only after
entering into “such circumstances” does the risk of becoming “dispersed” occur to Wegg.
Venus also confirms that bones have been found in the dust-heaps before.20 It is therefore
not surprising that Wegg takes this precaution of collecting himself; his access to the
mounds opens his body up to the risk of becoming physically part of the dust-heaps.
Wegg’s desire to collect himself makes real the metaphor of the permeability of bodies
and dust—makes a reality out of making “Dust” of one’s life. Wegg himself has been
recycled—his amputated leg was purchased, among a “warious lot” (82), by Venus, and
was set aside for the purpose of being articulated into a skeleton. Though Wegg finds the
means to purchase back his own leg—bringing up, meanwhile, the question of whether or
not Venus ever had a right to purchase it in the first place—this curious exchange reveals
the complexity of the matter of Wegg’s “dispersed” identity.
In the same conversation, both Wegg and Venus refer to the leg bone simply as Wegg
himself and not as a separate object or entity from his living body. Venus, who purchases
human bones in bulk before sorting and assembling them into “miscellaneous” (79)
skeletons, is annoyed by the uniqueness of Wegg’s leg bone, which prevents Venus from
using it as he wishes. Their peculiar conversation runs as follows:
“And how have I been going on, this long time, Mr.
Venus?”
“Very bad,” says Mr. Venus, uncompromisingly.
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“The old gentleman [Harmon Sr.] wanted to know the nature and worth of everything that was found in
the dust,” Venus tells Wegg, “and many’s the bone, and feather, and what not, that he’s brought to me”
(84).
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“What? Am I still at home?” asks Wegg, with an air of
surprise.
...
“I don’t know . . . to what to attribute it, Mr. Wegg. I can’t
work you into a miscellaneous one, nohow. Do what I will,
you can’t be got to fit. Anybody with a passable knowledge
would pick you out at a look, and say—‘No go! Don’t
match!’”
“Well, but hang it, Mr. Venus,” Wegg expostulates with
some little irritation, “that can’t be personal and peculiar in
me. It must often happen with miscellaneous ones.” (79)
Both in this dialogue and throughout their conversation, Wegg and Venus use personal
pronouns—“I,” “you,” “me”—rather than impersonal nouns or pronouns such as “the
leg,” “the bone,” “it,” and so forth. Wegg, who is bargaining for the lowest monetary
estimation of his leg, at first encourages Venus’s dissatisfaction with such comments as,
“Come! According to your own account, I’m not worth much” (82). However, Wegg
soon conflates Venus’s unsatisfactory assessment of his leg bone as a “personal and
peculiar” reflection of himself as a whole. He therefore takes it as a series of insults when
Venus says to him bluntly, “I never saw the likes of you,” “I wish I’d never bought you
of the Hospital Porter,” and “you might turn out valuable yet, as a— . . . as a Monstrosity,
if you’ll excuse me” (82).
The dispersal of Wegg’s identity is a more profound issue than it appears. Wegg himself
has been partially recycled into dust, and his desire to “collect” himself makes real the
metaphor of the permeability of bodies and dust—makes a reality of making Dust of
one’s life. By tacitly acknowledging the recyclable potential of his own body, Wegg
becomes a rare instance of non-anthropocentric recycling, or a form of recycling that
furthers the development of a waste ecology rather than a given capitalist economy.
Wegg’s identity is fragmented, in tension—extending at once to his living, animate body
that speaks, moves, and plots against the Boffins, as well as to the leg bone that Venus
purchased from a hospital porter as “one of a warious lot” (82). There is also the obvious
and deliberate pun that part of Wegg risks becoming literal trash while the moral
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character that forms the rest of his identity falls into figurative waste—a condition
exacerbated by his proximity to dust. “Dust,” as an omnivorous category of waste,
expands to include anything—it encompasses the dust on floor, industrial debris,
biodegraded vegetables, and human remains. This expandability comprises the most
threatening aspect of dust. Those who attempt to enforce binary categories upon this
material, those who are afraid of dust or garbage—the “outlaw underside” (Boscagli 228)
of commodity culture—and are determined to subdue it as an other, end up paradoxically
imbuing this other with a subtle biopower and end up acknowledging, in spite of
themselves, its animacy.
The Harmon dust-heaps reveal how waste ecologies demand a negotiation of the
boundaries of the human self. That self can be understood as bodily integrity (as in
Wegg’s case) or moral integrity (as in John Harmon’s and Boffin’s cases), and the dustheaps represent a threat to each. Wegg must assert his right to “collect” himself in order
to assert a boundary between his own body and the collectable bones and miscellanies
often found in the dust and repurposed as composite skeletons by Venus. Boffin pretends
to have been spoiled by his wealth in order to demonstrate the moral dangers of a life of
dust, and figuratively loses himself (if momentarily) in his adopted persona. In both
cases, the perceived dangers of the dust-heaps comes from a sense of the categorical and
ontological permeability between human and nonhuman entities. To “make Dust” of
one’s heart and life—to bind oneself to dust, to submit to an ecology of dust—is, in other
words, to put one’s selfhood at stake, and it is left to the individual characters themselves
to guard against the corrosion of their identities.

1.3
The novel’s purest expression of a massive waste ecology is the Thames, portrayals of
which many consider a staple of Dickens’s fiction. As Peter Ackroyd remarks, the “river
runs through Dickens’s fiction just as it runs through the city itself. . . . No previous
writer had so well captured the lachrymose and minatory aspects of the river. It was the
river of secrets, the river of mist and fog, the river of night and thus the river of mystery”
(Thames 326). While the dust-heaps were initiated and collected under Harmon’s aegis,
the Thames is a self-organizing mass of material that indiscriminately swallows up dirt,
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debris, and human corpses alike, rendering them indistinguishable. The power of the
Thames is overwhelming; human concerns are subordinate to its ebbs and flows. When
John Harmon is supposed to have drowned in the Thames, a sense of the river’s
movement attaches to the resulting sensationalized news: “the tides on which it had been
borne to the knowledge of men . . . ebbed and flowed . . . until at last, after a long interval
of slack water, it got out to sea and drifted away” (31). These same waters leave their
mark throughout the neighbourhoods by the shore, including “some muddy alleys that
might have been deposited by the last ill-savoured tide” (24), where every visible object
boasts of “the spoiling influences of water” (172) of the river’s power to transform the
living into non-living waste. The characters in the novel who drown or almost drown
serve as periodic reminders of that “spoiling,” that transformation from one category to
another.
Like the dust-heaps, the Thames of the novel is comprised of an assortment of matter,
and it is tempting to distinguish between the water and waste therein. Dickens was, after
all, writing Our Mutual Friend in the wake of the Great Stink and published the novel
during a decade of debate surrounding what Rosemary Ashton calls “the problem of the
Thames” (2). For the purposes of this analysis, I refrain from parsing too minutely the
types of matter circulated by the river. The water, though not a form of waste when
perfectly distilled, is fundamental to the creation of the fluid waste of the river; the water
is not merely a medium of conveyance but the originator of much that becomes river
waste. Drowned bodies, fallen debris, and fragments of ships—these are all turned into
waste because of their contact with the river. Where the dust-heaps are unmoving,
massively accumulated waste, the river in its circulation and hastening of the
biodegrading process represents an organization of, as well as the active creation of,
waste. Waste in this case cannot be considered separately from the river because its
waters are fundamentally involved as a physical foundation of the waste ecology; the
Thames’s waters are inextricably implicated in the origins, movement, value, decay, and
unwholesomeness of the trash they convey. The river’s animacy rests in the relation
between waste and the capacity of water, a dynamic complex to which any additional
material thrown into the river contributes. I will therefore treat water and waste as
inseparable in this case.
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Up until the 1860s, the Thames was comprised of such riverside communities as had
adapted, as much as was possible, to the “spoiling influences of water” (172). The novel,
set during this time, dramatizes this transient urban ecosystem, which was soon to be
transformed by growing concerns regarding its sanitation (or lack thereof). As Ashton,
Allen, Eileen Cleere, Ackroyd, and many others have observed, the journalism of the
1860s was full of debates on the necessity of sanitary improvements to the river—public
conversations that paralleled the planning and eventual construction of the Thames
Embankment. The Embankment construction, however, required the total clearing and
forced migration of the riverside communities of labourers. As Hannah Steyne notes in
her archaeological analysis of mid-Victorian riverside communities, “[t]he engineering
genius and sanitary improvements achieved by the Embankment construction have
overshadowed the implications of the wholesale removal of employment opportunities
along the riverside, upon which many of the working classes depended” (3). Our Mutual
Friend is imbued with new significance, therefore, when we consider the novel’s Thames
and communities of “waterside character[s]” (150) as a transient, complex ecology of
material relations on the verge of being lost through the riverside clearances and
Embankment construction.
Dickens’s complex rendition of the Thames carries the weight of its historical context,
including the Thames Embankment, the Great Stink, and Chadwick’s sanitary reforms.
Yet, even during momentous historical countermeasures against the dangerous wastes of
the Thames, Victorians held an ambivalent relationship with this encroaching waste
ecology, even as it threatened their lives. Allen questions the assumption that the
Victorian sanitary reforms were universally embraced, noting the diverse responses
among the middling-classes to the benefits of the sanitary reforms proposed by Mayhew
and Chadwick. Ralph Smith also points out the historically uneven response to the
Victorian sanitation movement. According to Smith, medical professionals—aware that
the majority of disease was spread by contagion—were sceptical of the sanitation
movement’s fixation on the miasma theory of disease, though ultimately tolerant of the
movement’s championing of sewage systems and public hygiene. Smith also finds that, in
spite of Dickens’s documented enthusiasm for Chadwick’s work, Dickens’s journalism
expresses misgivings about the sanitarian movement—particularly its tendency to blame
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the spread of disease on domestic mismanagement by women, on the labouring class, or
on the supposed carelessness of those living by the waterside. These misgivings made
their way into the art and literature of the period. Cleere argues that discourses of
sanitation and of aesthetics comingled in unexpectedly fruitful ways specifically because
narratives of sanitation reform were “more dilatory, more contradictory, more contested”
than one might expect (3).
The river’s animacy as a waste ecology is demonstrated through its consistent threat to
human life. Where the dust-heaps reorder in subtle ways the possibilities of identity for
those who orbit around them, the river represents a more existential threat to those who
must interact with it. This waste ecology, having reached a critical mass by the constant
input of matter, fascinates and fixates human characters with its power to transform
everything into the same indistinguishable ooze. The river demonstrates its animacy in its
omnivorous, indiscriminating consumption of material. Deathly fixation upon the river
gains additional meanings when that river is a waste ecology of shifting materialities.
While I will return to the more tangible threat that the river poses to human characters, I
first take up the river’s animacy in terms of the mesmeric hold that it seems to exert over
those who come into contact with it.
As Riderhood rows a police inspector, Eugene Wrayburn, and Mortimer Lightwood
toward Gaffer’s boat, the passengers cannot help noticing the threatening aspect of “all
the objects among which they crept” (171):
Not a lumbering black barge, with its cracked and blistered
side impending over them, but seemed to suck at the river
with a thirst for sucking them under. And everything so
vaunted the spoiling influences of water—discoloured
copper, rotted wood, honey-combed stone, green dank
deposit—that the after consequences of being crushed,
sucked under, and drawn down, looked as ugly to the
imagination as the main event. (172)
The spoiling influences of water—rust, rot, wear, mould—describe how that which
comes into contact with water becomes waste. It is not only the “main event” of
drowning that frightens Wrayburn and Lightwood here; the “after consequences,” the
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decomposition, the waste-becoming process, is equally formidable. Where the waste of
the dust-heaps seems to corrode identities, the river asserts a basic, categorical confusion.
Characters become bodies, ships offer underwater submersion instead of above-water
passage, fuel becomes rotten wood. Even Eugene Wrayburn and Mortimer Lightwood,
who are entirely unaccustomed to riverside life, begin to confuse whether they are trying
to track down a criminal, or are becoming criminals themselves. Before venturing out on
the water with Riderhood, Wrayburn, conscience-struck by the disastrous effects that
their investigation might have upon Lizzie, periodically tells Lightwood that their
participation makes him feel as uncomfortable as a guilty criminal—“like a dark
combination of traitor and pickpocket,” “Guy Fawkes and a Sneak in the area both at
once,” and the perpetrator of “[t]hree burglaries, two forgeries, and a midnight
assassination” (162, 164, 168). Mortimer affirms that he feels uneasy also, and Wrayburn
grimly proposes: “[n]ext time (with a view to our peace of mind) we’ll commit the crime,
instead of taking the criminal” (165). Hyperbolic and facetious though these exchanges
are, the “[i]nfluence of locality,” as Lightwood puts it, is profound (164). The very ale
they drink “[t]astes like the wash of the river,” and Wrayburn “feel[s] as if [he] had been
half drowned, and swallowing a gallon of it” (164). The spoiling influences of water are
pervasive, here. Under such circumstances, the riverside characters who scavenge, who
try to do something with the river’s waste, seem less like characters recycling and more
like people wearily submitting to a waste ecology.
The river indiscriminately circulates, biodegrades, and swallows up the living and
nonliving alike. The power of the river, however, is not the power to bestow life and
death; rather, its animacy lies in its excesses—the overwhelming quantity of the matter
that flows in and out of the river. The river may house, redistribute, and even equalize the
materials that come within its ambit, but these results are incidental to the massive,
geological scale on which the river operates. In their material excess, both the Harmon
dust-heaps and the Thames are formidable for having grown to such critical masses that
they become ecologies of waste.
This river waste ecology exerts a strange, mesmeric influence upon humans. As Bradley
Headstone prepares to murder his rival in love, Wrayburn, he stares down “with a ghastly
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relish” (635) over the brink of Plashwater Weir Mill Lock, mesmerized by the prospect of
certain death that the water presents for anyone who falls into it. Standing on a literal
brink, the schoolmaster contemplates the figurative boundary between murder and
suicide. Riderhood, the lock’s keeper, stands next to Bradley and observes that:
There was a very dark expression on his face; an expression
that the Rogue found it hard to understand. It was fierce and
full of purpose; but the purpose might have been as much
against himself as against another. If he had stepped back
for a spring, taken a leap, and thrown himself in, it would
have been no surprising sequel to the look. Perhaps his
troubled soul, set upon some violence, did hover for the
moment between that violence and another. (636)
Bradley’s fierce, purposeful look is not one of moral anguish; he is not struggling against
his determination to “set upon some violence,” but is one of indecision as to the target of
that violence. Instead of a moral problem, Bradley is contemplating a material one—that
is, which living body to transform into a nonliving body. The river, in its relation to
death, disrupts distinctions such as social status, wit, and ability. Indeed, the moral
outrage and jealous resentment that fuel Bradley’s murder attempt are altered in the face
of the material power of the river—so much so that Bradley considers his own death as
an equivalent to, or acceptable substitute for, the death of another.
Some characters try to resist the waste ecology and the intimate field of material relations
into which they are woven. These characters assert the integrity of living bodies in
opposition to bodies of waste, return to those “stubborn binary systems of difference” that
reassert animate hierarchies such as “dynamism/stasis, life/death, subject/object,
speech/nonspeech, human/animal, natural body/cyborg” (Chen 3). In the opening chapter,
Riderhood tries to point out Gaffer’s hypocrisy in shunning Riderhood for stealing from a
living man, asking how Gaffer might react if he had been accused of robbing a dead man.
Gaffer responds:
‘You COULDN’T do it. . . . Has a dead man any use for money? Is it
possible for a dead man to have money? What world does a dead man
belong to? T’other world. What world does money belong to? This world.
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How can money be a corpse’s? Can a corpse own it, want it, spend it,
claim it, miss it? Don’t try to go confounding the rights and wrongs of
things in that way. It’s worthy of the sneaking spirit that robs a live man.’
(4-5)
Unlike his daughter, Lizzie, Gaffer harbours no horror or revulsion of the lifeless human
body because the moment that a body ceases to be animated it loses its subjecthood—or,
as he tells Riderhood, the ability to own, want, spend, or claim. Most characters,
however, maintain a predictable aversion to the human corpse—especially Lizzie, for
whom the river and the dead are irrevocably linked. As Peter Schwenger observes in
Tears of Things, the human corpse is an emblem of the border between subject and
object, “[f]or if the dead body has now become object, it is not wholly so; it bears the
imprint of a residual subjectivity, residue within residue” (157). We are disturbed by the
corpse’s abject character, by the fact that that “[w]e cannot expel a corpse with the same
indifference with which we leave behind the wastes of the body,” and by how the corpse
sits within “a disturbing liminal state between subject and object” (158). In Our Mutual
Friend, the corpses in the river are disturbing because characters “cannot help but
identify the subject with this object” (Schwenger 158). The river, with its circulating
abject bodies, then, threatens characters with the possibility that subject-object relations
are unfixed, malleable, porous.
Lizzie is subject to what the novel calls her “fancies” (5). In the first chapter, Lizzie sees
the sunset light up a stain at the bottom of her father’s boat, and this stain resembles “the
outline of a muffled human form, coloured . . . as though with diluted blood” (2). These
“fancies” operate more as visions than as imaginative delusions, generating a curious
power and insight. Lizzie often sits by the fireplace in her home and spends her evenings
looking into “the hollow down by the flare” or the hollow space within the flames
produced by the reaction of fuel and oxygen, which is visible just above the burning
coals, and which produces a peculiar effect on her (30):
‘It’s that dull glow near it [the burning coals], coming
and going, that I mean. When I look at it of an evening, it
comes like pictures to me, Charley.’
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‘Show us a picture,’ said the boy. ‘Tell us where to
look.’
‘Ah! It wants my eyes, Charley.’ (28)
Lizzie’s “pictures” are one instance of the visionary wisdom—expressed as a second
sight—that she exercises throughout the novel. These images convey a range of
knowledge, sometimes giving her insights into the past and sometimes appearing as “a
fortune-telling one; a future one” (29). We see instances of Lizzie’s fireside fortunetelling—for Charley, when she predicts his breaking off from their father and leaving
behind his riverside life—for Gaffer, when she predicts her father’s ruin by Riderhood’s
slanderous accusations of murder21—and even for Bella Wilfer, when she predicts Bella’s
“heart well worth winning, and well won” (529). In another instance of Lizzie’s second
sight, she wonders whether her insights come of communicating with the dead. When
Lizzie discovers from Abbey Potterson that Riderhood has been slanderously accusing
her father of murder, she recalls seeing Riderhood creeping near the site where Gaffer
found the body believed to be John Harmon’s. Reflecting on this sudden memory, and its
suggestion that Riderhood was involved in the Harmon murder, Lizzie wonders, “Can it
be a truth? That was put into my mind by the dead?”—a question that the narrator
remarks she asks “rather of the fire than of the hostess of the Fellowship Porters” (68).
Consulting the “fire,” as is typical of her informal fortune-telling practice, Lizzie wonders
if the “dead”—which, in this case, being the abject waste of the river waste ecology, can
be taken as synonymous with the river as a whole—has put this knowledge into her mind,
just as the river fuels the fire that conveys to her various “pictures.”
Lizzie’s connection to the river instigates a series of insights on her own and others’
position within a waste ecology. As she tells Charley, only Lizzie herself can see these
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Gaffer, angrily gesticulating when he discovers Charley has left home, happens to be holding a knife as
he does so. Lizzie, who knows that people have begun to shun her father on suspicion of murder, tells
Gaffer that, while she is certain that her father should never hurt anyone, the sight of him wielding a knife
“was too dreadful to bear; for it looked— . . . O it looked—” (76). Lizzie’s “fancies” always take the shape
of visions, whether in hollow of the flares, in her father’s boat, or in the comfort of her own home, when
she imaginatively visualizes her father under the new light cast on him by Riderhood’s slander.
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“pictures,” which are fuelled literally by debris washed ashore by the river. Lizzie’s
fancies are a product of her contradictory revulsion of and attraction to the river—a
contradictory relationship that reveals her recognition of the river’s power as a waste
ecology and of her own position within it. Caught between resisting the field of material
relations that the river represents and embracing the same, Lizzie tries to explain this
confusing relationship to her brother—saying, “[t]o please myself, I could not be too far
from that river,” and yet “can’t get away from it” (228). Lizzie feels she has little agency
in her relationship with the Thames, claiming that “[i]t’s no purpose of mine that I live by
it still” (228). Yet this recognition of her lack of agency regarding the river is appropriate
when the substance of her fancies revolve around the humbling notion of her and others’
position within that waste ecology.
Neither her father nor her brother has patience with Lizzie’s propensity to give way to her
ambivalent “fancies,” which they do not share. As Gaffer looks back at the drowned
corpse he has in tow, the narrator observes: “A neophyte might have fancied that the
ripples passing over it were dreadfully like faint changes of expression on a sightless
face; but Gaffer was no neophyte and had no fancies” (5). The “fancy” here is the notion
that this human could return to life, might have survived its fatal interaction with the
river, which ominously mimics “faint changes of expression.” In his resistance to fancies,
Gaffer maintains that there is no recovery from wastehood, that the river’s power is
absolute, and steadfastly ignores any suggestion of its return to life. Though this cleareyed view is necessary for the execution of his profession, Gaffer perhaps forgets that
Lizzie’s dread of the river is well-founded—particularly in view of Gaffer’s own death in
the river shortly afterwards. Being so completely involved in a waste ecology, Gaffer
cannot escape the fact of his inevitable transformation into waste. While Gaffer may
realize that there is no return from waste, Lizzie understands the extent to which they are
all implicated within a waste ecology and the potential dangers of still deeper
involvement.
Gaffer and his son Charley each attempt to steer Lizzie away from her fancifulness,
though their reasons differ: Gaffer admonishes Lizzie for her ungrateful dislike of the
river, which provides their livelihood; Charley rebukes her continued and undue focus on
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the river after their father’s death, when they have worked to free themselves from its
influence. Charley periodically begs Lizzie to “control [her] fancies” (228), which have
led her to house with the eccentric and fanciful Jenny Wren, particularly as Lizzie’s
intuitions would seem to inconvenience his own social ambitions. While Gaffer cannot
understand Lizzie’s dread of the river, Charley cannot comprehend Lizzie’s involuntary
affinity with the same. Charley, like his father, is unable to see beyond those interests
necessary for his immediate survival, nor to fathom the full import of Lizzie’s fancies:
“Lizzie has as much thought as the best . . . Too much, perhaps, without teaching. I used
to call the fire at home her books, for she was always full of fancies—sometimes quite
wise fancies, considering—when she sat looking at it” (231). In this instance, Charley
categorizes Lizzie’s wisdom as of a kind that approaches his own formal education. This
acknowledgement, however, diminishes the radical extent to which her understanding,
stemming from an interaction with the river’s waste, differs from his. At other times,
Charley recognizes a gulf between Lizzie’s river insights and his own education, though
not necessarily one that does justice to her abilities:
“You are such a dreamer,” said the boy, with his former
petulance. “It was all very well when we sat before the fire—
when we looked into the hollow down by the flare—but we are
looking into the real world now.”
“Ah, we were looking into the real world then, Charley!”
(228)
Charley and Lizzie stage an implicit debate between the reality of social systems and that
of broader ecosystems beyond the control and complete knowledge of humans. And
while Lizzie tries to use this fortune-telling strategically throughout the novel to induce
herself and others to live up to their potential, she is eventually cast off by her brother,
unable and unwilling to discard her fancies for his.
Lizzie’s aptitude within the river waste ecology originates in her psychic connection to
fires. Fires are structurally dynamic, determined as they are by chaotic ecological
variables such as the movement and ratio of certain gases in a given space. The stochastic
quality of fires—their illegibility, effectively—imbues Lizzie’s fortune-telling with
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ecological as well as temporal insight. Caught between her father’s and her brother’s
interests, Lizzie emerges with an insight superior to both. In spite of the gendered coding
of and attempts to control Lizzie’s “fancies,” she remains the novel’s most capable judge
of the river and of her family’s relation to it. This incisive perspective allows her an
agency on the riverside. While her father is practised at hauling corpses out of the
Thames, Lizzie successfully pulls Eugene Wrayburn, still living, from its waters. Inspired
by “[h]er old bold life and habit,” Lizzie spots, rows out to, and retrieves the first body
she has ever hauled out from the river (699):
An untrained sight would never have seen by the moonlight
what she saw at the length of a few strokes astern. She saw
the drowning figure rise to the surface, slightly struggle,
and as if by instinct turn over on its back to float. Just so
had she first dimly seen the face which she now dimly saw
again. (700)
The repeated references to the skills that Lizzie previously acquired from helping her
father, and which turn out to be invaluable, contextualize Eugene’s rescue within Gaffer’s
work of retrieving corpses from the water. Not only does Lizzie possess more than an
“untrained sight”; she has developed a trained vision in two senses—a keen eye for the
river’s movements, and the second sight by which she reads the river as a waste
ecology.22 The fanciful vision that Lizzie sees at the beginning of the novel—“the outline
of a muffled human form, coloured . . . as though with diluted blood” (2)—is realized in
Eugene’s near-drowned and bloodied body. Lizzie’s psychic power is less an ability that
she can call forth at her desire, and more her willingness to be involved in and subject to
the river waste ecology. Just as human will waxes and wanes in the Harmon dust-heaps,
so do human will, agency, and knowledge wax and wane in Dickens’s Thames.
Successfully navigating such a river can sometimes require the suppression of the human
ego and interests, and the adoption of mediumistic neutrality.

22

The Hexams are also playfully connected to the occult by the pun embedded in that name—“Hex ’em.”
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The river supplies some characters with a living—as with Gaffer and Riderhood—but
this living necessitates a constant confrontation with nonliving remains. We see both
aspects of riverside life when Gaffer admonishes Lizzie for disliking the river, saying:
How can you be so thankless to your best friend, Lizzie?
The very fire that warmed you when you were a baby, was
picked out of the river alongside the coal barges. The very
basket that you slept in, the tide washed ashore. The very
rockers that I put it upon to make a cradle of it, I cut out of
a piece of wood that drifted from some ship or another. (3)
Coal, extraneous goods, scrap wood, money from dead corpses—all of these are
harvested from the river. For Gaffer, the river plays a foundational—even maternal—role
in Lizzie’s life. From her earliest years, the physical markers of Lizzie’s identity and
experience have been provided by an implicitly nurturing Thames. Gaffer’s reading of
the river is therefore not merely anthropocentric; it is anthropomorphic. While such
rhetoric grants the Thames agency, in a manner that mirrors my own argument, the
intentionality implied to the river erases the destruction, decay, and death that initiate
these gifts. Gaffer cannot see that human profit and disaster are alike incidental within
this broader waste ecology. The same resources from the river that benefit the Hexams
are bound up in the loss, disaster, or death of others. Gaffer unwittingly demonstrates the
river’s disregard for human life, and in so doing, demonstrates his own. The living
granted by the Thames’s waste ecology is taken from disastrous losses upstream. In this
way, the Thames can be life-sustaining and life-threatening, but these two experiences
exist on a spectrum and cannot be separated one from the other.
Thus, the riverside communities generate their living from the material excesses of the
river waste ecology. These excesses, however, are not merely the physical quantity of
river waste that circulates through the city; they encompass the categorical confusion of
materials that the river enforces upon all who come into contact with it. Drowned bodies,
industrial debris, water—the river melts these together into an indistinguishable mass of
slime and ooze that leaves these materials categorically in excess of the classifications
they might have enjoyed as individual, discrete entities. The river’s excesses, in this
sense, overwhelm basic binaries such as living and dead, product and waste. We see this
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categorical confusion when we examine more closely the Hexams’ relation to the river.
Riderhood describes the latter’s successful retrieval of a drowned corpse from the river as
being “in luck” (3). This common expression is appropriate to the neutral, unfeeling,
chance-based odds of the Hexams’ way of life. The idea of Gaffer’s being “in luck” is
ironic when that luck is based on the death of another, when it implies an unwillingness
to view the river as an ecology. This unwillingness to view the river as a waste ecology—
as a cycle of waste—dooms Gaffer to drowning. The same phrase comes up again when
Riderhood leads a search party in quest of Gaffer. Seeing Gaffer’s empty boat with a
corpse tied to it, Riderhood assumes Gaffer is “in luck again” (170). However, the “luck”
turns out to be Gaffer’s own body. Gaffer gets entangled in his own ropes and dies
occupying the same position of the many corpses that he has fished from the river.23 In
that moment, being “in luck” acquires multiple meanings—Gaffer’s successful retrieval
of a corpse and Gaffer’s becoming that corpse—that sums up Gaffer’s absorption into the
transformative, uncategorizable excesses of the river waste ecology.
“Luck” describes effectively the reason that Gaffer and Lizzie have benefitted so long
from the river without harm. Lizzie, whose fancies have foreseen Gaffer’s sudden switch
from receiving the river’s resources to becoming one of those resources himself, joins the
number of those who have lost rather than the minority who only gain by the river. As the
company tries to haul in the corpse, it resists the will of the search party (172):
He tried easy now; but the luck resisted; wouldn’t come.
‘I mean to have it, and the boat too,’ said Mr. Inspector,
playing the line.
But still the luck resisted; wouldn’t come. (172)
The “luck,” a form of abject waste, is Gaffer’s drowned body and the result of that man’s
final attempt to seize another instance of “luck.” Like the thing that looks back, that
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Riderhood also gets run down by a coal barge and almost drowns, and then is eventually murdered by
drowning, in spite of his insistence that “him as has been brought out o’ drowning can never be drowned”
(636)
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disrupts and subverts the anthropocentrism of human endeavours, “the luck resisted;
wouldn’t come.” The agentive force at play when Gaffer’s “luck resisted” is
grammatically assigned not to the humans who are trying to haul in the body, but to the
inanimate corpse that “wouldn’t come.” Gaffer’s abject body, with its thing-like
resistance to the Inspector’s investigation, here serves as an emissary of the river waste
ecology and demonstrates how the novel’s waste is invested with animacy. Gaffer’s
anthropomorphic reading of the river as a benevolent “best friend” therefore proves
incomplete. From a non-anthropocentric point of view, Gaffer’s death perfectly suits the
workings of the river as a waste ecology. His body becomes a contribution to the river’s
mass, to the power of its currents, and his body has fulfilled the natural conclusion of
living by and within a waste ecology—at some point, he must become that waste. Both
his liveness and his death are secondary to the broader circulations of the river.

1.4
The waste ecologies in Our Mutual Friend transform everything within their influence.
On an individual scale, waste appears as agentic, vibrant, animate matter. As a collective,
the accrued waste gives rise to ecosystems of interdependent material relations. Having
reached critical masses, these fictive waste ecologies resemble in some measure the
effects of Timothy Morton’s hyperobjects or “things massively distributed across time
and space relative to humans” (Hyperobjects 1). Couched firmly within the language of
object-oriented ontology, Morton’s theory of hyperobjects critiques the hierarchy of
material relations in which humans are still privileged over nonhumans. Hyperobjects
delineates a humbling account of humans’ inability to fully grasp entities that are not the
sum of its signs and which exist (to us) on incomprehensible scales of time and space.
Hyperobjects are not a modern phenomenon; the fact that hyperobjects like plutonium,
which remains radioactive for over twenty-four thousand years (Hyperobjects 94), exist
on massive scales of time means that many of the hyperobjects that we have begun to
notice existed across historical eras. Morton published an article briefly detailing some of
the Victorian hyperobjects—i.e., “geological time, capital, industry, evolution, cities, the
unconscious, electromagnetism, climate phenomena such as El Niño”—that we still
experience today (“Victorian Hyperobjects” 489). In spite of our perceptual limitations,
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Morton urges us to consider the “intimacy” between coexisting human and nonhuman
entities (Hyperobjects 108).
There have been mixed critical responses to Morton’s work as a contribution to
ecocritical theory. In a recent review of Hyperobjects, Ursula K. Heise acknowledges the
book’s theorization of the issues of scale latent in ecocriticism’s discussions of the
Anthropocene, deep time, and so forth. However, Heise takes issue with the structure of
Morton’s arguments—particularly his uncertain uses of quantum and relativity theory, as
well as how his “strawman environmentalism” misconstrues the state of the field (Heise
461). In spite of these limitations, Morton’s work is useful as a tool of literary analysis,
specifically in this instance because the hyperobjects theorization addresses the dilations
of scale that proliferate in Our Mutual Friend. The present analysis is therefore less
concerned with suggesting the presence of hyperobjects in Our Mutual Friend. Instead, I
wish to suggest that some of the broader aims of Morton’s theory are allied to and inform
my discussions of Dickensian waste ecologies.
For Morton, capitalism asserts a myth of Nature as a mass of nonspecific material that
exists to be turned into capital and ultimately ends up as waste. According to Morton, this
nonspecific “stuff” or “lump” is best described by Heidegger’s “Bestand (standing
reserve)” (Hyperobjects 113). A convenient and anthropocentric “stockpiling”
(Hyperobjects 113), this tidy assignation of Nature and waste as the before and after of
capital gives rise to the notion that Nature is somehow separate from humans or “over
there”—the world of Nature, in other words, denies how messily and inextricably
enmeshed we are with things. The world of Our Mutual Friend is suggestive of this idea
of Bestand. The dust-heaps are situated on private property, sifted and sorted out of the
public eye until they are sold and carted off to some unspecified “elsewhere.” The river
occupies its own distinct space with the embankment of the Thames, and those waterside
characters who muddy the boundaries between city and river are treated as social
miscreants subject to such tokens of suspicion as the Inspector’s “distrustful nod of
recognition upon Gaffer, plainly importing, ‘Ah! we know all about you, and you’ll
overdo it some day’” (Dickens 24). Yet, the novel undermines the idea of Bestand in
spite of itself. Dust billows throughout the city despite attempts to gather and sort it. The
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river ebbs and floods, overflows with waste, and clings persistently to those who
encounter it such as Lizzie Hexam, who “can’t get away from it” (228). These two waste
ecologies cannot be so easily contained and insistently force their presence onto humans.
Like hyperobjects, the waste of Our Mutual Friend is imagined as a powerful
destructuring force. The dust ecology upends our notions of garbage; dust can be used to
fertilize fields, conceal treasure, turn a profit, choke and irritate pedestrians, sever family
ties, blackmail one’s employer, or do nothing at all. The Harmon dust-heaps carry the
potential to alter the socioeconomic standings of those humans entangled with it—can
make the Boffins rich, or make the Boffins poor and Wegg rich—revealing the
contingency and mutability of our social and economic designations. The Thames
ecology, on the other hand, gives the lie to all of the human constructions that take for
granted a material and stable existence as living bodies. The biosphere of which humans
are a part includes death, decomposition, the transformation from living body to
nonliving materials. The characters that encounter this waste ecology are changed,
sometimes irrevocably—Gaffer Hexam goes from bird of prey to the prey itself, John
Harmon buries his identity “many fathoms deep”, Bradley Headstone glimpses the selfdestructive root of his violent desires, Eugene Wrayburn loses his languor and vanity, and
even Riderhood cuts a sympathetic figure when on the verge of death after being run
down in his boat by a steamer.
What Morton says is gained in the loss of a given world is intimacy—or those “entities
that coexist with us [and] obtrude on our awareness with greater and greater urgency”
(Hyperobjects 108). We return full circle, then, to Chen’s view of animacy’s having “the
capacity to rewrite the conditions of intimacy, engendering different communalisms and
revising biopolitical spheres” (3); the waste ecologies of Our Mutual Friend foreground a
communalism of radical, intimate material relations. And while such a communalism
may be anathema to the Victorian ethos of systematic order, classification, even
sanitation, the novel nonetheless offers us a fleeting glance of what such intimacies look
like.
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As communities of intimate material relations, the waste ecologies appear to the
characters as sites of continual, if futile, negotiation; Gaffer, Riderhood, Venus, Wegg,
and Lizzie are only some of the many characters who attempt to negotiate the terms by
which they are circulated or even, as in Wegg’s case, “dispersed,” scattered, and rendered
uncollectable (82). Just as Venus’s collections of bones and articulations of skeletons
provoke polemic debate, Our Mutual Friend foregrounds the mesh of material relations
into which characters are woven, whether or not those relations take the forms of
resistance and negotiation.
Of all of these characters, Venus is a unique intermediary associated with both of the
novel’s waste ecologies. As a collector of “[b]ones, warious” (81), Venus’s work is
devoted to collecting, sorting, and repurposing human and animal bones, among other
things. In this capacity, he has had dealings with both the Harmon dust-heaps and the
Thames. As he explains to Wegg, Venus was frequently sought out by Harmon Sr. to
appraise “the nature and worth of everything that was found in the dust” (84). Venus’s
trade also took him to the riverside, where, hoping to purchase parrots “to buy for
stuffing” and “a nice pair of rattlesnakes, to articulate for a Museum” (500), he first
meets and falls in love with Pleasant Riderhood. Venus is perhaps the novel’s most
extreme example of stoic repurposing because he has no problems with considering
subject and object as interchangeable categories. He tells Wegg: “if you was brought here
loose in a bag to be articulated, I’d name your smallest bones blindfold equally with your
largest, as fast as I could pick ’em out, and I’d sort ’em all, and sort your wertebræ, in a
manner that would equally surprise and charm you” (83). Venus accepts at once
individual human body parts as metonyms for the human subject, and that those same
body parts have a thing-like potential to be deployed in all manner of ways beyond that
subject’s understanding or control. He alone is able to regard all living things in a “bony
light” (84), or as equal to nonliving things.
For the majority of the novel, Venus acts as an agent of the novel’s two waste ecologies,
dealing evenly between the living and the nonliving. Like the dust-heaps and the Thames,
he manually reorders (i.e., in articulating skeletons) and redistributes (i.e., selling at his
shop) human and animal bones. This position, however, does not last, and even Venus is
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subject to a manner of reform. Thanks to the mediations of Boffin and John Harmon,
Pleasant Riderhood—who previously refused Venus from not wanting “to regard
[her]self, not yet to be regarded, in that bony light”—is persuaded to marry him on the
condition that he “confine[s] [him]self to the articulation of men, children, and the lower
animals” (84, 782). Pleasant, in other words, is the only character besides Wegg who
takes steps to safeguard her physical identity from absorption into a waste ecology.
Accepting these terms, Venus ends his partnership with Wegg. Venus also strictly
censors the language he hears used in connection with Pleasant; he objects to Wegg
referring to Pleasant as “the old party,” and to their wedding “in the form of a Fight,”
each time demanding that Wegg rephrase his remarks (782).
Venus embodies Chen’s and Morton’s notions of the intimacy of material relations. The
“bony light” with which he regards everything and everyone about him is the view of
intimacy—of the nearness of humans to things, of the material relations in which we are
enmeshed. Admiring a stuffed bird that he has just sold to a customer, he says: “There’s
animation! On a twig, making up his mind to hop! Take care of him; he’s a lovely
specimen” (81). Venus delights in the animacy of things on either side of the life/death
binary, always regarding the agentive quality of matter without particularly noticing or
caring for its liveness. However, Venus curtails this intimacy in order to persuade
Pleasant Riderhood to marry him—exchanges a more radical form of intimacy for a
conventional one. The strict censorship that Venus exercises upon any discourse relating
to Pleasant is therefore appropriate, corresponding to the self-censorship that he exercises
on his own perspective.

1.5
There is something particularly unsystematic about the waste of Our Mutual Friend.
Contrary to the consistency and productive potential implicit in an ordered system,
ecologies of waste scatter and transform the discarded remnants of production. The
novel’s waste does not assert a particular order so much as a disruptive organicism, and
one that extends out to material categories such as living and nonliving. Waste
continually ebbs and flows beyond human control: dust continues to buffet about the
streets of London despite constant efforts to sweep and sort, human body parts become
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interchangeable with objects for trade,24 and the strong currents of the Thames are an
ever-present danger to those who scavenge along its shores. Indeed, characters in the
novel who make their living scavenging from waste ecologies do not clean, sanitize, or
reform waste-ridden spaces with any success; some characters like Gaffer Hexam and
Mr. Venus are so embroiled within cycles of waste that they cannot live beyond them.
What, then, do we do with those parts of the novel overtly devoted to recycling—
particularly those characters undertaking acts of repurposing within, near, or because of
either of the two waste ecologies? Mr. and Mrs. Boffin’s initial acts upon inheriting the
dust-heaps centre on “doing what’s right by our fortune” (99) and repurposing the
Harmon wealth to serve, rather than to injure, others; the “Fashionable Society” (99) that
Mrs. Boffin desires is to be surrounded by the company of her beneficiaries, Bella Wilfer,
Sloppy, and John Harmon. The scheme to reform Bella’s “mercenary wretch[edness]”
(319) comes of the Boffins’ and John Harmon’s attempts to repurpose Harmon Sr’s will,
transforming it from one that bound the son to a wealthy but unhappy marriage to one
that grants the son both wealth and affection. Similarly caught up in acts of repurposing
are Harmon Sr. (the recyclable dust-heaps), Wegg (who clumsily attempts to repurpose
literature when he “drop[s] into poetry” (51), in addition to repurposing another of
Harmon Sr.’s wills), George Radfoot (who attempts to repurpose John Harmon’s
identity), and Riderhood (who repurposes Gaffer’s “luck,” Betty Higden’s fears, and
Bradley Headstone’s disguise). If what these characters practice can be termed recycling
at all, it is a recycling out of bounds—an omnivorous willingness to repurpose everything
from scrap paper, debris, and bottled wills, to bones, bodies, and legal identities. Such
patterns of behaviour are the mechanical responses to the waste ecologies, and they speak
to the profound breakdown of any categorical divides amongst a field of intimate,
material relations. Living in a waste ecology, these characters are so ingrained in their
habits of repurposing that, like the river, they are also subject to confusing the boundaries
between living and nonliving, product and waste, subject and object.
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Venus almost loses some of his collectible teeth when it mixes in with the change that he has just given
to a customer.
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Once we as readers look past the ‘world’ of waste as the before-and-after of commodity
culture, the novel is revealed for the rich intimacy of material relations that it represents.
Although some characters—especially the poorer and labouring-class characters—
practice recycling, these practices are only a small fragment of how waste (in its
movement, activity, and latent animacy) is expressed within the novel. As we witness
characters’ interactions with waste, Dickens also opens readers up to waste’s presence
and effects at the societal level, at the urban level. Recycling is not the issue at the heart
of waste in the novel; recycling is simply how humans process, adapt to, and vainly
attempt to enact animacy within an ecology of waste that seems increasingly to have a
trajectory of its own.
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Chapter 2

2

Values, in Decay: Bleak House and Accumulating
Waste Ecologies

Bleak House rivets its focus on London’s accumulation of a dense surplus of material
from its opening paragraph, and, throughout its narration of a legal suit that spans
generations and distant family members, it maintains this focus on the intimidations of
material excess. There is “[a]s much mud in the streets, as if the waters had but newly
retired from the face of the earth” (13). Polluting smoke is the chief weather of this area,
“lowering down from chimneypots, making a soft black drizzle, with flakes of soot in it
as big as full-grown snowflakes” (13). The streets swarm with mud-splattered
pedestrians, “losing their foot-hold at street-corners, where tens of thousands of other foot
passengers have been slipping and sliding since the day broke (if the day ever broke)”
(13). The crowds leave in their wake “new deposits to the crust upon crust of mud,
sticking at those points tenaciously to the pavement, and accumulating at compound
interest” (13). This ceaseless friction between people, animals, fog, and dirt is ever
productive of new material. Their involuntary physical contact exacerbates the material
density of the urban landscape.
The link between mud and compound interest is not incidental. This ambivalent image
joins the most valueless matter to an open-ended stream of abstract wealth. While
compound interest typically increases value by accumulation, Dickens uses the concept to
complete an image of diminishing value by accumulation. Mud accumulating at
compound interest is the central ironic metaphor for the relentless aggregation of waste in
Bleak House. Outside of a financial context, compound interest is geometric growth that
in this case corrodes value instead of increasing it. Mud’s unbounded growth in an urban
space is an ecological productivity that upends human cultural aesthetics and definitions
of value. The opening of Bleak House signals the novel’s deeper concern with ecologies
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and rampant accumulation that over long intervals actively disrupt and decay both the
accumulation and often the accumulator.
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Pushing material into excess, accumulation confuses the distinctions between established
hierarchies and categories—subject and object, living and nonliving, commodity and
waste—and displaces their signification. The dogs are “undistinguishable in the mire”
and the “Horses, scarcely better; splashed to their very blinkers” (13). Nothing, moreover,
escapes the weight of this excess material. The very atmosphere is cumulative to an
overwhelming degree; there is “Fog everywhere,” up and down the river, aboard ships
“in the eyes and throats of ancient Greenwich pensioners,” and along bridges forming “a
nether sky of fog” (13). At the centre of this crowded, ever-accumulating, material excess
are three peculiar institutions: the Court of Chancery, Krook’s rag-and-bottle shop, and
Tom-all-Alone’s. The novel’s characters regard these institutions as ordered and
controlled systems; the Court of Chancery was designed to systematize disputes of
equity, Krook’s to reintegrate waste commodities into an economic system, and Tom-allAlone’s to methodically dispose of and to fairly designate properties in Chancery. All
three, however, fulfill precisely the reverse of these roles. These institutions represent, if
anything, the failure of systematization.
Victorian literary studies have often noticed the accelerated materiality that pervades
Bleak House. Daniel Tyler describes Dickens’s work as a “remarkable investment in and
studied depiction of a minutely realised material culture” (7). Dickens’s microscopic
attention to Victorian material culture, as well as to the material situatedness of people,
places, and things, has led scholars to examine Bleak House’s many papers, letters, and
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Emily Steinlight notes a similarly ironic vocabulary of accumulation in Dickens’s portrayal of the
wealthy guests assembled at Chesney Wold, which draws upon the unexpected term “supernumeraries”
(Dickens 191): “In a period obsessed with the health of the social body as a whole, Dickens’s fiction speaks
to one of the greatest perplexities of the century’s bioeconomic discourse of population: the virtually
unthinkable problem suggested by the term supernumeraries, or the paradox of a total in excess of the total
. . . the cynicism implied in the narrator’s use of this term relies in part on the potential for statistical
evaluation to produce its own exception” (229–230). In referencing both compound interest and
supernumeraries, Dickens draws upon economics and statistics, two subsets of the broader policy-making
that he consistently critiques throughout the novel.
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documents, which in the novel are notable more for their volume than for their written
contents. A number of scholars have revisited J. Hillis Miller’s famous remark that Bleak
House is “a document about the interpretation of documents” (179), suggesting instead
that the novel is less about interpreting documents than about “the materiality of
documents and the interpretation of that materiality” (Hack 38). Additionally, scholars
have shown keen interest in Bleak House’s representations of waste, from Robert E.
Lougy’s discussion of the liminality of filth, and Patrick Chappell’s readings of the
fluctuating value of rubbish, to Nasser Mufti’s analysis of nationalized mud. This chapter
is indebted to both lines of inquiry, and to some extent unites the two in pursuing an
analysis of the material situatedness of human endeavours, human systems of meaning,
and human bodies as they come to form waste. At the same time, this chapter differs in
joining the materiality of documents and writing to waste, as well as its attention to less
literal forms of waste. The three readings I offer combine the methods of new
materialism, ecocriticism, and waste studies. My particular interest lies in the tension that
develops between systematic and ecological structures in Bleak House—a tension that
becomes clear in the novel’s three loci of accumulating waste: the Court of Chancery,
Krook’s rag-and-bottle shop, and Tom-all-Alone’s.
The scale at which this chapter enacts its close readings dilates between large- and smallscale waste, following another important development in Victorian literary criticism—an
increasing interest in scalar methodologies. Emily Steinlight suggests that “scalar
thinking” spans “new applications of world systems theory to experiments in distant
reading to literary histories situated in deep time” (15). Steinlight’s contribution to this
shift is to forgo the Dickensian city’s celebration of individual subjectivity, reading
instead for that city’s decided inattention to the individual and its bland privileging of
anonymous, heterogenous masses. For instance, while critics have previously read Bleak
House as championing nineteenth-century sanitation reform and as celebrating the
preservation of the individual from harm, Steinlight opts instead to focus on the novel’s
emphasis on “the power of epidemic to belie apparent distinctions between individual and
mass and among classed bodies and spaces” (111). This chapter follows Steinlight’s
interest in the larger structural formations latent in Bleak House, without dispensing
entirely with examples from the text that may appear to showcase the individual human
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subject. To an extent, I apply scalar methods in the previous chapter, which is oriented to
the materiality of the Thames and piles of waste rather than to the human economies of
recycling built around them. This chapter, however, pursues the ways in which scale
itself can be used to reconstruct human relations and boundaries within a novel.
Disintegrating distinctions between humans and waste are at the heart of this novel’s
provocative dissolution of a typical hierarchy of material relations. Scale is an important
concept in Bleak House—particularly the threat that large-scale structures pose to the
liberal subject. That threat is precisely Dickens’s concern in presenting three loci of
accumulated material which, in their vast scale, devalue individuation. This is not to
suggest that there is no place for reading for individuals in the novel; individual
characters are often the means by which the larger threat to the individual is presented.
However, by turning to a more dynamic, scalar methodology, and in exercising some
caution against taking the value of the liberal individual for granted, we may understand
more fully those structural and stylistic drives of Bleak House that are bound to the
concept of accumulation.
In Our Mutual Friend, I examined how human characters engage with waste by
becoming waste—or by becoming enmeshed in a web of material relations wherein waste
is catching, in a sense. In Bleak House, human endeavours, structures of meaning, and
even bodies approach waste in a cycle of accumulation, negotiation, and devaluation. The
present chapter, then, addresses a different set of material waste relations from those seen
in Chapter 1. While the previous chapter moves between two notable waste ecologies that
express an obscure influence across Our Mutual Friend, this chapter begins with one
primary waste ecology—the Court of Chancery—that gives rise to two subsidiary waste
ecologies—Krook’s rag-and-bottle shop and Tom-all-Alone’s. The Court of Chancery
sits at the converging point of the novel’s conflicted systems of meaning; each turns upon
Chancery in one way or another. As Hillis Miller observes, “there is at the center of Bleak
House a tension between belief in some extra-human source of value, a stable center
outside the shadows of the human game, and on the other hand the shade of a suspicion
that there may be no such center, that all systems of interpretation may be fictions” (197).
This chapter explores the processes and associations that entangle those conflicted
systems of meaning into a larger waste ecology. I follow the Court of Chancery from its
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proceedings to Krook’s rag-and-bottle shop, and then on to Tom-all-Alone’s, tracing the
strained material relations that surround them. To do so, as well as to appreciate the full
complexity of material that grows exponentially in quantity, my analysis includes both
Krook’s rag-and-bottle shop and Tom-all-Alone’s, and the strained material relations that
surround them.
Taking each of these waste ecologies in turn, this chapter examines the ways in which the
Court of Chancery, Krook’s rag-and-bottle shop, and Tom-all-Alone’s all rehearse
cyclical patterns of accumulation that foster decay and operate as what this dissertation
has been calling waste ecologies. As waste ecologies they accumulate and reorient
everything—papers, clothing, animals, humans, even language—towards decay. I
consider that these forms of material growth through accumulation has an ecological
structure in this novel; as the useless and wasteful hoards of the novel grow, that growth
appears more organic than numeric in kind. As such, accumulation is imbued with an
unacknowledged power that interferes with the very “human game” that tries to support
systems of interpretation. Though the characters of the novel often search for meaning
and recuperation within these sites of accumulation, these negotiations with waste
inevitably fail. In this sense, Bleak House stages the impossibility for humans to find
anything like meaning, purpose, or agency next to these critical masses of waste.

2.1
Bleak House dramatizes the Court of Chancery’s elusive structural organization through
the ubiquitous fog of London. The weather surrounding Lincoln’s Inn Hall, where the
Court is located, reflects excessive accumulation through atmospheric density: “[t]he raw
afternoon is rawest, and the dense fog is densest, and the muddy streets are muddiest” by
Temple Bar and Lincoln’s Inn, and the Court itself sits “at the very heart of the fog” (14).
On the one hand, fog is an elusive substance representing the “groping and floundering
condition” of the inefficient and perennially deferred administrative work in Chancery
(14). The pernicious influence of Chancery is reflected in fog’s vaporous and
unstructured physical properties. On the other hand, the novel invests fog with a distinct
material presence: it “hang[s] heavy . . . as if it would never get out”; “the attendant
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wigs” appear to onlookers as if they were trapped in position, “all stuck in a fog-bank!”
(15). Even beyond Lincoln’s Inn, fog is invested with material properties. There is:
Fog up the river, where it flows among green aits and
meadows; fog down the river, where it rolls defiled among
the tiers of shipping and the waterside pollutions of a great
(and dirty) city. Fog on the Essex marshes, fog on the
Kentish heights. Fog creeping into the cabooses of collierbrigs; fog lying out on the yards and hovering in the rigging
of great ships; fog drooping on the gunwales of barges and
small boats. Fog in the eyes and throats of ancient
Greenwich pensioners, wheezing by the firesides of their
wards; fog in the stem and bowl of the afternoon pipe of the
wrathful skipper, down in his close cabin; fog cruelly
pinching the toes and fingers of his shivering little 'prentice
boy on deck. (13)
Dickens compares fog to various physical entities, alternating between the large and the
small. Fog bears the physical qualities of a large body of water; it “flows,” and “rolls.” It
is also localized to the body of a living creature, found “creeping,” “lying,” “hovering,”
“drooping,” and “pinching.” At times fog grows smaller still, congesting throats and
pipes. Fog in other words accrues material characteristics, emulating an accumulation of
its own.
Dickens’s fog has accumulated a critical canon as well. Hillis Miller, pointing to its
pervasive tendrils stretching from fashionable to impoverished districts, observes
that fog suggests “the interconnectedness of people in all levels of society” (180).
This reading of the fog parallels Richard Menke’s interest in telegraphy as a
mediating fantasy in Dickens’s work. Menke draws upon revealing notes that
Dickens jotted in preparation for a different work of fiction. Dickens’s directions
to himself read as a more dynamic and linear version of the unfurling beginning
of Bleak House: “Open the story by bringing two strongly contrasted places and
strongly contrasted sets of people, into the connexion necessary for the story, by
means of an electric message. Describe the message—be the message—flashing
along through space” (Dickens qtd. by Menke, Telegraphic Realism 90). The first
two chapters of Bleak House seem to realize this “connexion” running between
differences in a more gradual and passive juxtaposition. The reader’s attention

44

connects the worn suitors of Chancery with the wealthy party at Chesney Wold.
The more direct parallel in the novel’s opening, however, lies in the fog and the
connections that it makes as whole across social, material, and legal categories.
Menke suggests that the telegraphic offered Victorian realist authors a narrative
influence “associated with neutral, abstract information” (Telegraphic Realism
89). These networks also offered authors like Dickens a means to imagine social
ties through “a wider sense of new contiguities and expanding interconnection”
(94). In the famous opening passage of Bleak House, these interconnections cross
social and spatial distances—become thoughtless, ominous, and disconcerting.
The neutrality and abstraction of an information network reappears in the
senseless, colourless mediation of a meteorological event. That readers experience
the fog’s ubiquity, much as they might experience the telegraphic message’s
direct movement, suggests our own entanglement with the fog’s objective
prospect. If, as Menke remarks, “the telegraph signifies electric information that
lacks a material body, and that seems identifiable with no body in particular”
(Telegraphic Realism 90), the fog offers a less optimistic alternative. Its bodiless
immateriality decentres the individual within a populace, a space, an environment.
The fog ushers in an ecology that obscures clear distinctions and categories. No
longer linear, the fog suggests an ecological unity, binding the city into an
interrelated environment.
Recently, Jesse Oak Taylor has reaffirmed this understanding of Dickens’s fog as an
urban membrane:
Dickens presents a city of smoke and fog, enveloped in its
own exhalations. . . Rather than a closed system nested within
an environment, the novel presents a tangled thicket of
interrelated assemblages and multitiered systems at once
legal, bodily, and economic, with all of the systems open to
and affected by the others. (33)

45

Taylor points to the truth lying behind the euphemistic use of the term “fog.” London’s
air was filled with atmospheric pollution. It is atmospheric pollution that “irritat[es] the
eyes and throats” (Our Mutual Friend 144) of Dickens’s Londoners and that flows
through the city, mirroring the polluted Thames discussed in the previous chapter. When
Esther first arrives in London, she immediately recognizes the disastrously polluted
quality of the air. She mistakes the fog for smoke from “a great fire” (42). Esther’s
comment reveals her recognition that the London fog is waste, a pollutant that does not
belong. As well, this recognition betrays her as a stranger to the city, one outside of the
social mesh of the “fog” and who does not belong. Chase and Levenson express fog’s
urban ubiquity most succinctly when they observe that the “descent of gloom blinds the
city into unity” (207). Guppy is proof that this blindness may be attributable to the
polluted nature of the atmosphere itself. He corrects Esther’s observation, assuring her
that pollution, or “fog,” is “a London particular” (42). Londoners’ sense of blind unity,
their metropolitan connection across class, is an identity borrowed from waste. If fog
emulates the traits of London, it is because these characteristics are endlessly bound into
and represented by waste. This euphemistic fog becomes emblematic of London life, and
denying its character as waste becomes characteristic of London living. This negotiation
with waste, which borrows an agency or identity from waste’s rampant accumulation,
repeats in a variety of forms throughout this chapter. The irritation in the pensioner’s
throat signals the destructive outcome of such temporary bargains.
This cumulative quality is what aligns fog to the Court at Lincoln’s Inn. Like the
many documents in Chancery that are more important for their physical quantity than for
what their contents signify, fog’s material presence competes with its own metaphorical
signification. Fog suggests the geographically vast boundaries of Chancery-based
influence, the court’s oppressively opaque atmosphere, and its intangible consequence.
As D. A. Miller suggests, “what Chancery produces, or threatens to produce, is an
organization of power that, ceasing entirely to be a topic, has become topography itself: a
system of control that can be all-encompassing because it cannot be encompassed in
turn” (61). The power of Chancery exceeds the systemic bounds in which it was initially
designed. This organizational topography, with its elusive disorganization, resembles an
ecology in its cyclical growth. The only form of progress that the Court recognizes
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consists of repetitive speeches, paper copies, and meaningless formalities, the only
function of which is to contribute to its institutional growth. As a vehicle for reimagining
the Court as urban topography, then, fog might reasonably be the event horizon by which
we measure the material influence of this urban waste ecology.
Rather like its parallel institution, Krook’s rag-and-bottle shop, the Court of Chancery
amasses many things, and everything within this unceasing accumulation decays and
becomes waste. In its attempt to prolong the bureaucratic mechanisms by which its
members profit, the Court amasses props, documents, and people under the semblance of
due legal process, and combines a strong reluctance to relinquish with a rapacious desire
to involve and gather. In its first description, the Court is characterized not by its juridical
or administrative functions, but by its additive propensities—its tendency to accrue in
material weight:
This is the Court of Chancery; which has its decaying
houses and its blighted lands in every shire; which has its
worn-out lunatic in every madhouse, and its dead in every
churchyard; which has its ruined suitor, with his slipshod
heels and threadbare dress, borrowing and begging through
the round of every man’s acquaintance . . . (14-15)
These are seizures that the Court of Chancery is legally responsible for, but they are also
expressed as seizures in the sense of ownership and the possession of collected items.
Dickens’s language here links accumulation with capture. The Court “has”—retains
ownership of—“its decaying houses,” “its blighted lands,” and “its worn-out lunatic”
(emphases added). However, a ward of the state and a suitor are two legally separate
entities endowed with a wide margin of difference in legal agency; yet, the power of the
Court is such that it can reduce a suitor to the condition of a ward in its custody or a
desperate and bankrupted paramour (the other, tongue-in-cheek meaning of “suitor”).
Moreover, there is a fatal ambiguity present in this quotation’s use of “with.” The
implication of the Court’s ownership of a “ruined suitor, with his slipshod heels and
threadbare dress” allows for the possibility of yet another doubled reading. The Court
may have a suitor who wears “slipshod heels and threadbare dress” or may have a suitor
along with “his slipshod heels and threadbare dress.” In the midst of the Court’s rampant
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material accumulation, characters gradually approach emblems, becoming the more
significant for their material qualities. Accumulation in Chancery functions by engaging
such material qualities. Miss Flite, Richard, and others before them are transformed into
tropes of the proceedings, the token “worn-out lunatic” and “ruined suitor.” Speeches and
reports are infused with physical characteristics, with members of the bar “tripping one
another up on slippery precedents, groping knee-deep in technicalities,” and “running
their goat-hair and horse-hair warded heads against walls of words” (14). The Lord High
Chancellor is similarly enmeshed in swaths of material, sitting “with a foggy glory round
his head, softly fenced in with crimson cloth and curtains” (14).
In Chancery, Bleak House develops a vision of accrued materials so excessive that they
can barely sustain their signification, their legibility. The Court’s legal documents and
proceedings continue to baffle and remain incomprehensible because their larger meaning
lies in the fact of their multitudes. When Esther first attends court while the Jarndyce and
Jarndyce cause is on, she struggles to comprehend the proceedings:
there was a buzz, and a laugh, and a general withdrawal of the
bystanders, and a bringing in of great heaps, and piles, and
bags and bags-full of papers.
I think it came on ‘for further directions,’ – about some bill
of costs, to the best of my understanding, which was confused
enough. But I counted twenty-three gentlemen in wigs, who
said they were ‘in it;’ . . . and some of them jocosely proposed
to read huge volumes of affidavits, and there was more
buzzing and laughing . . . . After an hour or so of this, and a
good many speeches being begun and cut short, it was
‘referred back for the present,’ as Mr Kenge said, and the
papers were bundled up again, before the clerks had finished
bringing them in. (397)
Bewildered by this incomprehensible multitude and accumulation, the one impression
that Esther can grasp is the quantity of what she sees—i.e., “great heaps, and piles, and
bags and bags-full of papers,” “twenty-three gentlemen in wigs,” and “huge volumes of
affidavits.” The physical quantity of the papers exceeds even the stultified duration of the
proceedings; the documents are too numerous to be brought in within the span of the
hearing. The passage presents the Jarndyce and Jarndyce proceedings as a catalogue—
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itemized lists being something of a signature move in Dickens’s literary style, as Daniel
Tyler and others have noted. The scene lists the multitudes of objects, persons, and
activity in this space as an inventory of stock, but without any explanation of the
organizing logic of the items gathered therein. This cataloguing emphasizes numbers and
context-less quantity, barring us from the central concerns and meaning of the
proceedings much as Esther is. Indeed, Esther scarcely comprehends the “further
directions” or the arbitrary costs that lie at the centre of these proceedings, but she
immediately counts the “twenty-three gentlemen in wigs.” Being “in it” also has a double
meaning: on the one hand, the barristers are involved in the suit; on the other hand, these
men are yet another item added to the suit’s collection. The parting image of the only
partially-delivered papers, never considered in their totality, completes the suggestion
that what matters here is their overwhelming numbers and not anyone’s access to them as
legible texts. When the Court and its innumerable cases are read for their enactment of
accumulation, the baffling machinations of Chancery become clearer. Under such a
principle, what began as an expression of systematized sovereign power has evolved into
ungovernable, unrelenting material excess.
That these various material signifiers are ultimately empty of meaning betrays the
essential vapidity of the Chancery system itself. When John Jarndyce tries to describe
what the suit is about, for instance, one sees a linguistic example of the strain that the
Chancery system places on meaning:
It’s about a Will, and the trusts under a Will – or it was, once.
It’s about nothing but Costs, now. We are always appearing,
and disappearing, and swearing, and interrogating, and filing,
and cross-filing, and arguing, and sealing, and motioning, and
referring, and reporting, and revolving about the Lord
Chancellor and all his satellites, and equitably waltzing
ourselves off to dusty death, about Costs. That’s the great
question. All the rest, by some extraordinary means, has
melted away. (118)
As Jarndyce explains, the enactment of these legal procedures has supplanted the
administration of the will and its trusts as the aim of Jarndyce and Jarndyce. In the suit’s
rapacious productivity, the legal motions—represented by ample and meticulous
copies—blend together into one incomprehensible mass of documentation. The
“extraordinary means” by which this legal administration has become opaque,
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unknowable, is that, rather than being figuratively material to the case, the various
motions of Jarndyce and Jarndyce are material to the case only in a literal sense—they
comprise so much material gathered in the name of this one cause. Meanwhile, “All the
rest”—referring to any other distinction, value, or signification these papers might have
had—“has melted away.” Jarndyce’s catalogue of verbs is not simply conventional to
Dickens’s stylized prose; the list of ambiguous verbs echoes the circuitous path by which
Chancery suitors are bewildered. We might consider a contrasting example to this
Dickensian list in A Christmas Carol (1843), which assigns to Scrooge the verbs
“squeezing, wrenching, grasping, scraping, clutching” (23). When we compare this list of
verbs to Jarndyce’s “appearing,” “disappearing,” “swearing,” “interrogating,” “filing,”
“cross-filing,” “arguing,” “sealing,” “motioning,” “referring,” “reporting,” “revolving,”
and “waltzing,” the grammatical reasons for the obscured meaning of Chancery
documents become clear. The Christmas Carol verbs all share a single subject, Scrooge,
and their significance builds upon this basis; the Jarndyce verbs reference a vague array
of subjects, including, perhaps, witnesses, lawyers, clerks, judges, documents, and
evidence. The doubled meanings of the verbs (literal and legal), combined with the length
of the list and the number of subjects, confuse the significance of the whole. The
signification of the Chancery papers are so confused and displaced that Jarndyce must
invent a vocabulary to describe the process: “Wiglomeration,” or the “vastly
ceremonious, wordy, unsatisfactory, and expensive” legal proceedings (121). In other
26

words, the text enacts the grammatical accumulation that negates meaning.
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Jarndyce’s criticism is that the verbs are effectively meaningless, that criticism is staged
by Dickens’s own syntax.
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Steinlight suggests a reading in which Dickens’s signature style finds a new significance within Bleak
House. Where I point to accumulated language that diminishes each individual word’s signification,
Steinlight observes the superficial development of the novel’s nameless supernumerary characters: “In
Bleak House, however (as is so often the case in Dickens’s writing), the implicit verbal irony of the
narrator’s description produces the further irony of an unlikely narrative truth. For all its strident populism,
the novel generates larger numbers than its own domestic and political economies can accommodate”
(Populating the Novel 228).
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When Jarndyce tries to convey to Esther the extreme redundancy that defines the
Jarndyce and Jarndyce suit, what he imparts is the uselessness of resisting the non-linear
and self-replicating structure of the Chancery waste ecology. He explains:
In the question how the trusts under that Will are to be
administered
. . . the Will itself is made a dead letter.27 All through the
deplorable cause, everything that everybody in it, except one
man, knows already, is referred to that only one man who
don’t know it, to find out – all through the deplorable cause,
everybody must have copies, over and over again, of
everything that has accumulated about it in the way of
cartloads of papers (or must pay for them without having them,
which is the usual course, for nobody wants them); . . . And
thus, through years and years, and lives and lives, everything
goes on, constantly beginning over and over again, and
nothing ever ends. And we can’t get out of the suit on any
terms, for we are made parties to it, and must be parties to it,
whether we like it or not. (118-119)
In Chancery, waste reproduces excessively; the “copies, over and over again” and
cyclical procedures “constantly beginning over and over again” result in “cartloads” of so
much waste paper, “for nobody wants them.” The Jarndyce and Jarndyce suit “constantly
begin[s] over and over again,” lacks a clear termination or direction, and eventually lacks
the funds to reach a full resolution in court. That cyclical structure is also infectious.
Jarndyce’s own speech takes on some of the redundancy that characterizes the processes
he describes, with its repetitions and the syntax that seems endless (“over and over
again,” “years and years,” “lives and lives,” “parties to it . . . parties to it”). Indeed,
Jarndyce’s familiarity with these terms and expressions suggests either that he was once
drawn in by these bewildering legal machinations, or is subtly influenced by it in spite of
his determined refusal to seek signification in Chancery. Jarndyce’s invented vocabulary,
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The cause, as we see, is so productive of waste paper that even the central document around which the
entire case revolves “is made a dead letter.” Resulting typically from the illegibility of written directions,
the dead letter is a fitting emblem for Jarndyce and Jarndyce, a suit built upon the ambiguity of its original
will’s written directions. Dead letters stymie circulation and steadily accumulate in piles of paper whose
signification is indefinitely deferred. Dead letters, however, may also result from the absence of a clear end
point or destination, as well as from insufficient funds to cover the cost of postage.
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his repetitive attempts at explanation, and his multi-referential imagery all suggest
language’s fundamental inability to encompass the expansive and unspecific nature of a
suit that beggars significance, and of a growing waste ecology that absorbs and
consequently diminishes the value of individual human endeavour.
The self-replication and patterns of decay that govern the Court of Chancery form an
ecology of waste. The structure of Dickens’s Chancery is not so neatly contained or
regulated as that of a system; its apparent order and regularity is a blind for a chaos of
rampant accumulation, of emptied signification, and of growth by decay. A Chancery suit
does not develop along a linear progression; what the Jarndyce and Jarndyce example
shows is that a suit will repeat certain cycles of legal proceedings, increasing its
expenditure or its rate of wasting resources until either the resources have been fully
absorbed into costs or the suitor dies and becomes the final, bodily addition to the
accumulated waste. Whatever the form of accumulation in Chancery, that which is
accumulated is driven toward decay. Dickens’s lavish legal metonyms alert us to the
objecthood encroaching upon human characters entangled in Chancery. The Jarndyce
suitors are the bearers of a “scarecrow of a suit”—the tattered clothing that remains after
the wasted body beneath it disappears (16); “the maces, bags, and purses” are the
metonyms by which Dickens refers to officers of the State (17); Queen’s Counsel
barristers are referred to by their attire, including “Mr Blowers the eminent silk gown”
(17). These metonyms are assigned carefully; while suitors waste away until nothing is
left of them but the tattered remains of their clothing, those individuals who can survive
or thrive within the system of the Court become interchangeable with those articles that
they wear or use. In either case, the Court’s material presence signifies neither the
authority of the state, nor the interests of the citizen, but rather an accumulating
materiality for its own sake. If Krook devalues the goods of his shop to the point of
destroying their economic significance, the Court of Chancery destroys all signification
beyond the material itself. Gordon Bigelow points out that the physical routinely
overwhelms the semiotic in Bleak House when he describes the Jarndyce and Jarndyce
suit as “a pure materiality of writing, an infinite semiotics, a language that does not
signify, but only increases itself” (88). This emptiness of meaning is why the Chancery
system is as heedless of the waste and ruin brought upon its suitors as Krook is of the

52

disorder and disrepair of his wares. The Court operates on the rehearsal of the forms and
motions, on the accrual of papers and suitors, because it supplements, even replaces,
judiciary substance with the accumulation of material substance. Import, relevance, and
significance are papered over.
We see an extension of this displaced meaning in Snagsby’s law-stationer’s business,
which deals specifically with the reproduction of legal documents, and which has enough
business to warrant sending surplus work out regularly to independent law-writers such
as Nemo. Snagsby’s profession is described not by the naming of the work itself, but
rather through the many objects accessory to copying work:
. . . Mr. Snagsby has dealt in all sorts of blank forms of legal
process; in skins and rolls of parchment; in paper—foolscap,
brief, draft, brown, white, whitey-brown, and blotting; in
stamps; in office-quills, pens, ink, India-rubber, pounce, pins,
pencils, sealing-wax, and wafers; in red tape and green ferret;
in pocket-books, almanacs, diaries, and law lists; in string
boxes, rulers, inkstands—glass and leaden—pen-knives,
scissors, bodkins, and other small office-cutlery; in short, in
articles too numerous to mention . . . (154)
That we are thrown headlong into the minutiae of the material realities of undertaking
such work suggests that material propagation begets more material propagation. Copying
work not only produces more paper copies, but also necessitates the production of seven
varieties of paper, writing tools and accessories, and all manner of “small office-cutlery.”
Furthermore, the variety of stationary products suggests the variety of formats that copied
documents require. The only indication of these copies’ existence, moreover, lies in their
material properties—which are facilitated by these accessories—and not in the
signification of the copied text. The material, in other words, stands in for semantic
28

possibility here.
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Victorian literary scholars have been keenly alert to the narrative significance of waste paper. Richard
Menke’s recent article, “New Grub Street’s Ecologies of Paper,” implies the fascinating semantic
possibility of waste-paper, enabled by a shift in the late-nineteenth century from rag-paper production to
wood-pulp paper. Menke argues that the latter mode of production, which is cheaper and less durable,
imbues the subject of Gissing’s novel (the waning medium of the luxury triple-decker novel) with ironic
significance. In the context of this dissertation, however, Menke’s work further presents an intriguing
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Snagsby’s law stationer’s shop is therefore a satellite waste ecology that grows out of the
Chancery waste ecology. Ambiguous papers (in the form of legal copies) sustain an
ecology of stationary that similarly has no other meaning beyond their material presence
in the novel. As we will see in Krook’s shop, ambiguous papers appear throughout the
novel. Their crisis, however, lies in Chancery. Copying and copied-texts bear material
significance, if they have no semantic value. The Court of Chancery initiates their
cancerous proliferation of paper as a force that upends their typical status as the
overlooked material substrate of signification. The legal copies that come Snagsby’s way,
for instance, have heightened natural properties:
Mr. Snagsby is behind his counter in his grey coat and
sleeves, inspecting an indenture of several skins which has
just come in from the engrosser’s, an immense desert of
law-hand and parchment, with here and there a restingplace of a few large letters to break the awful monotony and
save the traveller from despair. Mr Snagsby puts up at one
of these inky wells and greets the stranger with his cough of
general preparation for business. (728)
Snagsby’s engagement with these “skins” is the navigation of topography and this
interaction emphasizes the unnoticed blank space that marks the absence of text. The
association with a desert draws attention to parchment’s material properties; it has a
sandy colour and has been dried out through its curing. When we fail to notice the
paper—here, the parchment—of a text, it is because we, as readers, use paper to
background the type or writing on a page. Paper offers a physical field of contrast that at
once aids and stands against linguistic significance. Bleak House consistently emphasizes
paper, the designated canvas of signification, for its own ontic quality, which, in its sheer
ubiquity, supplements and even dwarfs textual signification. The document, however, is a
“desert of law-hand and parchment” (emphasis added). The document is dry in a

instance of waste paper (paper made of repurposed waste) that proliferates (books with wood-pulp paper
that quickly yellow and crumble sooner become waste paper); not even the physical media of literature
escapes entanglement in a waste ecology.
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figurative sense; the reading is uninteresting and, ultimately, unvalued. What little
interest the document presents is in the “few large letters” that “break the awful
monotony and save the traveller from despair.” These few points of interest, which
provide the interaction with its only notable moments, has a material source; the visual
variety offered by the occasional large initial is what gives this text some significance
rather than its written context, which John Jarndyce assures readers will remain
fundamentally valueless. Throughout the Court of Chancery, barristers’ papers are not
known by their written contents, but depicted as: “A battery of blue bags . . . loaded with
heavy charges of paper” (19). The pun that casts these papers as both military
ammunition and a grouped series of items—playing on the use of “battery” and
“charges”—highlights the quantity that makes their meaning impossible to decipher. The
copy is also, then, a desert of meaning—that is, it is a copy, and does not produce any
new textual content. As we shall see, it is this quality of the copy, unproductive of
meaning but productive of largely wasted paper, that defines the battery of papers’
ultimate retort to significance.
As an institution with an ecological structure, Chancery suits also attract parasites. The
lawyers representing the Jarndyce and Jarndyce suitors, including Conversation Kenge
and the predatory Vholes, are too happy to fund their livelihood through their clients’
vain attempts to find meaning or purpose in the wastes and copies accumulated in
Chancery. These parasitic characters assume a language that is curiously focused on the
material. Vholes, for instance, maintains his influence over his increasingly exasperated
client by insisting upon his own inanimate qualities. First, he advises Richard to be
patient with the suit and to adopt “a little of my insensibility” (624). Vholes refers
regularly to objects or a state of object-like “insensibility” as a source of reassurance, as
though the physical immediacy of material objects offers a reprieve from the abstraction
and confusion of legal administration. While Richard is ashamed at the idea of accusing
Vholes of insensibility, the latter insists that such a disposition is necessary to his
profession and presses the point further by rapping on his desk, which “sounds as hollow
as a coffin,” and proclaiming, “This desk is your rock, sir!” (625). In Chancery, material
pushes back against human signification. Characters like Richard endeavour earnestly to
find some recuperative purpose in Chancery proceedings—some signifying value in the
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many Jarndyce and Jarndyce papers—only to succumb bodily in their failure to exercise
command over any part of this waste ecology. Although Vholes asserts a metaphor of
stability (the desk as a rock), the desk produces a hollow sound, speaking out as it were
against the insincerity of Vholes’s reassurances with a competing and more accurate
material association (the desk as a coffin). By linking an object to the legal proceedings,
Vholes borrows the authority of that image—its solidity and stability—and claims it,
acquires it, on behalf of the meaningless suit.
The rampant copying work of the Jarndyce suit foregrounds the way in which material
can outweigh signification. Copies are not productive of new meaning except by error.
Without a corresponding increase of textual content, copies simply attenuate signification
through meaningless repetition. Circulating several copies of the same document is likely
to add structural confusion to a text and ultimately to produce so much material as to
render all text inaccessible. The legal copies accumulated in Jarndyce and Jarndyce push
this attenuation of signification to an extreme, utterly upending the ratio of paper to
meaning. As we have already seen, “everybody must have copies, over and over again,”
the suit accumulates “cartloads of papers,” and it is hardly surprising that “nobody wants
them” when they yield “nothing but confusion and failure” (118, 118, 118, 316). And
where there is little signifying value, as in Chancery documents, material accumulation
becomes the only register upon which documents hold any meaning. Miss Flite’s habit of
carrying “some small litter in a reticule which she calls her documents; principally
consisting of paper matches and dry lavender” (14-15) marks the novel’s most whimsical
satire of the copy. Miss Flite’s miscellaneous materials are no less meaningful than any
legal copy in the Jarndyce suit, emphasizing not only their value as approaching that of
waste, but their materiality over any textual import. The scraps of paper and dried flowers
in her bag imitate a full set of legal documents of which she has more than one as she
keeps several copies of this copy, with “some half-dozen reticules and work-bags,
‘containing documents’” on reserve in her apartment (73).
The copied affidavits produced by Miss Flite’s neighbour, Nemo, are a counterexample,
demonstrating the extraneous significances that might arise in copies due to idiosyncrasy
and error rather than textual meaning. Lady Dedlock pays these copies unusual attention,
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not for their “detestable monotony” (27), but because of the unique appearance of the
handwriting, which she recognizes as Captain Hawdon’s. Though she attempts to
disguise her interest from Tulkinghorn, the two continue to discuss the peculiar
characteristics of Nemo’s writing instead of their legal import, with Lady Dedlock asking
if it is written in “law-hand,” and Tulkinghorn informing her that “the legal character
which it has was acquired after the original hand was formed” (26, 27). Nemo’s aesthetic
identity, engaged through the material qualities rather than the legal matter of the
document, arises from the desert of the copy, again aiding and standing against its
superficial communication.
When material signification overwhelms the human characters of the novel—or, rather,
when the human character comes to embody material signification in Chancery—their
bodies bear the marks of physical depreciation. Those who try to make waste significant
in order to actually recuperate human effort, like Richard, are inevitably brought to a
tragic end. As Richard becomes further entangled in the Jarndyce and Jarndyce
proceedings, his body becomes increasingly marked by his interactions with the suit.
Esther first realizes this in moments when Richard interacts with his heaps of legal
copies: “As his look wandered over the papers again . . . I noticed how sunken and how
large his eyes appeared, how dry his lips were, and how his finger-nails were all bitten
away” (784). Though these are copies of legal documents, they are also figured as copies
of Richard’s own psyche and obsession. Esther, seeing Richard unawares, imagines these
papers as narcissistic “dusty mirrors reflecting his own mind” (784). Paper is the locus of
Richard’s unhealthy obsession with the suit, one that has a material impact upon his
body. These marks appear on Richard from an early point in his entanglement, shortly
after Richard has hired Vholes to represent his legal interests in the suit:
Richard . . . passes under the shadow of the Lincoln’s Inn
trees. On many such loungers have the speckled shadow of
those trees often fallen; on the like bent head, the bitten nail,
the lowering eye, the lingering step, the purposeless and
dreamy air, the good consuming and consumed, the life turned
sour. This lounger is not shabby yet, but that may come.
Chancery, which knows no wisdom but in Precedent, is very
rich in such Precedents; and why should one be different from
then thousand?
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Yet the time is so short since his depreciation began, that . .
. Richard himself may feel his own case as if it were a startling
one. . . . But injustice breeds injustice; the fighting with
shadows and being defeated by them, necessitates the setting
up of substances to combat; . . . (630)
As Richard is worn down, his condition is linked to the proliferation of new entities.
While Richard’s body—bent, bitten, lowered, lingering, consumed, and sour—
depreciates in substance, “injustice breeds injustice”; his predicament gives rise to new
“substances to combat.” True to its purpose, the Chancery waste ecology makes Richard
productive even though it not productive on his behalf. These images of reproduced
copies (Richard’s case being but one of thousands of “Precedents”), of physical
transformation (the early signs of Richard’s shabbiness to come), and of proliferation (the
breeding injustices and combative substances) articulate the stakes of Richard’s
circumstances in material terms. The “setting up of substances to combat” is the material
situation of Richard’s frustrated hopes in John Jarndyce—another body to be read, or
misread, in its absorption into the suit. Richard’s own body registers another revolution
of cyclical, merciless waste-accumulation—the ultimate end of the individual human
subject overwhelmed by material signification.
Richard describes the effect of being in Chancery as living in perpetual instability. He
explains, “I was born into this unfinished contention with all its chances and changes, and
it began to unsettle me before I quite knew the difference between a suit at law and a suit
of clothes; and it has gone on unsettling me ever since” (371). Interestingly, Richard
assigns the active verb to the suit as opposed to himself, suggesting that his life was
under the organizing power of Jarndyce and Jarndyce. Richard further enmeshes himself
in the suit from a desire to protect his and Ada’s financial interests—and tries to become
a kind of curator of its materials. However, no order can be imposed upon Jarndyce and
Jarndyce, which by this point has grown into such a complex ecology that it has taken to
organizing its members rather than being organized by them. Those like Kenge and Vole
who assist in the voracious proliferation of the suit profit from it accordingly. On the
other hand, suitors such as Miss Flite, Gridley, and Richard, who are opposed to its
proliferation, are eventually destroyed; Miss Flite is robbed of her mental health, and
Gridley and Richard their physical health. Richard’s eventual death is particularly timely.
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When the suit is finally resolved, Richard’s existence as a contributor to the Court’s
material accrual abruptly ends; released from its accumulative principles, then, Richard
has no more reason to live. When the final judgement is given, announcing that the whole
Jarndyce estate has been expended in legal costs, Richard tries to voice his discontent but
cannot, “his mouth being full of blood” (976). It is significant that Richard is forced to
embody his extreme failure to recuperate his wasted endeavours when he is thus unable
to speak; his speech is physically impeded by the waste of his own body. This moment
can be read as his final engagement with the material vocabulary of the Court, which has
no other signification beyond accumulation. As we have seen, the Court substitutes
materiality for significant writing or speech. Though Richard’s continued engagement
with the suit has gradually worn away his body, he has internalized the material logic of
Chancery, as we see in his gradual obsession with legal copy. His final, gory exchange,
then, can be read not as a frustrated complaint but as a material one. In trying to
communicate within a system that does not recognize ordinary methods of signification,
all he can do is spew forth his own bloodline—his physical, material argument for
inheritance.

2.2
In a wide-ranging chapter on the social and material encounters of Bleak House, John
Parham observes that “[l]urking beneath the material is the (barely perceptible)
immaterial—the damp, smells, infections, and diseases whose consequences we cannot
see. In Bleak House, Dickens is attempting to read and unravel the complex turbulence of
these intra-actions” (121). Parham’s interests in the material and immaterial registers of
waste parallel my own in this chapter. He examines waste for its ecologies and
connections, arguing that they stage many of the social encounters of the novel through a
trans-corporeality—a concept connected to my discussion of the indigestible in the next
chapter. Here, his discussion figures the material world as haunted by spreading,
interconnected, unclassifiable miasmas (“the damp, smells, infections, and diseases”).
These atmospheres often emulate their more material connections. Fog, as I mentioned in
the previous section, responds in form to the bodies and spaces of London, mimicking
even the movement of the Thames. A subtler, more disturbing example is the “greasy” air
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and “tainting sort of weather. . . sinking to the spirits” (Dickens 507) that prefigures the
novel’s most extraordinary engagement with waste: Krook’s spontaneous human
combustion. I am interested in Parham’s sense of the immaterial atmosphere, particularly
when it becomes so polluted as to seem material. However, I am interested, as well, in an
immaterial connection that stems from material repetition. Interactions with the material
world repeat throughout this novel, creating immaterial, implicit connections between
various material encounters. Chancery recurs in a rag-and-bottle shop and in Tom-AllAlone. The bargains for meaning and agency that define Chancery’s doomed suits,
reappear in the waste of these spaces. Richard’s death is only one example of the lost
integrity of the individual body—and the loss of a certain version of meaning—in the
accelerated materiality of the world of Bleak House. The novel, moreover, mourns that
loss, as we see in the lingering pathos of Jo’s death, and in the abject horror of the deaths
of the Jarndyce and Jarndyce suitors Tom Jarndyce (“victim of rash action – brains” (19))
and Richard Carstone (“his mouth being full of blood” (976)). The novel periodically
stages the obliteration of individuals enmeshed in some form of rapacious material
reproduction or accumulation. Richard’s death, however, is not the most memorable of
these examples. Rather, Krook’s final engagement with his waste-full shop has become
the novel’s signature moment of lost integrity in the face of a waste ecology.
Recalling Bleak House’s opening image of mud accruing at compound interest, Krook
and his rag-and-bottle shop extend this metaphor of accumulation that devalues. He has
“a liking for rust and must and cobwebs” because “all’s fish that comes to my net” (70).
In other words, Krook treasures the unsanitary increase of valueless material that is
produced by his hoard because it is nonetheless an increase of matter. It is this behaviour,
ultimately, that he claims is the origin of his nickname, “the Lord Chancellor” (69).
Krook “can’t abear to part with anything [he] once lay[s] hold of . . . or to alter anything,
or to have any sweeping, nor scouring, nor cleaning, nor repairing going on about [him]”
(70). This prioritizing of increased matter at the expense of value, even sanitation,
parallels the structure of the Court of Chancery, which is intended for the oversight of
equity but is portrayed as harvesting legal documents, labour, and funds rather than
concluding ongoing suits. Both institutions function according to an eccentric avarice for
more material.
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The primary business of Krook’s shop is not to acquire business at all, but tenaciously to
accumulate more wares. This warehouse—in which “Everything seemed to be bought,
and nothing to be sold” (67)—forgoes exchange for hoarding. The shop is a site of
competing measures of valuation and devaluation, a confusion fostered by Krook’s
practices of accumulation. Though Krook’s is nominally a business, it has fallen into ruin
because he would rather amass rust, must, and cobwebs instead of altering, cleaning, or
selling any part of his hoard for profit. Krook explains that the shop is a place of “so
many things . . . of so many kinds, and all, as the neighbours think (but they know
nothing), wasting away and going to rack and ruin” (70).29 In this place, material
accumulation takes precedence over all—over sales, maintenance, repairs, renovation,
even cleaning. Unlike his neighbours (who “know nothing”), Krook embraces the
wasteful and ruinous process; the many things of many kinds gather dust, filth, and
mould, which effects a physical, material addition to his stores and advances a goal of
accumulation if not one of fiscal value. What for some qualifies as “wasting away and
going to rack and ruin” is for Krook the successful accomplishment of his shop’s true
purpose.
Krook’s hoarding does not simply lay waste to his wares in a physical sense; it also
wastes language and writing as mediums of signification. Papers comprise a significant
portion of Krook’s business, though he is not able to read. The novel is careful to
emphasize that Krook’s papers are both a financial waste—in that he does not sell
them—and a waste of language—in that the sole proprietor of the papers can not read
them and jealously guards them from being read by others. Instead, Krook’s relationship
to language is to treat it as a hoard on a few different levels. He has a hoard of letters,
including the bundle of Lady Dedlock’s love letters that he steals from Hawdon. Krook
also has a hoard of upper and lower case letters, in a sense. He can reproduce individual
letters because, as Jobling reports, he has a photographic memory for any writing he has
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There are two voices at play in the final clause of this sentence; it is at once Krook’s proud statement of
his wares going to waste and ruin, and also a summary of his neighbours’ critical opinions. In these two
senses, the final clause contains both a positive and a negative sensibility: the negative, for Krook, is to
“know nothing” or to lack things; the positive is to possess a motley assembly of things.
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seen. In spite of this ability, Krook still cannot read; his hoard of internal images remains
as unstructured and disordered as the clutter of his shop. This suggests that he perceives
the pure materiality of texts—that language for him is a series of visual impressions—
detached from their semantic value. He has, essentially, a store of accumulated images
that happen to represent graphemes, words, and whole documents. Like the steadily
increasing bags of useless legal papers in the Jarndyce suit, Krook mimics the same
repetitive cycles of waste-accumulation that characterize the Court of Chancery.
Krook’s approach to writing also follows a principle of accumulation and multiplication;
he writes by producing copies of the various writing he has seen. When he writes the
letter “J” for Esther, she notices that he does so “in a very curious manner, beginning
with the end of the letter and shaping it backward. It was a capital letter, not a printed
one, but just such a letter as any clerk in Messrs Kenge and Carboy’s office would have
made” (75-76). Unfamiliar with standard handwriting techniques, Krook writes by
enacting a visual fidelity to the writing he has access to—i.e., legal documents—to the
extent of reproducing the standard cursive style of “any clerk in Messrs Kenge and
Carboy’s office.” In effect, he sketches a picture of a letter rather than expressing it in
writing. Contrary to the usual speed expected of copying work, however, Krook’s
writing-by-copy is a slow and inefficient process; he does not write in full words but,
palimpsest-like, writes one letter in chalk, erases it, writes the next letter, erases it, and
repeats this process for the remaining letters of the word. He cannot connect letters into
their standard sequential order, nor insert them into a value system of linguistic meaning.
Instead, he accumulates letters, building up layers of images that the reader must
assemble into recognizable words. In this moment, the novel offers the notion of words as
an accumulation of letters, allowing us to glimpse at a fundamental level the strange logic
of a space where gathering hampers signification and value.
That Krook develops this peculiar regimen of self-education, that he desires access to the
signification of language, suggests that he does attempt to find some deeper significance
in his wasteful hoarding. However, his long orientation toward accumulation interferes
with this endeavour. When John Jarndyce points out to Krook that he would learn to read
and write more easily if he were taught by another, Krook, “with a wonderfully
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suspicious flash of his eye,” replies: “Aye, but they might teach me wrong! . . . I don’t
know what I may have lost, by not being learnd afore. I wouldn’t like to lose anything by
being learnd wrong now” (237). Notably, Krook frames his distrust of education in terms
of a loss. He is too far defined by his drives to accumulate, and in adopting the same
approach to language undermines his search for semic knowledge. Though he stands to
gain by being taught, the slightest chance of “los[ing] anything” further through an
imperfect education excites all of his suspicions and possessiveness. Krook’s writing
method undermines linguistic signification, straining even Esther’s relationship to
language when he writes out the word “Jarndyce” for her; it is harder to read a word the
letters of which are only visible one at a time. Krook’s discrete letters may mimic the
movement of relational text, but that text’s value as a tool of signification is diminished
because he is afraid to lose any further information. Krook has hoarded waste—has
submitted to cycles of waste-accumulation—for too long to retrieve any further meaning
from it.
Within the orbit of the rag-and-bottle shop, however, Krook is not the only character who
overlooks the semantic meaning of written text for the meanings suggested by the
material characteristics of writing. When Krook copies out the name “Hawdon” from the
direction of one of the love letters, Jobling correctly identifies the original as a woman’s
writing based on the aesthetic qualities rather than the linguistic properties that Krook
mimics; as he observes, the writing “slopes a good deal, and the end of the letter ‘n,’ long
and hasty” (512). In order to fulfill their task of reading Krook’s writing, both Esther and
Jobling are guided toward accumulating letters, whether alphabetical or postal, with a
particular focus on their material features. And though theirs are not examples of how
Krook himself accumulates, they do suggest that the rag-and-bottle shop is a site of
analogous impulses of accumulation. Krook’s, in other words, draws others to varying
degrees into acts of accumulation.
Accumulation in Krook’s makes waste of material, leading to the fluid boundaries of the
wares and their tendency to bleed into each other. For instance, Krook’s legal documents
infuse his other wares with a legal character. When Esther, Richard, and Ada see his
“heaps of old crackled parchment scrolls and discoloured and dog’s-eared law-papers”
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(68), this leads them to link a series of objects to the legal profession. As Esther relates,
they:
. . . could have fancied that all the rusty keys, of which there
must have been hundreds huddled together as old iron, had
once belonged to doors of rooms or strong chests in
lawyers' offices. The litter of rags tumbled partly into and
partly out of a one-legged wooden scale, hanging without
any counterpoise from a beam, might have been
counsellors' bands and gowns torn up. One had only to
fancy, . . . that yonder bones in a corner, piled together and
picked very clean, were the bones of clients, to make the
picture complete. (68)
The rusted keys that might have come from anywhere may very well belong to
generations of law offices and lawyers’ strong boxes. The litter of rags could indeed be
the torn fragments of counsellors’ uniforms. Even Richard’s joke might be true: the
clean-picked bones might after all include the bones of former clients. In their
accumulated state, these items move easily in and out of different categories of
signification. The legal papers, rusty keys, clothing rags, and human bones thrown
together in masses all appear equally linked to or tainted by decay. This passage provides
an early sense of how waste spreads by association—legal documents register more
clearly as waste in their association with other useless things. The keys are gathering rust
instead of opening the hundreds of doors and chests to which they belong. Neither rags
nor bones are used or even repurposed here, as they might have been in Venus’s shop.
Even more grotesquely, Guppy is ready to “cut [his] hand off” (516) after touching the
grease that turns out to be human tallow. Dickens creates a heightened sense of the decay
produced by accumulation in this sequence of useless, wasted things. And in maintaining
a fluid relationship to stable systems of meaning, accumulated material in this shop
develops its own emergent significance beyond the language written on the papers, the
use-value of keys and clothing, and the abjection and reverence that we invest in human
bones.
What we find in Krook’s decaying, accumulated wares, then, is a deterioration of the
boundaries between material bodies, living and nonliving. As a result, the human bodies
that pass through Krook’s shop are liable to be reoriented toward, or even to embody,
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waste. Krook’s hoard is indiscriminate to the point of including human parts. In their first
meeting, Krook covets Ada’s hair to add to his “three sacks of ladies’ hair” (69). Indeed,
so distracted is he by the prospect of a new addition to his store that he interrupts his own
monologue explaining his nickname. He takes hold of a strand of Ada’s hair, captivated,
not out of a lover’s but an appraiser’s appreciation, attentive to its “colour” and “texture”
(69). Human hair was a crafting material in the Victorian period, but even the novel itself
acknowledges a certain grotesque excess in this stockpile of hair and an uneasy quality to
his ready and exact knowledge of his inventory. Later interceding on Esther’s behalf,
Richard alludes to this excess, remarking: “Don’t be tempted. Three sacks below are
quite enough for Mr Krook!” (76). Krook’s fixation with Ada’s hair, and his desire to add
that hair to his bags, represents a threat to her bodily integrity. Predatory in a strictly
accumulative sense, he sees this living woman as simply a carrier of what could be
another bag of ladies’ tresses. In this action, Krook mimics the subtler, more sinister
devaluation of human life and the rapacious growth of accumulation that we also see in
Chancery. The gathering of one material incites more of the same. Krook mentions his
three sacks of ladies’ hair to Ada as if the fact of his already having some women’s hair
was a likely means of persuasion. In death, both Nemo and Krook befoul the walls “with
soot, and grease, and dirt” or falling flakes of soot that “smears, like black fat!” (164,
512), as if the first instance invited the second. In all of these cases, accumulation causes
some form of devaluation; Ada’s hair is less aesthetically valuable cut off and in bags
than when attached to her head, while the two deaths leave the rag-and-bottle shop less
economically valuable as lodgings for rent. The effect of accumulation, moreover, is to
devalue bodies and wares, both economically and by blurring the division between
subject and object; in this world, people are continually on the verge of being reduced to
their material parts.
These dissolving distinctions between human body and collectible object are ultimately
the result of humans’ failure to exercise command over accumulated waste, or to retrieve
new meaning out of accumulated waste. When Nemo’s (i.e., Hawdon’s) body is

65

discovered, there follows a brief investigation into his identity that is restricted to the
clues afforded by his dead body.30 When asked if he knew anything of his lodger’s past
life, Krook answers, “You might as well ask me to describe the ladies whose heads of
hair I have got in sacks down-stairs” (168). This ready comparison suggests that Krook
was already in the habit of considering Nemo as part of his wares; the shop owner can no
more find meaning in his lodger’s corpse than he can identify the origins of his ladies’
hair or decipher the contents of his legal papers. The devaluation that occurs through
excessive accumulation—i.e., the fluidity of boundaries—also has ramifications that are
inscribed onto the human body. We see how the human body comes to embody waste in
Krook’s spectacularized death, when it becomes clear that his wares have always
threatened to absorb or consume the characters of the novel. In evaporating into the
atmosphere, coating the walls and window sills, he fulfills the continued accumulation of
the shop. His evaporated remains join ranks with the shop’s secondary materials—the
dust, must, and cobwebs that Krook was so loath to part with when living—adding,
ultimately, to the material volume of this hoard. By the time his remains are discovered,
Krook is so thoroughly reduced to lifeless residue—to “suffocating vapour in the room,
and a dark greasy coating on the walls and ceiling” (517)—that Guppy and Jobling do not
register immediately what has happened to him. The novel is clear that this particular
death is the only one possible for Krook, that his body can do nothing but ignite or
subject itself to “none other of all the deaths that can be died” (519). Krook has fully
transformed from subject to object, into a final, abject addition to his own stock.
The categorical fluidity of accumulated objects in Krook’s hoard, including Krook’s
body, haunts and disturbs the other characters of the novel. Guppy and Jobling are
acutely aware of Krook’s lingering physical remains when they revisit the shop after his
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Allan Woodcourt, with his physician’s experience, is able to read the story of the body to some extent;
“from his appearance and condition,” Woodcourt deduces that Nemo “must have been a good figure when
a youth, and I dare say good-looking” (168) in his attempt to find indications of a deeper significance, as if
the body were a document. However, the body is an illegible text both to the solicitor Tulkinghorn, who
looks to the body to decipher the hidden significance of another text (i.e., Nemo’s copied affidavits, which
Lady Dedlock recognizes), and to Krook, who only considers him another material body within the
building.
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death; both “have a great disinclination to touch any object, and carefully blow the dust
from it first” (635). The “little bundle of burnt paper” that, after Krook’s combustion,
seems to be “steeped in something” has fused with his remains, becoming part paper, part
ink, part human (519). From legal documents, to keys, to clothing, to bones, to human
tallow, and to greasy love letters, all of the accumulated stuff in this shop is governed by
a category confusion meaning that materiality itself is the primary significance emergent
in such an unstructured, fluid space. The novel’s characters respond to that confusion in
kind. Krook’s lodger, Miss Flite, treats her birds, omens, and acquaintances as
interchangeable; “the Wards in Jarndyce” (922) are to her, equally, two friends (Ada and
Richard), two omens, and two birds (which she names after Ada and Richard).

2.3
This section turns from a search for justice in legal papers, and for the value in masses of
inventory, to homemaking or the endeavour to situate oneself in a home with all its
attendant concerns over location and security. Just as earnest human endeavours fail in
Chancery and in Krook’s, however, so too do these endeavours to create a home end up
as waste. Tom-all-Alone’s is a spatial and topographical manifestation of the destructive
qualities of Chancery. It is a locus of the wasted efforts of those seeking a home or a
place to belong in order to avoid becoming waste themselves. This street is postapocalyptic in the sense that it represents the aftermath of humans’ failure to overcome
their orientation to waste—their failure to recuperate some meaning within waste,
whether waste-paper or waste-location.
Tom-all-Alone’s attracts those who cannot permanently attach themselves to a home or
place, and this in some measure is the work of Chancery. The present state of Tom-allAlone’s owes its origins to Chancery proceedings, though the exact circumstances of
these are unclear:
This desirable property is in Chancery, of course. It would
be an insult to the discernment of any man with half an eye
to tell him so. Whether “Tom” is the popular representative
of the original plaintiff or defendant in Jarndyce and
Jarndyce, or whether Tom lived here when the suit had laid
the street waste, all alone, until other settlers came to join
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him, or whether the traditional title is a comprehensive
name for a retreat cut off from honest company and put out
of the pale of hope, perhaps nobody knows. Certainly Jo
don’t know. (257)
Being in Chancery disrupts the concept of place itself; the grammatical ambiguity of
being “in Chancery” allows the expression to denote either that the neighbourhood is
located on Chancery property or that the property was seized in the name of Chancery.
This street of dilapidated houses may or may not have been owned by a Jarndyce suitor
once. The name may or may not originate from the street’s sharing, along with the
Jarndyce and Jarndyce suit, the condition of being “cut off from honest company and put
out of the pale of hope.” In Tom-all-Alone’s, only the material accumulation that occurs
within the space is relevant. How the neighbourhood came to be, the condition of the
streets, the medical, legal, or educational welfare of the people who live there—all such
concerns are immaterial to its relentless acquisition. What is relevant—what everybody
knows so well that it would be an insult to presume otherwise—is that the place is in
Chancery.
The cycle of waste-by-accumulation recurs here as much as in the Court of Chancery or
in Krook’s. Under whatever auspices this property was claimed in Chancery, it would
have been seized because as property it once held value. Once lost to the miserable
suitors who were barred from using these places, the houses were left to succumb to
disrepair and to decay. The cycles of waste in this street, then, centre on the concept of
place and the significance with which a place is imbued. If Tom-all-Alone’s is an attempt
to classify or somehow demarcate property under the Court’s protection, that designation
fails, the property becomes derelict with disuse, the empty houses are co-opted by selfappointed slum landlords, and the houses regularly crumble in their ongoing decay.
Moreover, Tom-all-Alone’s is a place where the homeless endeavour to find or to lay
claim to a home within a crumbling, disreputable neighbourhood, the decaying or wasted
houses of which are the waste homes of London. When a building crumbles, the
individual crevices of the fallen debris are sold again as lodgings, and attract further
numbers of placeless people afresh.
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Vague though they may be, the slum’s ties to Chancery offer context for its extreme
structural chaos. In The Novel and the Police, Miller observes the “ultimate
unlocalizability” of the Court of Chancery—the incomprehensible expansiveness of its
presence (61). “What Chancery produces,” Miller writes, “or threatens to produce, is an
organization of power that, ceasing entirely to be a topic, has become topography itself: a
system of control that can be all-encompassing because it cannot be encompassed in
turn” (61). The crumbling and disintegrated buildings of Tom-all-Alone’s realize, on a
material level, the elusive structural power of Chancery. “To violent acts of penetration,”
Miller writes, the Court “prefers the milder modes of permeation, and instead of being
densely consolidated into a force prepared to encounter a certain resistance, it is so finely
vaporized . . . that every surface it needs to attack is already porously welcoming it” (61).
As a by-product of the wastes in Chancery, Tom-all-Alone’s is a waste ecology that has
emerged out of another. An entire neighbourhood permeated with the de-structuring
powers of Chancery, Tom-all-Alone’s has grown into a nightmarish landscape in which
no categories remain intact. A kind of extension of the Court of Chancery, the ecology
that develops out of this urban space operates along the same mandate of accumulation.
The houses here are in such dilapidated condition that a house crumbles to the ground at
periodic intervals. New tenants, however, still seek shelter in the rubble of the newly
levelled building; “[t]he gaps remain, and there are not unpopular lodgings among the
rubbish” (257). The sudden crumbling of a house gives rise to new material; the
reordered spaces attract new bodies that crowd together within the debris, give rise to “a
cloud of dust, like the springing of a mine” (257), and offer new crevices for mould and
festering water to pool. Bodies and spaces converge in these sites of material collapse.
With these origins in Chancery, Tom-all-Alone’s confuses the very concept of imbuing a
place or space with significance. Observing the impossibility of anything like structural
or categorical consistency, Miller suggests that “what is most radically the matter with
being ‘in Chancery’ is not that there may be no way out of it (a dilemma belonging to the
problematic of the carceral), but, more seriously, that the binarisms of inside-outside,
here/elsewhere become meaningless and the ideological effects they ground impossible”
(62). We may borrow from Miller’s striking vocabulary of broken binaries to suggest the
key attribute that distinguishes how accumulation, materiality, and category confusion
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operate separately in Krook’s rag-and-bottle shop, in the Court of Chancery, and in Tomall-Alone’s. Where Krook’s accumulates and uniformly objectifies its wares to the
detriment of their economic value, and the Court of Chancery abuses its powers of
acquisition in order to supplant meaning with the material, Tom-all-Alone’s is a space of
nightmarish, hyper-materiality that results from not just Chancery but all of London
having accumulated abandoned households, both the working and unemployed poor,
sewage water, and discarded rubbish within this wasteland of a neighbourhood. My
intent, then, is not to mark superficial analogies between useless wares, wasted paper, and
London’s poor, but rather to read devaluing accumulation at the point where it comes
home to the human orientation to place. Krook and Richard both become materially tied
to and compromised by the accumulating logic of specific institutions. Here, that
accumulating logic of decay not only collapses spaces physically, but also categorically.
The classifications that we use to signify a space, to invest that space with
anthropocentric meaning, fall apart and morph along an endless series of disruptions.
Tom-all-Alone’s presents the body and its surroundings in steep decline. A “villainous
street, undrained, unventilated, deep in black mud and corrupt water,” as well as
crumbling houses and precarious ruins, these slums have been tacitly claimed and rented
out to those desperate enough to wish to take shelter therein (358). This image is one of
waste that has grown wildly out of control. As a space in which the outdoors bleeds into
the indoors—a kind of storehouse whose products have decomposed into one another—
Tom-all-Alone’s is a site of dissolving ontological boundaries between material entities.
The street offers a version of what Maurizia Boscagli terms “a materiality out of bounds”
that altogether rejects physical, ideological, and semiotic order (3). What emerges is a
hyper-productivity akin to what we saw in Our Mutual Friend, one that consistently
works to obscure and devalue material hierarchies. Tom-all-Alone’s exhibits a hyperproductivity in decay. As the novel’s omniscient narrator tells us:
. . . these tumbling tenements contain, by night, a swarm of
misery. As on the ruined human wretch vermin parasites
appear, so these ruined shelters have bred a crowd of foul
existence that crawls in and out of gaps in walls and boards;
and coils itself to sleep, in maggot numbers, where the rain
drips in; and comes and goes, fetching and carrying fever
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and sowing more evil in its every footprint than Lord
Coodle, and Sir Thomas Doodle, and the Duke of Foodle,
and all the fine gentlemen in office, down to Zoodle, shall
set right in five hundred years—though born expressly to do
it. (256-257)
Through Dickens’s layered metaphors, this passage performs the permeability of
classification in Tom-all-Alone’s. The “tumbling tenements” are like a “ruined human
wretch,” but this is ultimately the only human figure offered in a vision of seething
vitality. There is, however, a general sense that the human population, the animal
population, and the insect population blur together under the umbrella term of “a crowd
of foul existence”; the passage merges the rats that crawl, the snakes that coil, the
maggots that multiply, with the humans that leave footprints, into vaguely interrelated
metaphors of gathering. Tom-all-Alone’s is, in other words, a space of such radical
material boundaries that it collapses the distinctions between buildings, animals, insects,
disease, and people alike. The slum is nightmarish in its continual warping of
classification, in the impossibility of identity and individuality therein.
Human bodies are not exempt from the devaluation born of excessively accumulating
materials. As Dickens’s poor accumulate in Tom-all-Alone’s, they present a horrific
breakdown of the categorical distinction between living humans and nonliving waste—of
the nightmare of ambiguities that result when humans are forced to embody waste. In
offering this image of humans as a single, undifferentiated “swarm of misery,” Dickens
represents a nightmare of radical materiality that is deliberately ruthless in its equation of
people living in poverty with disease-carrying parasites. The human population that has
been devalued by London society is expressly devalued here in their accumulation. The
purpose of this ruthlessness, which is at odds with the usual tenor of Dickens’s
representations of the socially and economically underprivileged, is to illustrate in vivid,
grotesquely material terms the outcome of considering people as generalized multitudes
rather than as individuals. One need only to look to Bleak House’s sympathetic and
highly individualized representations of Jo, Liz, and Jenny, or even the brickmaker’s
offended defiance of Mrs. Pardiggle, to understand that this portrait of humans living as
“vermin parasites” is indeed pointed, staging the horrific implications of neglecting or
dismissing the suffering of the poor. The apparent parasitism of the residents in Tom-all-
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Alone’s is also mirrored by the hypocritical parasitism of Lord Coodle and company,
those aristocratic authorities who appear as a similarly indistinguishable mass defined by
the sole purpose of increasing in number. In both cases, rampant, concentrated
accumulation is what transforms individuals into indistinguishable, redundant, vigorous
waste.
This brimming, surfeit of flesh and debris is matched by a swarming excess of infection
that fills ruined spaces and moves out with the crowd, “carrying fever and sowing more
evil in its every footprint than Lord Coodle” and his peers. These footprints, then, present
their own microcosm of a waste ecology. As I have defined it in the previous chapter, a
waste ecology is an accumulation of interrelated material connections born of the
discarded, which becomes productive or transformative of new material connections. It is
through this productivity that the undifferentiated matter of Tom-all-Alone’s pushes back
against London’s broader population, chiefly through teeming, spreading disease. Ralph
Smith provides historical context for Dickens’s shifting opinions on public health during
the mid-Victorian period, which we can productively apply to these footprints. Between
1842 and 1855, Dickens shifted from his initial support of Chadwick and the sanitarian
movement. Smith compares the fever narratives published in Household Words between
1850 and 1855, finding that Dickens’s journalism increasingly reflects a discomfort with,
and eventually a complete opposition toward, the foundational principles of the sanitarian
movement for three main reasons: firstly, his scepticism of Parliament’s ability to effect
sanitary reforms; secondly, his gradual adoption of the view that disease was spread by
contagion and not simply by the inhalation of vaporized waste; thirdly, that he objected to
sanitarians’ tendency to consider the poor as “irresponsible objects” that caused rather
than were the victims of epidemics (Smith 159). Given this context, we may read the
fever-carrying footprint as a site of interaction between bodies and space. Bleak House’s
initial serialization places the novel, given Smith’s timeline, during the turning point of
Dickens’s attitudes toward sanitarian reform. We can also trace an ambiguous
understanding of disease transmission; infection in Tom-all-Alone’s carries qualities of
both theories of miasma and disease contagion, portraying at once infectious spaces and
infectious bodies.
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Bodily porousness meets spatial porousness within a site of accumulation, fulfilling
Miller’s suggestion that Chancery and its satellites corrode the signification and
ideological power of “the binarisms of inside-outside, here/elsewhere.” Tom-all-Alone’s
is a site of accumulation, but its porousness reaches outward to the rest of London. In
spite of the ineffectual and even ruinous “mighty speech-making” in Parliament that has
led to the present condition of this slum, however, Tom-all-Alone’s has the final word
(708):
Even the winds are his messengers, and they serve him in
these hours of darkness. There is not a drop of Tom’s
corrupted blood but propagates infection and contagion
somewhere. It shall pollute, this very night, the choice
stream (in which chemists on analysis would find the
genuine nobility) of a Norman house, and his Grace shall
not be able to say nay to the infamous alliance. There is not
an atom of Tom’s slime, not a cubic inch of any pestilential
gas in which he lives . . . but shall work its retribution
through every order of society up to the proudest of the
proud and to the highest of the high. Verily, what with
tainting, plundering, and spoiling, Tom has his revenge.
(710)
The accumulation and neglectful treatment of the poor by the rest of London has material
consequences for the city as a whole, an effect of large-scale devaluation. The new
material that has grown out of the decaying houses—the corrupted blood, the atoms of
slime, the cubic inches of pestilential gas—transgress the prescribed boundaries of Tomall-Alone’s and exact their revenge by transforming the spaces and bodies it encounters
to new agents of contagion or death. An apocalyptic double to Chancery, Tom-allAlone’s similarly knows no bounds. As with the metaphors of parasitism, the images in
this passage suggest a similar material hybridity. The pestilence here is at once bloody
(“a drop of Tom’s corrupted blood”), slimy (“an atom of Tom’s slime”), and gaseous (“a
cubic inch of any pestilential gas”). The source of disease, in other words, is a hybrid of
material classification—of abject materials at once human, sedimentary, and vaporous.
The novel’s most overt representation of embodied waste is Jo, who stands as the novel’s
exemplar for a living human treated as excess, as surplus, even as an object. Jo gets
“hustled, and jostled, and moved on,” finding that he has “no business, here, or there, or
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anywhere” and yet is “perplexed by the consideration that [he is] here somehow, too, and
everybody overlooked [him] until [he] became the creature that [he is]!” (257-258). Jo is
not the active agent, but the passive agent, here. Jo is excluded from legal, social, and
linguistic systems. A “rejected witness,” who cannot read, who “don’t know nothink,”
and who “can’t exactly say” what knowledge he does have, Jo is fundamentally cut off
from the systems of representation that surround him (181, 257, 181). His aimless shuffle
through the streets can be read as the movement of a discarded and undesirable object.
Indeed, it often is by characters like Lady Dedlock and the London constabulary, who
view him as matter of no use and of no classification. Jo’s existence nonetheless asserts
itself. He lives in a “strange state,” considered “scarcely human (as in the case of [his]
offering [himself] for a witness), but to feel it of [his] own knowledge all [his] life!”
(258). Jo’s passivity is predetermined by both his inability to read and his inability to find
a permanent home. The novel satirically posits that full human subjectivity must rely
upon engagement with a linguistic system of signification that, regrettably, Jo cannot
access. The source of the strangeness he feels, then, is a bodily materiality which asserts
itself above and beyond human subjectivity and literacy to the extent that Jo’s “whole
material and immaterial life is wonderfully strange; his death, the strangest thing of all”
(258). Strangeness in death, here, means the total transformation from animate to
inanimate—an existence defined entirely by the material, outside of the linguistic. Jo is
caught between an inaccessible definition of the human and an unimaginable existence as
pure material. And this hybridity—between subject and material, between culture and
exclusion—expands outward to the size of a city street in the form of Tom-all-Alone’s.
Unlike Krook’s rag-and-bottle shop and the Court of Chancery, Tom-all-Alone’s is not
an agent of accumulation but rather the site in which the city has accumulated. It serves
as a kind of storage facility for the seized properties in Chancery. It is the only place to
which the unwanted Jo may “move on” (308). Everyone appears concerned about the
condition of Tom-all-Alone’s; “both in and out of Parliament,” there is “much wrathful
disputation how Tom shall be got right” (708-710, 710). However, like Mrs. Pardiggle’s
criticism of “the untidy habits” of the poor—a presumptuous remark resembling
sanitarian discourse—such disputation turns out to be ineffectual and chiefly
demonstrative (130). Meanwhile, as Tom-all-Alone’s is “reclaimed according to
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somebody’s theory but nobody’s practice,” these formal debates scatter yet more “dust
and noise” to accumulate somewhere (710). Claimed by everyone and wanted by no one,
Tom-all-Alone’s has material implications for all of London. As Steinlight has recently
observed in Populating the Novel, the epidemic that spreads from Tom-all-Alone’s
decimates the distinctions between classed people and spaces. As if in retaliation to the
endeavour to sequester illnesses within Tom-all-Alone’s, the disease that Jo carries into
Bleak House seems to rebuke those who would see certain persons tied to certain places.
A disease that does not stay in one place vaunts the human failure to define, classify, and
infuse meaning into a place. Steinlight’s remarks on disease contagion in Bleak House
can therefore be pushed further; infectious disease in the novel suggests the power of
multiplicity. The power of the disease is the power of numbers; it is the overwhelming
accumulation of persons and places left to decay, and the failed signification of place as
concept, that levels class categories, spatial boundaries, humans, and biohazardous waste.
The struggle of those who cannot place themselves is echoed by the contagious disease
which, like the ever moved-on Jo, cannot possibly stay contained in one place.
Ultimately, Tom-all-Alone’s houses both those who cannot find a place and a disease that
is place-less or refuses to be bound to a place.

2.4
The excessive accumulation that characterizes this slum returns us to the heart of
Dickensian London, with compounded increase of dirt and debris. As Nemo’s body and
Ada’s hair are curated as collectible wares—as Flite mimics the accumulation of lawpapers with her documents—as the faceless “crowd” of Tom-all-Alone’s lurks about
newcomers “like a dream of horrible faces, and fades away up alleys and into ruins, and
behind walls; and with occasional cries and shrill whistles of warning, thenceforth flits
about them until they leave the place” (358)—these accumulations exhibit a broader
devaluation not only in what they accumulate but in those who orbit those accumulations.
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Chapter 3

3

As Within, So Without: Spectres of Waste in Le Fanu’s
“Green Tea”

In a medieval Christian legend recounting the trying of Saint Dominic, the devil appears
to the saint in various guises to distract him from his devotional reading. Saint Dominic
resists these annoyances with a folkloric response, humorously drafting Satan into his
bible study. Although the allegory of the devil’s attempts to distract Saint Dominic from
his religious duty is no longer common knowledge, this narrative was frequently
depicted—most notably in Pietro della Vecchia’s St. Dominic and the Devil (1630), an oil
canvas rendition of the moment when the devil appears to the saint as a small, blackfurred monkey with two pins of red light reflected in its eyes. Robert Southey also
mentions this legend in a tract on “The History of the Inquisitions” (1811), and his
description offers a vivid account of the encounter as it would have been known and
circulated in the nineteenth century:
The manufacturers of hagiology are sometimes playful in
their inventions. They tell us, that as the Saint was reading
one day, the devil annoyed him in the shape of a flea,
skipping backward and forward upon the page, in order to
divert his attention from the devout subject of the book
before him; but Dominic soon spoiled his sport, for he fixed
him as a mark at the place where he left off, and used him
in this manner through the whole volume. On another
occasion the devil came to tease him in the form of a
monkey: Dominic was too much used to such visits to be
embarrassed by them; he called him to hold the candle,
which he made him do till it had burnt down to the snuff, to
the sore annoyance of the paw which held it. (324)
As Southey makes clear, both the insect and the animal here represent the satanic danger
of attention diverted from religious devotion. Here, the dutiful and morally vigilant Saint
Dominic is undeterred from his studies, captures two creatures known for their physical
alacrity and evasive skill, and commands both in the service of religious study. Southey’s
version of this legend stresses the importance of a zealous, scholarly attention and of
resisting persistent temptation. And if Southey’s account was the most widely-known
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version of the legend, Joseph Sheridan Le Fanu’s short Victorian ghost story, “Green
Tea,” was more influential for fusing this medieval allegory to contemporary Victorian
values and anxieties.
“Green Tea” is the first of the series of short stories that Le Fanu narrates through Doctor
Martin Hesselius, a German physician who evidently specializes in cases of occult or of
metaphysical interest, and from whose personal letters and notes these occult tales
ostensibly originated. The short story begins when Hesselius investigates the supernatural
visitations that stubbornly plague a clergyman, the Reverend Mr. Jennings. These
visitations or hauntings take the form of a small black monkey with glowing red eyes;
they begin when Jennings takes large quantities of green tea during his studies of ancient
European paganism. At first, the monkey only follows Jennings in watchful silence;
gradually, however, its presence becomes more menacing, disrupting Jennings’s sermons,
whispering various blasphemous or disturbing remarks in his ear. The monkey’s
appearances drive Jennings to distraction, particularly whenever the latter attempts to
fulfil his devotional duties. By the end of the story, just as Jennings finally confides his
troubles to Hesselius, the monkey reappears and drives the clergyman to suicide.
Like Southey’s retelling of Saint Dominic’s demonic visitations, “Green Tea” is
concerned with specific forms of scholarly engagement and the means necessary to
sustain that engagement. The saint’s demons attempt the same kind of dissolution of
devotional attention that Jennings experiences when he describes the monkey’s
“indefinable power to dissipate thought” (30). The flea that dances across Saint
Dominic’s book of devotion attempts a visual barrier similar to that which Le Fanu’s
monkey successfully accomplishes when it appears in Jennings’s pulpit and squats over
his book, interrupting both his reading and his sermon. Furthermore, just as “Green Tea”
somewhat confusedly muddles together green tea, pagan metaphysics, and demonic
monkeys, the demonic distractions that threaten Saint Dominic’s devotional work have a
multitude of forms.
Where “Green Tea” and the hagiographic legend differ, however, is in their protagonists’
chosen approaches to their studies, as well as in the power that those characters exercise

77

over their respective demons. On the one hand, we find an important food-based
difference when Jennings turns to green tea for an enabling agent; the saint, on the other,
appears fuelled by an unwavering religious devotion and presumably a more Christian
sacrament given that one of Saint Dominic’s miracles involved the creation of wine.
Whereas the monkey drives Jennings to distraction and suicide, the saint exhibits a
mastery that allows him to capture the devil in its manifest forms and commands him in
the service of the saint’s religious devotion. The tragedy of Jennings’s case is that his
monkey succeeds where Saint Dominic’s flea and monkey fail. This medieval legend of
hagiography therefore re-emerges, transformed and adapted, in Le Fanu’s text. “Green
Tea” is effectively a grim adaptation of a medieval allegory. Those moments in which the
two narratives part ways foreground the specific preoccupations to which Le Fanu’s text
responds. Instead of a scene in which religious devotion and discipline are proof against
the supernatural, the demonic, or the occult, Le Fanu’s spectral monkey gradually but
relentlessly gains in power, changing in ways that are initially small but then increase in
intensity over time. At first, it is barely distinguishable in the darkness by its glowing red
eyes; later, the monkey is surrounded by an ambient red light that glows like embers;
later still, the monkey is so visible that Jennings is entirely distracted and absorbed by its
movements and he sees the monkey perfectly through closed eyelids. The monkey’s
behaviour, too, begins lethargic only to become increasingly energetic and disruptive,
culminating in the demon’s incessantly urging Jennings to kill himself.
Scholars have named a few texts as the possible source material and cultural contexts for
“Green Tea.” The inspiration for the spectral monkey, especially, has been a major source
of scholarly speculation, though literary critics have not yet observed its hagiographical
resonances. W. J. McCormack argues that “Green Tea” was based on an article published
in 1841 for the Dublin University Magazine, titled “German Ghosts and Seers,” which
featured glowing, disembodied eyes and a drinker of green tea. McCormack’s claim is
part of his larger argument that Le Fanu’s story originates in and still betrays traces of an
Irish gothic sensibility, though he adapted the tale for an English audience at the
insistence of his publisher. William Hughes finds McCormack’s argument too focused on
reclaiming Le Fanu’s work for an Irish gothic literary tradition. Hughes argues instead
that Le Fanu adopted several narrative devices that he encountered in the gothic tales of
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Samuel Warren’s Passages from the Diary of a Late Physician (1854), including the
episodic character of the stories, the frame narrative of a retired physician who
documented his most peculiar cases, and the inclusion of a few spectral animals. In doing
so, he highlights the theological import and Swedenborgian influences of Le Fanu’s
highly metaphysical text. Other critics tend to be less interested in an originary
inspiration, but take up similar discussions of its broader Victorian milieu. John Langhan
and, most recently, Melissa Dickson, analyze “Green Tea” in the context of evolutionary
discourses, and read Le Fanu’s monkey as a reference to Darwin’s Origin of Species.
Dickson further situates the text within the history of the British imperial tea trade, as
well as within the Orientalist discourses that linked green tea consumption to opium
addiction. Jen Cadwallader makes the salient point that “Green Tea” participates in a
larger conversation about Victorian pharmacology. Le Fanu’s plots, as Cadwallader
suggests, consistently present the “near-impotent organ” (46) of the Victorian mind as
submissive and susceptible to troubling new substances.
To some degree, the present chapter engages this critical tradition that examines the
cultural implications of Le Fanu’s text. As we will see, “Green Tea” reads as an ironic
response to late-Victorian medievalism. The narrative features an allegory of failed
attention, or the means by which an Anglican clergyman’s concentrated religious
attention is transformed by the material and spiritual conditions in which he is situated.
Saint Dominic’s miraculous feat is his ability to maintain a narrow, linear, and even
obsessive focus upon his devotional work throughout his monastic life. Jennings, by
contrast, is worldly and vulnerable to distraction. His worldliness reveals the
interconnected nature of contemporary Victorian concerns including urbanization,
productivity, and the imperial project. His repeatedly broken attention and ultimate
suicide can be contextualized through an understanding of his situated embodiment
within these interrelated anxieties of the nineteenth century. In this chapter, I draw these
historically situated readings into conversation with a range of critical approaches from
food studies to the new materialisms. The first section is particularly concerned with the
mutually transformative relations between food and the human body. The second section
builds this discussion out to encompass the vulnerability of the British subject plagued by
the ghosts of empire.
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More importantly, this chapter also conceives of an ecological method of reading the
interrelated anxieties at play in Le Fanu’s story. “Green Tea” accommodates several
readings, whether of the monkey as a metaphor for imperialism and racial othering, of
Jennings’s tea-drinking as a euphemism for opium addiction, or of “Green Tea” as
hagiographic adaptation. Under this ecological structure, all of the above readings of Le
Fanu’s text coalesce, with the result that “Green Tea” reflects the holism that Jennings
both observes and fears in pagan metaphysics. Rather than assessing the viability of a
single reading of “Green Tea,” I explore the structural reasons—the waste ecologies—
that enable this text to accommodate such a variety of impressions. Waste ecologies are
generative; they are a source of endless meanings, as well as of the connections between
those meanings. Therefore, when I consider hagiographic source material such as the
legend of Saint Dominic—with its demonstration of unbreakable devotional attention and
monastic asceticism—I consider that material as a foil. The legend reveals by force of
contrast the ambiguous amalgamation of digestive systems, nervous systems, and the
occult in “Green Tea.” Instead of contending with any one interpretation over others, this
chapter considers the structural ecology that gives rise to this diverse array of readings—
that creates the analytical space for a spectral monkey, paganism, religious attention, and
the tea at the root of each.
On the surface, “Green Tea” offers two apparently binary possibilities for Jennings’s
experience. Jennings might indeed be interacting with a pagan spirit or ghost.
Alternatively, green tea or some active agent within the tea may act upon him as a
hallucinogen. Hesselius’s diagnosis toward the end of the story begins to complicate and,
more particularly, interrelate these apparently contradictory interpretations. Hesselius
suggests that an impurity in the tea brought Jennings into contact with the spiritual world.
Critics are largely interested in examining the significance of either of these possibilities,
through discussions of Orientalism, psychology, and theology. However, my interest lies
in this suggestion of an interrelation that stems from impurity and waste. In Le Fanu’s
text, the horror does not come from the monkey, or from the ingestion of green tea;
neither is the horrific point that spirits exist. One source of horror is certainly the malign
interaction between spirits and humans in this text—in spirits’ ability to interact with
Jennings, as well as Jennings’s ability to interact with them, to attract and hold their
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attention, and his inability to escape their attention at will. In other words, “Green Tea”
situates its horror in connections and involvements. On the level of soul and body,
Jennings’s consumption of tea and—I will argue—metaphysical knowledge, connects his
digestive impurities with his soul. In this way, his soul becomes a part of a broader
spiritual ecology. These interactions are at once imperial and domestic; they expand
outward from the monkey to larger Victorian imperial anxieties. They bring spiritual
damnation and philosophical investigation to bear on psychological duress and
physiological indigestion. Each interaction is complicated and often productive of
unpredictable associations, but Jennings does not realize the extent to which he is situated
within those associations. Beneath this horror of spectral engagement is, ultimately, a
deeper horror of being involved in a waste ecology so complex and subtle that one cannot
recognize the parameters of that involvement. It is a horror of being enmeshed in a waste
ecology.
This chapter highlights the ecological relations of Le Fanu’s “Green Tea” through a form
of waste that I call the indigestible. The indigestible refers to a specific material and
power relation in which ingested matter permeates the body, and yet resists complete
incorporation into that body at the same time. Informed partly by Jane Bennett’s work on
edible matter and Chen’s toxicities, my view of the indigestible is as failed digestion.
Digestion implies nourishment; it encompasses the successful extraction and assimilation
of those material components of a food that benefit the eating body, as well as the
filtration and expulsion of those non-nutritive components from the body as waste.
Indigestion, on the contrary, occurs when the ingested substance refuses to be
subordinated to the body that tries to consume it: it cannot be dissolved and filtered for
those of its parts that are salutary; nor can its unwanted parts be so easily cast aside.
When the indigestible gets taken into a body, it permeates that body but not necessarily in
ways that are desirable. In “Green Tea,” the indigestible permeates even those systems of
the body that it was never meant to access—systems that are not strictly the digestive
system. I use “indigestible,” here, more as that which causes indigestion. As with
indigestion, the indigestible is not that which may pass through a system unaltered.
Rather, once ingested, it gives rise to its own transformative effects, relations, and
alterations, often in toxic or occasionally hyper-productive ways. This chapter considers
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the indigestible in “Green Tea” both in its physiological effects and in its parallel cultural
implications. Specifically, section 1 of this chapter attends to the physiological ecologies
of the indigestible, at the centre of which is Jennings’s consumption of green tea. The
second section of this chapter shifts its focus to a parallel metaphorical ecology of the
indigestible in which the Victorian imperial subject is permeated by a cultural and
spiritual other that refuses to be assimilated.
While Le Fanu’s “Green Tea” begins as a story of digestion, it ultimately reveals the vast
ecologies of the indigestible. When Jennings takes green tea to advance his studies, he
strays into a nexus of physical and supernatural relations that he did not realize existed.
The spectral events of “Green Tea” draw from a dizzying number of discourses, from
toxic food, religious devotion, natural science, and the occult; they are at once “a
symptom of nervous dyspepsia,” a “sullen” and “surly” monkey, a demon encased in a
flaming glory, and a poltergeist-like creature prone to obscene gestures and speech.
Given this aggregate of images loaded with metaphorical significance, Hesselius’s final
diagnosis—that Jennings suffered from a combination of a disturbed circulatory system
and a hereditary predisposition to suicide—falls flat. Jennings digests green tea literally,
while attempting to digest paganism figuratively, only to end up overcome by both—to
be digested, rather than to be the one who digests.
In his introduction to the 1947 edition of In a Glass Darkly, V. S. Pritchett observes Le
Fanu’s remarkable ability for forcing into relief our deepest, most repressed anxieties—
anxieties that burst forth in a catharsis of the occult. “Guilt is the ghost in Le Fanu,” he
writes. “The secret doubt, the private shame, the unholy love, scratch away with
malignant patience in the guarded mind.” From this treasure trove of psychoanalysis,
Pritchett singles out “Green Tea” as a story that “weaken[s] the catch we normally keep
clamped so firmly down” and unleashes “all the hags and animals of moral or Freudian
symbolism” (10). Pritchett ranks Le Fanu’s tale “among the best half-dozen ghost stories
in the English language” (8)—an achievement more notable for its being published at a
time during the Victorian period when ghost stories were common enough to be
unremarkable. Pritchett’s notion that “Green Tea” is particularly effective in staging the
steady victory of repressed anxieties over “the guarded mind”—that the text registers a
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nightmare of breached boundaries—still holds. The ghost in “Green Tea” is overwhelmed
with layered meaning, and built into its excessive signification is a profound anxiety of
classification. The nexus of physiological, neurological, and psychical experiences that
Jennings encounters while studying paganism and sipping his tea is precisely what the
Victorian mind attempts to guard itself against. Without the security of discrete
categorization, the spiritual bleeds into the physical, the colonial into the imperial, the
occult into the Anglican religion, the Victorian Gothic into the medieval Christian, the
animal into the human. Ultimately, it is clear that the vulnerability of the insufficiently
“guarded mind” to this complex of Imperial Gothic forces—or destructively interrelated
ecologies—is what generates the horror in Le Fanu’s text.

3.1
“Green Tea” presents itself as the personal letters and case notes of Hesselius. In the final
chapter, he offers his diagnosis, though too late to be of any use to the deceased Jennings.
This diagnosis places Jennings’s tea-drinking at the centre of entangled ecologies of food,
digestion, ghosts, and waste. Hesselius’s post-mortem summation of the case begins with
his elaborate theory of “The Cardinal Functions of the Brain” (38). He claims to have
proven the existence of a circulatory system in the brain, through which courses a fluid
that is at once spectral and material: it enjoys a physical existence as a liquid, and it is
also the “seat of interior vision” or “that which we have in common with spirits” (39).
This language—and particularly the idea that the human-spirit connection materializes as
a liquid—bears a striking resemblance to what would become known as ectoplasm from
the 1890s through to the 1920s.31 This spiritual “brain circulation” is, like blood
circulation, transformative: “[t]he fluid, which is propagated hence through one class of
nerves, returns in an altered state through another” (39). As long as the fluid maintains
balanced levels across these stages of circulation, the human body cannot communicate
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As L. Anne Delgado has recently described, late-Victorian ectoplasm referred to bodily fluids expelled
by spiritualist mediums as a by-product of the spiritual communications that took place during a séance.
While the term was not in use until the 1890s, Delgado suggests that earlier forms of the concept appeared
in the mid-nineteenth century such as Allan Kardec’s “manifestation of the perispirit” in 1857, as well as
George Henry Lewes’s “psychoplasm” in 1874 (32).
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with spirits; if this balance is disrupted by the influence of certain substances, however,
there are spiritual consequences. As Hesselius draws an analogy between the circulatory
system of the heart to this system of psychical fluids, his language opens up the
possibility of another parallel system in the human body—the digestive system:
By various abuses, among which the habitual use of such
agents as green tea is one, this fluid may be affected as to its
quality, but it is more frequently disturbed as to
equilibrium. . . . a congestion found upon the masses of brain
or nerve, connected with the interior sense, forms a surface
unduly exposed, on which disembodied spirits may operate:
communication is thus more or less effectually established.
(39)
The “congestion” that Hesselius describes is a digestive blockage—one that begins with
ingestion, leads to an imbalanced system, creates a vulnerability within that system, and
undermines the original aim of nourishment. Jennings takes excessive amounts of green
tea, which permeates his various circulatory systems and disturbs the balance of
ectoplasmic fluids that formerly kept unwelcome communication channels to the spirit
world at bay. However sensational in detail, the process that Jennings undergoes is one of
digestion gone wrong—of indigestion. And if, unlike fin-de-siècle ectoplasmic mediums,
Jennings does not quite expel liquid waste from his orifices, he becomes a vessel for a
kind of spiritual waste—a malign spectre.
Hesselius’s diagnosis reveals the physician’s unique view of waste as an excess build-up
that bleeds across categories such as mind, body, and soul. His pseudo-scientific views
lead us to a definition in which the indigestible not only disrupts a given system but also
permeates multiple systems. The green tea that circulates Jennings’s venous arterial
system also has a sympathetic impact on the parallel nervous system that Hesselius
describes, which leaves it vulnerable to spiritual contact. In this text, green tea moves
from expansive and large-scale systems, like the British imperial trade network, to
increasingly detailed and delicate subsets of those systems, from Jennings’s digestive and
arterial systems to his nervous and spiritual systems. “Green Tea,” as a whole, similarly
engages the structural porousness of ecologies as diverse as imperialism, the counterfeit
tea trade, paganism, digestion, spiritualism, and waste. This accrued waste, moreover,
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cannot be as easily expelled from the body or filtered out. If a green tea addiction has
somehow infused itself throughout Jennings’s body—if it is the food waste that has
corrupted the complex interrelations of his digestive, arterial, and psychical systems—
then these integrated structures could not be undone even though Jennings does quit
drinking green tea. Hesselius claims to have cured one similar case “by the simple
application of iced eau-de-cologne” (39), and yet the material and immaterial ecologies
that he describes are so exceedingly complex that his solution almost appears risible. The
congestion and disrupted equilibrium that Hesselius describes speaks to a dissolution of
carefully constructed boundaries. Perhaps it is less that the monkey convinced Jennings
to commit suicide than that these violent impulses had already seeped into his thoughts.
When we consider the relationships that Hesselius draws between tea and spectral visions
in the text, even the presence of this spiritualist German physician—with his mesmeric
language of spectral fluids and blocked spiritual circulatory systems—is entirely
appropriate. Hesselius invokes the whole history of green tea, with all of its imperial,
Orientalist, and pseudo-scientific resonances. In doing so, his diagnosis enables us to
infer three key features of indigestible ecologies: first, that food waste accrues, perhaps
irreversibly; second, that food waste moves freely between digestive systems, nervous
systems, and spiritual systems; third, that the haunting, whether a true supernatural
phenomenon or a chemically-induced hallucination, is an emblem of the underlying and
complex ecologies that were always present but to which Jennings became vulnerable
once aware of them.
Food offers rich analytical inroads into imagining waste as part of an ecology. Digestion,
as we see, involves complex material interactions that yield one type of what we describe
as waste. When this chapter refers to the indigestible as a type of food waste, however—
especially in the context of “Green Tea”—it considers that waste as rebellious matter that
can be ingested and yet resists being fully incorporated into the consuming body. The
indigestible is not a passive substance that gets broken down and nourishes a digestive
system; rather, it permeates, reconfigures, and transforms that system. A food studies
approach to “Green Tea” also enables us to explore the many and imaginative
connections that Victorians drew between food and the occult. Food, for instance, was the
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basis for rationalist denials of spiritual phenomena. The late-eighteenth and earlynineteenth centuries witnessed “a remarkable cluster of scientific and philosophical antiapparition writings” which dismissed alleged ghost-sightings as symptoms of dyspepsia
(Castle 171). Dickens references this anti-spiritualist movement in A Christmas Carol,
when Scrooge stubbornly insists to Marley’s ghost that “[t]here’s more of gravy than of
grave about you, whatever you are!” (52). This empiricist counterargument clung to
nineteenth-century ghost stories, whether to be dismissed or playfully admitted, so much
so as to become one of the genre’s foremost conventions. Another, parallel belief held
food as a revelatory substance—as the causeway that grants humans access to the parallel
spiritual world. Whether or not the connections between food and spiritualism were
extensions of Enlightenment rationalism, both views invested food with a primacy within
the broader domain of the supernatural or the occult. If ghost sightings were the result of
some physiological weakness or disruption in the body—particularly as a result of faulty
digestion—then what one eats could not only determine the condition of the body and of
the mind, but also of the soul.
Food is connected to the supernatural for Jennings, who tries to use food to benefit from
the connectedness of the body and of the mind during his study of ancient paganism. In
keeping with the belief that food impacts the mind as much as the body, Jennings
experiments on his own body and mind by drinking green tea. He claims that anyone who
writes a large intellectual work necessarily fuels the process by ingesting certain
stimulating foods:
I believe that every one who sets about writing in earnest does
his work, as a friend of mine phrased it, on something—tea, or
coffee, or tobacco. I suppose there is a material waste that
must be hourly supplied in such occupations, or that we should
grow too abstracted, and the mind, as it were, pass out of the
body, unless it were reminded often of the connection by
actual sensation. At all events, I felt the want, and I supplied it.
(22)
Jennings’s explanation simultaneously acknowledges and resists the connectedness of the
body and the mind. On the one hand, Jennings’s belief that food can determine certain
states of body and mind relies on the connectedness between that body and mind to begin
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with. On the other hand, this connection can evidently be compromised if the mind
requires reminding of its connection to the body through “a material waste that must be
hourly supplied” and “by actual sensation.” Though Jennings evidently believes he is
supporting the connectedness of the mind and body, what he effectively proposes to
achieve in drinking green tea is to fully detach and to thereby maximize the efficiency of
the tasks performed by each. He suggests that it is necessary to use the body to make
waste in order to avoid wasting the mind; physical digestion (the process of making
“material waste”) prevents a wasteful form of mental digestion where “the mind, as it
were, [would] pass out of the body” (22). Jennings’s self-inflicted experiments come
from his recognition of the transformative capacity of food. This recognition, in turn,
leads him to try to separate the waste-making processes of the body from the intellectual
processes of the mind.
And yet, as the events of the story prove, the material relations into which he has
wandered are more complex than Jennings realizes. “Green Tea” remains ambiguous as
to the exact cause of his visitations. In spite of its title, the text does not establish
Jennings’s tea-drinking habit as the cause; the apparitions are as likely to result from the
clergyman’s studies of paganism than from his diet. Jennings tries to use food to deny the
embodied nature of intellectual work and spiritual phenomena. He tries to reverse what
he has begun and gives up green tea in a vain hope of curing what he frantically hopes is
a mere “symptom of nervous dyspepsia” (26). Ultimately, this attempt proves futile, as
well as indicative; the text stages an ecology of events instead of linear, logically
sequenced events. The ecological structure of the text’s spiritual phenomenon might
explain Hesselius’s inadequate postmortem diagnosis of Jennings’s case. A number of Le
Fanu scholars have remarked upon this shortcoming of the ending, observing that
Hesselius’s explanation is superficial at best and a sign of his dehumanizing perspective
at worst.32 The narrative problem becomes clearer when we consider that Hesselius looks
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According to Cadwallader, Le Fanu uses Hesselius to problematize the doctor-patient relationship,
highlighting his “inability to comprehend the totality of human experience,” as well as “the failings of the
new psychological/physiognomic approach to medicine” too apt to classify the inexplicable as the products
of a compromised sensorium (44).
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for a linear and physiological explanation for complex events so far beyond his
understanding that the investigator-like physician is somewhat parodied for his
shortsightedness.
Jane Bennett devotes a chapter of Vibrant Matter to the mutually transformative relations
that exist between humans and food. Bennett notes how these relations were particularly
interesting to Western thinkers in the nineteenth-century, and how, at the time, “it was
fairly easy find a philosopher who believed that food had the power to shape the
dispositions of persons and nations” (43). For Bennett, these thinkers acknowledge “a
profound reciprocity between eater and eaten” (43), or an understanding of food as an
actant alongside human beings and according to which the ingestion and digestion of
food are “conative bodies vying alongside and within another complex body (a person’s
‘own’ body)” (39). Reading a selection of prose works by Friedrich Nietzsche and Henry
David Thoreau, Bennett argues that these philosophers:
discern a productive power intrinsic to foodstuff, which
enables edible matter to coarsen or refine the imagination or
render a disposition more or less liable to ressentiment,
depression, hyperactivity, dull-wittedness, or violence. They
experience eating as the formation of an assemblage of human
and nonhuman elements, all of which bear some agentic
capacity. This capacity includes the negative power to resist or
obstruct human projects, but it also includes the more active
power to affect and create effects. On this model of eating,
human and nonhuman bodies recorporealize in response to
each other; both exercise formative power and both offer
themselves as matter to be acted on. Eating appears as a series
of mutual transformations in which the border between inside
and outside becomes blurry: my meal both is and is not mine;
you both are and are not what you eat. (Bennett 48-49)
For Bennett, this interaction of two mutually transforming material bodies figures eating
as a process of shifting, collapsing boundaries. With a methodology grounded in actornetwork theory, Bennett meditates upon food’s “agentic capacity” to initiate any number
of psychological or physiological responses in the human body as it is being consumed
and digested by that body. Food, in other words, transforms the human body by which it
is transformed. Bennett’s work suggests, therefore, that, though ingested by a human
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body, food is ultimately ambiguous in its effects—neither entirely passive nor entirely
dominant.
Reading for the permeability that exists between the human body and non-human food, as
Bennett might, infuses some of Jennings’s remarks on his tea-drinking habit with new
significance. This notion of mutually transformative “bodies” explains why Jennings
might take green tea to “refine the imagination,” when writing an intellectual work. The
same green tea has also rendered his disposition liable to “ressentiment, depression,
hyperactivity, dull-wittedness, or violence,” as Bennett would suggest, or “hereditary
suicidal mania,” as Hesselius does suggest (40). In this text, both Jennings and Hesselius
underestimate the complexities of eating food. The physiological and the spiritual are
coexistent ecologies that collide together by an act of ingestion. Ingesting food has made
Jennings’s monkey demon accessible on the physiological levels of sight and sound.
Rather than growing “too abstract,” as he fears, Jennings’s tea-drinking habit completes a
collapse between his physiological and spiritual perception. With the collapse of the
physiological and the spiritual, a new ecology develops on the site of Jennings’s body.
Food is not the interaction of a subject and an object, but rather the collision of two
complex ecologies whose relations become radically interpenetrated, and this larger
expanse of relations comes into play when Jennings takes green tea.
This perspective yields two possible readings of Jennings’s suicide, then. The first is that
Jennings, accepting the connectivity of the physiological and spiritual, curtails his
material existence in order to end his new spiritual one. The second is that Jennings’s
suicide is proof of the persuasive domination of the monkey demon, which convinces him
to fully abandon the physical and effect a total separation of his mind and body. This
latter reading makes Jennings’s early concerns about the condition of his mind and body
ironic; he achieves the very separation that he sought to avoid through green tea.
Jennings’s impulse to parse the processes of his mind and of his body, and to do so by
supplying himself with excess material, has fatal consequences. He has grasped the
mutually transformative relations between food, the body, and the mind, but without
understanding that his experiment would also have consequences for the spiritual plane to
which he gains access. As the story develops and as we realize the full extent of
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Jennings’s circumstances, the maxim that food affects both body and mind is slightly
revised: food’s effects on the body and the mind can have spiritual consequences. While
Bennett’s approach to “edible matter” offers a useful foundation for theorizing the
material relations involved between humans and their food, her chapter focuses on the
ontological porousness of the two and consequently misses some opportunities to
apprehend the latent power dynamic embedded in these material relations. He similarly
does not understand his own choice to settle on drinking green tea; he simply “felt the
want, and . . . supplied it.” He has only a provisional theory as to why a writer might need
to take a physical stimulant: even here, however, he defers to what seems a flippant
remark made by a friend—the necessity of being “on something” while writing any
difficult work. By examining the material relations between Jennings’s mind, body, and
food, we may begin to understand the limitations that lead Jennings to despair. Jennings
cannot and does not realize the extent to which his mind, body, and the food that he so
indifferently consumes can be mutually constitutive.
“Green Tea” develops a sense of ambiguity surrounding practices of consumption. The
text refuses to confirm a single root cause of what happens to Jennings one way or
another; we receive no absolute conclusion as to whether the monkey appears as the
result of faulty digestion, of withdrawal, or of an excess of green tea. What we may say
with more certainty, however, is that Jennings’s condition is not purely psychoactive; it
does not depend on his ingestion of a particular substance for its continuance, since
quitting his green tea habit does not effect a corresponding cessation of the monkey’s
visitations. The irrevocable nature of Jennings’s predicament recalls Stevenson’s Dr.
Jekyll—more, perhaps, than it does De Quincey’s experience with opium; Jekyll’s fatal
mistake is to treat the contaminated salts that transform him into Mr. Hyde as though the
process was psychoactive, reversible, impermanent. If green tea is involved in Jennings’s
revelation, that involvement is as a sacramental food. Rather than initiating an
individual’s transformation, green tea engages Jennings with an unconsidered, extant
spiritual environment. Mr. Hyde is one strange instance of the monstrous in an otherwise
unchanged London. By contrast, Jennings is a scholar whose mind and body become
instantiated into a monstrous ecology.

90

Notwithstanding the sometimes humorously presumptuous deductions that Hesselius
draws from Jennings’s case, the doctor’s diagnosis does show some recognition that the
spheres of Jennings’s experience are interrelated. In contrast to Jennings’s divisive
approach to food, mind, and body, Hesselius views the three as a triage of intermingled
material players that, in certain combinations, causes the human to access (or be
vulnerable to) the spiritual. For Hesselius, the mind is as much a material substance in its
own right as are food and the body. As he reminds us, the mind resides in the nervous or
spiritual fluid produced by the brain and is “not immaterial, any more than, as I before
remarked, light or electricity are so” (39). Hesselius’s proposed solution, though vague, is
reliant on the material: he claims that “acting steadily upon the body” would have cured
the symptoms that drove Jennings to despair (39). He compares Jennings’s experience to
a parallel case that presumably happened to the addressee of his narrative, Professor Van
Loo of Leyden. He begs the professor to “remember how effectually [he] dissipated [Van
Loo’s] pictures by the simple application of iced eau-de-cologne” (39). The reasoning
behind this solution is only slightly different from that of his patient. Jennings takes green
tea on the supposition that the best way to enhance the mind is to operate through the
body, and Hesselius believes that the best way to cure Jennings of his spiritual vision is
also through the body. Rather than viewing green tea as an enhancer of physiological
ability, however, Hesselius refers to green tea as something closer to a psychical toxin.
Chen offers a theoretical model suited for reading Jennings’s predicament as a response
to a toxin. In her 2012 monograph, Animacies, Chen defines toxicity as the commingling
of two material bodies. Under what Chen identifies as “a basic semantic schema for
toxicity” that emerges out of several examples, one body is under threat of damage,
death, or alteration by the other (191). Hesselius’s clinical assessment of chemical
“abuses, of which the habitual use of such agents as green tea is one,” contains echoes of
Chen’s schema (39). Jennings’s body is altered by a supposedly toxic agent (green tea),
which causes “the over-action of the cerebral heart” and “prodigious nervous
congestions” (39). Toxicity encompasses a latent power dynamic; and, indeed, there are
important racial and nationalistic implications underlying this portrait of a white
imperialist body threatened by a product of colonialism, which will be examined more
closely later in this chapter. For now, we will simply bear in mind Chen’s reminder that
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“Toxicity’s ‘first’ (under threat) and ‘second’ (threatening) bodies are thus in the eye of
the beholder” (191). Though Hesselius does not actually apply the term “toxic,” or its
variants, to green tea, his description of its effects echoes the semantic schema of
toxicity. Habitual green tea-drinking is one of “various abuses” that can disturb the
“equilibrium” between the brain and an inner spiritual vision, causing that brain to be
“unduly exposed” to “disembodied spirits” (39). This language of chemical violence,
imbalance, and vulnerability effectively casts green tea as a toxin that threatens and
operates upon the body.
The semantic schema of toxicity acknowledges the power dynamic latent in the human
body’s absorption of external substances, whether or not that intake is voluntary.
According to Chen, toxicity reverses the typical allocation of subject and object positions,
where the subject is the animate human and the object is passive inanimate matter.
Instead, this reversal emerges from the subject-like agency of the inanimate toxin and the
object-like animate human body’s passive receptivity to that toxin:
By its very definition, the toxin, as much as it may have
been categorized as inanimate, is more than mere matter,
for it has a potency that can directly implicate the
vulnerability of a living body. Prototypically, a toxin
requires an object against which its threat operates. This
threatened object is an object whose defenses will be put to
the test, in detection, in “fighting off,” and finally in
submission and absorption. But some confusion occurs
when we note that the object of toxicity, its target, is an
animate one—and hence potentially also a kind of subject—
and that the toxin, the subject of toxicity, is inanimate.
(203)
Here, Chen’s schema of toxicity does not reflect the equal standing implied by Bennett’s
interpretation of ingestion as a “profound reciprocity between eater and eaten” or by any
mutually constitutive relationship between parallel actants (Bennett 43). Rather, toxicity
manifests an unequal distribution of power. It is the potency or the greater power of the
toxin that determines the toxin’s subjecthood, as well as the objecthood of the living body
under threat. Hesselius therefore invests green tea with material agency in rhetorically
situating it as a toxin.
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Ultimately, Bennett’s and Chen’s theories only extend the present discussion so far; the
approaches of vibrant matter and animacies rely, however reluctantly, on subject-object
relations in spite of their striving to resist the limitations of that binary. Chen’s discussion
of toxicity loses some of its impact when taken out of the context of twenty-first century
biopolitics. Applied to nineteenth century imperialism, toxicity more or less reiterates the
central concerns of the Imperial Gothic, wherein the colonized returns to transform (and
to degrade, often into bestiality) the body of the colonizer. As Hesselius describes his
studies of the various fluid systems connected to both the human body and spirit, his
language evokes a sense of the interconnectedness and complex relations between
material and spiritual that comes closest to resembling an ecology. The degree to which
material and immaterial parts are connected within this ecology make it possible for such
insignificant events like Jennings’s drinking green tea to have profound and devastating
consequences. Moreover, this interconnectedness also confuses causal relationships. It
may well be that Jennings’s experiences are caused by green tea and it may not; the text
denies any narrative closure of the kind found in mystery fiction and which posits a final
master narrative of causes and effects.
One difficulty of describing the new material ecologies of the indigestible stems from the
implicitly hierarchical discourses surrounding human engagement with food. The word
“food” is itself predicated upon the anthropocentric functions of food. The OED’s first
definition of food classifies the word under the heading, “Nourishment” (“food,” I.),
before more specific variations emerge, including the familiar definition of food as “Any
nutritious substance that people or animals eat or drink in order to maintain life and
growth; nourishment, provisions” (“food,” def. 1.a.). From a linguistic standpoint, it
seems impossible to avoid relegating food to a subordinate position relative to the human
eater. We necessarily refer to food by its utility in providing sustenance to the human
body. Even Bennett is limited by using the term “edible matter,” which still casts food as
an object-for-consumption. There are also further problems as to the variable matter that
food encompasses; food can be solid or liquid, living or nonliving, material or abstract (in
the figurative sense of “providing spiritual, emotional, or mental sustenance” [OED,
“food,” 2.a.]), all depending on the nutritive needs of the food consumer. Yet, it is still
possible to nuance our conceptions of food, these limits of language and classification
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notwithstanding. If our vocabulary of food is incomplete, we may still reimagine the
material terms on which food and humans interact. Thinking through food ecologies is to
imagine ingestion as the interaction between two complex ecologies, between the food
and the biota of the human body. Food, whatever its form, is already enmeshed in and
composed of ecologies, whether in the sense of the dynamic relations of growth,
consumption, digestion, and decomposition surrounding that which can be considered
food, or of the communities of microscopic bacteria living symbiotically on complex
organisms and upon which bacteria complex organisms rely for survival. Another
example is Jennings’s “material waste,” which signifies both an excess and a
diminishment—consuming a material resource to excess, and the wasting away of
Jennings’s body and mind as he attempts to digest that which turns out to be indigestible.
The term “ecology” is therefore useful here for bringing with it more discursive
flexibility than the terms of subject and object, from which even new materialisms
theorists like Bennett and Chen who work to dismantle such binaries have trouble
disentangling themselves.
Before we can further parse Jennings’s entanglement with the indigestible, it is necessary
to first pause and consider what exactly constitutes the digestible within such a nebulous
imagination of a literary food ecology. If ingestion involves a collision of food ecologies,
digestion suggests a relation in which one ecology would be disintegrated, subsumed, and
absorbed by the other. The consuming ecology, then, would be strengthened, enlarged,
and nourished by the digested ecology. The logic of digestion is a logic of dominance that
necessitates hierarchical relations. One limitation of Bennett’s conception of edible
matter is its presumption of the equanimity between the actants or conative bodies
involved. This equanimity of material bodies cannot be said of the food relations in Le
Fanu’s text. If we imagined the process of eating as Bennett might, as the interaction of
equal material parts, then the resulting ecology of relations would exhibit actants without
momentum, conflicts, tension, or shifts of power—none of the components, in short, that
are necessary to the narrative. Continuing this relational logic of digestion between
ecologies, then, indigestion would imply a relation of failed absorption, where the
consuming ecology manages neither to break down or to nourish itself by the ecology
with which it has engaged. The food ecology of “Green Tea” centres on the ingestion of a
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food item that Jennings had intended to absorb—to assimilate within the machinations of
his body during his production of intellectual labour. This green tea resists such
absorption and comes back to haunt its consumer, in a Gothic return of a substance that
was only partially integrated—ingested but unsuccessfully digested. In this way, the story
of the green tea and Jennings is a story of the indigestible. That which ought to have been
broken down, consumed, digested instead returns in a more powerful and destructive
form. Whether or not from a hereditary predisposition to suicide, Jennings is powerless
against his demonic pursuer and destroys himself at its bidding.
When we view the characters and events of “Green Tea” through the lens of food
ecologies, the text shifts from being a tangle of competing and contradictory resonances
to an ecology of overdetermined phenomena—an ecology of the indigestible. The
monkey suggests a multitude of ideas: when Jennings first realizes that his umbrella
easily passes through the monkey “without the slightest resistance” (24), it is a ghostly
apparition that evokes nineteenth-century spiritualism and the occult; when he finds that
it total darkness it is “all visible distinctly in a halo that resembles a glow of red embers”
(27), lit as if by a glory, it becomes a confused symbol of alternately satanic or pagan
power; when the monkey “exhibit[s] an atrocious determination to thwart” (29) the
Reverend’s religious duties, an allegory of compromised religious devotion rendered
through the lens of Victorian medievalism; the choice of a small black monkey in itself
could serve as a subtle invocation of nineteenth-century evolutionary discourse, or even
the social Darwinism that would eventually evolve into the eugenics movement. This
ecology of the indigestible is an emergent, multifaceted phenomenon. The primary horror
of this tale is not the existence of a spiritual dimension in itself, but rather what could
happen to us if like Jennings we had a channel of access to it—if what we experience as
two discrete environments collided together. The monkey demon offers a glimpse of a
dimension to which we do not and would not desire to have access. It is an environment
that rides on the material relations at play within indigestion, including the occult and, as
we shall see in the next section, the imperial.
There is a further dimension to the horror of food or of the indigestible that has
significant materialist consequences. While for Bennett the physical dynamic between
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human bodies and food is ambiguous, and for Chen that dynamic is an embodied power
relation, “Green Tea” expresses a horror of the productive, generative quality of food.
Jennings takes green tea so that it might create certain effects conducive to his studies,
but the tea is too effective. We have already seen how he takes “a little green tea” for its
mentally stimulating effects—or for the way that it “cleared and intensified the power of
thought” (22). Afterward, when the monkey appears and Jennings narrates the impression
that these appearances produce, what he describes is an amplified version of the effect
that he sought in drinking green tea:
There is in its motion an indefinable power to dissipate
thought, and to contract one’s attention to that monotony,
till the ideas shrink, as it were, to a point, and at last to
nothing—and unless I had started up, and shook off the
catalepsy I have felt as if my mind were on the point of
losing itself. (30)
The narrow, contracted attention is an extreme of the sustained scholarly focus that he
sought to maintain while writing. The green tea, in other words, heightens Jennings’s
perceptions to the extent that, as Hesselius later describes it, his mind becomes “unduly
exposed” to the communications of “disembodied spirits” (39). The tea is altogether too
successful and exceeds the will of the body that consumes it.
Having thus become vulnerable, Jennings’s hauntings follow the same method by which
he increased the strength of his tea, moving from stronger brews of black tea to multiple
kettles of green tea. Occasionally, the monkey would disappear for a few weeks, only to
return more imposing and imbued with a “new energy” (27). Like Jennings’s gradual
strengthening of his tea, the monkey’s increased aggression also occurs in stages: first,
“in an increased vivacity, and an air of menace” (27); later, in an “intense and increasing
fury, whenever [he] said [his] prayers, or even meditated prayer” and which culminates
eventually in “a dreadful interruption” (30). Both the green tea and the spectral monkey
follow parallel patterns of intensification, with the latter occurring immediately after the
former. Through this excess efficacy, green tea becomes the waste that immerses
Jennings irrevocably into an ecology of its own.
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Jennings becomes entangled in this new waste ecology as if he were entering a new
social relationship. “Tea was my companion” (22), he explains, casting the substance as
an animate fellow creature whose presence he believes will offer some source of vitality
during his solitary studies. The term “companion” here connotes the comfort offered by a
friend, or even a pet; it evokes the same possibility of emotional fulfillment, as well as a
similar demand upon one’s services (whether socially, as a caretaker, or as the one who
prepares the food). In addition to the comfort of intimacy, however, companionship also
suggests constant presence or attendance, and that presence becomes a burden as it does
for Jennings when he realizes that it never entirely goes away. Jennings reports being
riveted by an “irrepressible uneasiness as to its movements” and constantly tracking its
behaviour so as to notice that “[i]n all situations, at all hours, it is awake and looking at
me. That never changes” (26). “Companion” is, in other words, a loaded term in “Green
Tea.” Le Fanu loosely applies the term to the green tea, to the monkey (chapter six is
titled, “How Mr Jennings Met His Companion” [21]), and to Jennings himself (as
Hesselius remarks, “He has read, travelled, and thought, and having also suffered, he
ought to be an accomplished companion” [11]). This language of companionship marks
Jennings’s absorption into a new ecology centring on his spectral companion and to the
diminishment of all of his other social and spiritual connections. The green tea’s or the
monkey’s constant attendance supplants all of Jennings’s other existing or potential
relationships. Green tea, as Lady Mary admits, was a source of disagreement between her
and Jennings. The monkey’s constant presence and interruptions force Jennings to give
up his vicarage. Ultimately, Jennings’s consumption of green tea effects and alters his
social possibilities, as a new and unwise acquaintanceship might. Jennings is prepared for
green tea’s stimulating capacity but not for its long-term efficacy and its constant
companionship.
The impurities of green tea and their effect on Jennings’s spiritual system long overstay
their welcome. The efficacy of the green tea is such that it continues even after Jennings
stops drinking it. On the night of the monkey’s first appearance, Jennings claims that he
“drank no tea that night” (26). A common acquaintance, Lady Mary, also confirms to
Hesselius that, though “Green tea was a subject on which [they] used almost to quarrel,”
Jennings has “quite given that up” (11). Nevertheless, Jennings cannot escape his
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condition or disengage from the new perceptions to which the tea has exposed him. This
sense of a potent impurity, long stored within the body and subtly active, parallels a
33

memorable anecdote that initiates Stacy Alaimo’s discussions of trans-corporeality.

In a

now famous account of toxicity, the new materialist thinker describes her realization that
her body had unwittingly contacted and ingested heavy metals. She describes a campaign
against mercury that measured the toxicity found in volunteers’ hair:
Such an action renders palpable one’s own corporeal
connection to global economic, industrial, and
environmental systems. . . Someone who participated in this
campaign may well have considered how her own body was
literally enmeshed within the wider world. When I received
my results, I imagined various routes that mercury may
have taken to my body (tuna sandwiches in childhood?
Dallas air pollution?). (19-20)
Alaimo’s narrative recounts a newfound hyper-awareness of her body’s material
interactions that would most likely be eerily familiar for Jennings and, indeed, Le Fanu’s
readers. As I describe in the final section of this chapter, Jennings’s latent and unfiltered
impurity enmeshes him in a global ecology that is similarly economic, but also occult and
imperial. Reading Alaimo’s trans-corporeal epiphany alongside Le Fanu’s text can reveal
the implied anxiety in her account. Beyond the recognition of her enmeshment is a
discomfort with the lingering effects of material relations with no single clear cause.
Moreover, the toxicology results betray the body’s unexpectedly ineffective filtration
system when weighed against an unexpectedly effective impurity. Again, the good vicar
might find these impressions familiar.
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Alaimo uses trans-corporeality as a form of critical engagement that mirrors Morton’s understanding of
the mesh. Alaimo writes: “[i]magining human corporeality as trans-corporeality, in which the human is
always intermeshed with the more-than-human world, underlines the extent to which the substance of the
human is ultimately inseparable from ‘the environment’” (2). For Alaimo, this enmeshment de-centres the
human subject amid an environment of systems, relations, and connections. While I invoke these relations
using a parallel term—the indigestible—this emphasis on the “more-than-human” seems particularly
pertinent to Le Fanu’s text, which envisions a more-than-human, more-than-material ecology emerging
from waste.

98

The green tea of Le Fanu’s text is not only remarkable for these enduring and vigorous
effects. It also enjoys a certain structural ambiguity, which allows it to permeate system
to system, whether digestive, circulatory, sensory, or spiritual. When Jennings
experiments upon his own mind and body using green tea, he appears to recognize that
these discrete systems are connected. He takes green tea under the belief that “there is a
material waste that should be hourly supplied” (22) in occupations such as writing or else
“we should grow too abstracted, and the mind, as it were, pass out of the body, unless it
were reminded of the connection by actual sensation” (22), he appears to recognize the
interconnectedness of these systems to some extent. However, he is not prepared for the
full implications of his own embodiment when thus experimenting upon himself. The
green tea, with its totalizing influence over his body, forces him into a hyper-sensitized
version of that embodiment that only ends with the self-destruction of that body.
Finally, green tea is generative in the sense that it produces a seemingly spiritual
phenomenon. The ultimate irony of Jennings’s demise is that he received precisely what
he wished for—the opportunity to study minutely the phenomena that both Jennings and
Hesselius associate with “the actual religion of educated and thinking paganism” (21).
The dark joke of this text is that it grants Jennings the immersion in his subject of study
that he was seeking, along with the destructive consequences that he did not anticipate.
These destructive consequences stem from the unexpected agency of the material
substance with which Jennings engages as a food. Jennings expresses his helplessness in
the face of such power when he despairs of all possibility of escaping the spectral
monkey by an effort of will: “it is gaining such an influence over me: it orders me about,
it is such a tyrant, and I’m growing so helpless” (32). He goes on to explain that: “while I
pray with my eyes closed, it comes closer and closer, and I see it. I know it is not to be
accounted for physically, but I do actually see it, though my lids are closed, and so it
rocks my mind, as it were, and overpowers me, and I am obliged to rise from my knees”
(30). Whether by the monkey or the green tea, Jennings is mentally and physically
overpowered. As an active material agent within Jennings’s body, the green tea of the
text is a fictionalized version of what Bennett and Chen saw in both edible matter and
toxins.
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Jennings’s feelings of horror grow out of his awareness that he is now compelled to use
his new senses: he sees the monkey in daylight or darkness, whether his eyes are closed
or open; he is driven to desperation because its movements rivet and then disperse his
attention, or “contract one’s attention to that monotony [of its motion], till the ideas
shrink, as it were, to a point, and at last to nothing” (30). The strength of Jennings’s
horror lies to a considerable degree in the unexpected and inexplicable complexity of his
sensory experience. That he tries to classify his visions as “purely disease” (25), without
once believing his condition to be any other than a “satanic captivity” (26), shows his
desperate desire to cling to a purely physiological sensorium. He is not alone in this. In
her 2016 discussion of “Green Tea,” Cadwallader points to “Doctor Hesselius’s inability
to comprehend the totality of human experience. While he repeatedly claims to believe in
the supernatural, he treats his patients’ encounters with it not as spiritual experiences but
as evidence of a deranged sensorium” (44). While this is certainly true, Hesselius himself
has a limited understanding of the interactions and interrelations behind Jennings’s
experiences, as I discuss in the next section. He prescribes for Jennings’s spiritual
malaise, or even cursed existence, an incongruously dainty material commodity.
Cadwallader’s remark is that Hesselius has no spiritual treatment to weigh against
spiritual disturbance. However, while Jennings’s experience may not arise out of a
deranged sensorium, the monkey and its ecology of connections work to derange his
sensibility. It would be inaccurate to say that Jennings’s haunting operates through some
of his physiological senses and not others because he perceives the monkey through
senses that are grounded in but also detached from his ordinary physiological vision and
hearing. The monkey violates ocular principles, perfectly visible in both daylight and
darkness by means of “a halo that resembles the glow of red embers, and which
accompanies it in all its movements” (27). When the monkey begins speaking to him, its
voice has “a peculiarity” (31); just as Jennings sees the monkey with a secondary, inner
vision, he also hears the monkey through a secondary sense of hearing. As Jennings says,
the creature’s voice “is not like the tone of a human voice. It is not by my ears it reaches
me—it comes like a singing through my head” (31). It is therefore less that his sensory
experience is inconsistent, but rather that this experience is apprehended through senses
that seem a ghostly echo of his normal physiological senses.
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3.2
When Hesselius recounts his first shock on hearing of Jennings’s suicide, he wanders into
a meditation on the unlikely connections that exist between binary opposites:
It is the story of the process of a poison, a poison which
excites the reciprocal action of spirit and nerve, and
paralyzes the tissue that separates those cognate functions
of the senses, the external and the interior. Thus we find
strange bedfellows, and the mortal and immortal
prematurely make acquaintance. (37)
The way in which the waste ecologies at play in Le Fanu’s story are capable of
intertwining such seeming contradictions as the material and the spiritual recalls the tale
of Saint Dominic as I laid it out in the introduction to this chapter. The hagiographical
legend offers a whimsical, even folkloric collapse of the spiritual and the material; its
humour lies in Saint Dominic’s talent for combating, in strictly physical terms, a spiritual
threat made manifest. Rather than banish his devilish distraction, the saint reduces Satan
to a lamp; rather than recoil from or become annoyed with the fiendish flea on his page,
he marks his spot with a bug-splat. This flux between apparently contradictory
categories—material and spiritual, “mortal and immortal” (37)—recurs in Le Fanu’s
parallel narrative, where physical symptoms and spiritual distress, dietary choices,
hobbies, and Christian despair all seem connected. Hesselius’s iced eau-de-cologne
remedy is as ridiculous as Saint Dominic’s playful resolution of his own troubles. Such a
mundane solution, however, appears inadequate next to the tangled web of “spirit and
nerve” in which Jennings is involved, especially given both the complex cultural
associations around the monkey and the violent physical consequences of its
manifestations.
In the previous section I examined the indigestible nature of a form of spiritual waste, left
behind by Jennings’s compulsive and wanton consumption of imported tea. Here, I trace
the ecologies of associative meanings into which this waste ushers Jennings—particularly
the spectral associations between food consumption, learning, and anxieties toward the
imperial other. The indigestible is, after all, hyper-productive, and not simply of physical
interrelations and ironic dietary outcomes. The digestive ecologies that provide context
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for Jennings’s tea consumption parallel contemporary anxieties toward nineteenthcentury cultural products and preoccupations, imports and occupations. The tale figures
imported green tea as a poisonous form of the indigestible, lingering long after in the
spiritual system of its victim. Occult paganism emerges in this story as a parallel form of
the indigestible toward which Jennings is irrevocably drawn. It lingers in the history of
Europe, on the margins of Empire, and it lurks in the corners of Jennings’s eye. Like any
imperial fear, it cannot be incorporated into English life and yet it permeates nonetheless
to form its own complex relations. Where the previous section explores the indigestible
on a literal level (green tea), this section explores the indigestible through layers of
occulted associations (paganism). Just as the residue from Jennings’s past tea abuse lies
latent and unincorporated in his body, occult paganism throughout the story figures as a
past residue still present and still unassimilated into Jennings’s contemporary European
context. And, although both sections share a parallel structure, they are also not discrete
from one another; the text binds green tea and pagan occultism together within its
broader, bewildering interrelations.
Jennings is not haunted in the usual way; he is not the target of a spiritual subject or
agency. Rather, Jennings finds himself immersed in a new environment. As McCormack
observes, “Le Fanu’s world, even in the more mundane novels, is prepositional: relation
holds it together and haunts it. A universe of nouns and verbs is replaced by a multiverse
of prepositions, conjunctions, disjunctions” (McCormack 153). “Green Tea” depicts a
multilingual scholar struggling to comprehend the grammar of his surroundings. From the
time that he begins his work on paganism to the height of his harassment by the monkey
demon, Jennings describes his experience as a way of living. This new environment,
moreover, is the result of a catalytic reaction between Jennings’s research and his
ingestion of green tea—an emergent ecology of the material/physiological and of the
spiritual/occult. Here, digestion and indigestion do not result from ingestion, but rather
from Jennings’s engagement with an ecology. Food moves between the physiological and
the spiritual, initiating a new perceptual dimension that resides in Jennings and which
collapses the spiritual and the material.
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The waste ecology into which Jennings stumbles is a holistic environment that integrates
food, religion, imperialism, and the occult. The text creates a sense of the expansive reach
of this ecology when Jennings describes his own research as a state of mind that redefines
the spaces that he occupies. “I was always thinking on the subject,” he explains, “walking
about, wherever I was, everywhere” (21). This holistic quality, or what Jennings refers to
as an “essential unity” (21), is what he finds unwholesome and implicitly fascinating
about studying paganism. In this same passage he remarks that he has been “thoroughly
infected” (21) by his new studies, depicting the topic’s resistance to scholarly objectivity
as contamination. While this image speaks more to contagion and to contact than to
consumption, it evokes the same sense of bodily permeability as well as Jennings’s
ambiguous sense that the spirit or intellect is itself a body, distinct and yet intricately
connected to our corporeal form. Jennings is so fascinated by his “delightfully
interesting” (22) work that he does not notice the degree to which it entangles him or the
impossibility of extricating himself from that work hereafter. His narrative suggests that
one cannot study paganism at arm’s length; one must live within and become subsumed
by paganism. He has inadvertently fallen into a religious belief and practice that consume
him.
Jennings lives in a particular state of mind, which in turn alters and reshapes his
engagement with his surroundings. Unlike Saint Dominic, Jennings cannot perform his
religious work specifically because of his interactions with the spiritual world. While
Saint Dominic commands his spiritual environment, Jennings falls to its commands. As
Jennings begins this transition into a new way of life, he develops a new habit of drinking
tea. As he believes, this habit is the physiological counterpart to his mental exertions.
Jennings “felt the want, and [he] supplied it” (22). Mental stimulation must have a
corresponding physical stimulus, lest the mind lose its connection to the body. Jennings
therefore imbibes and is habituated to drinking green tea in the same way that he imbibes
and is infused with this holistic knowledge. The food item in this case—the green tea—is
aligned carefully with Jennings’s engagement with an environment of his own making.
Green tea is not, then, an object to be digested; it is a component of what will soon
become an unconsidered ecology. Indeed, it does not matter if green tea enables the
studies that push Jennings toward the spiritual, or if in its impurity it provides a visionary
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experience. As we shall see, green tea is as inextricably bound to paganism as are
Jennings’s occult studies.
As Jennings sits at his studies—surrounded by deep Turkish carpets and distracted from
his Anglican ministry—his obsessive consumption of a product of empire evokes the
nineteenth-century fascination with the Imperial Gothic. In the nineteenth-century
imagination—particularly as it was expressed in anxious genre fiction—the Victorian
Empire was a site of occulted interrelations and blurred significance. As Karen
Macfarlane observes, the Imperial Gothic channels the era’s preoccupation with “failures
of classification and anxieties about the limits of knowledge” by writing them onto the
Victorian individual, betraying “the mutable, unclassifiable body” (76). Le Fanu’s
“Green Tea” exhibits many of the late-Victorian epistemological anxieties that are clearly
visible in tales of a plundered ancient Egypt, of the archeological Other, or of the
imperial body lost to the colonies, all of which belong more recognizably to the Imperial
Gothic. Of course, it is fairly straightforward to imagine the colonialist implications of
“Green Tea.” The text can easily be—and indeed has already been—read as an
imperialist nightmare in which a colonized object returns to colonize the unsuspecting
imperial subject. Melissa Dickson, for instance, argues that the tea itself represents the
tensions between its nationalization as an iconic food of British domesticity and imperial
anxieties surrounding chemical dependency and racial Otherness (85). Though Dickson
does not explore the Orientalist undercurrents of “Green Tea” beyond these observations,
she pairs her claim with a brief reference to the quality of things that, as Elaine
Freedgood has shown, carries the potential to “destabilise the boundaries between the
material and the metaphysical” within a gothic text (Dickson 78). In other words,
Dickson hints, however briefly, at the interesting material implications that this text has
the potential to offer through a food item heavy with conflicting cultural tensions.
Green tea was an uncommon food product in Victorian Britain, and comprised a far
smaller percentage of imported teas from China compared with black teas such as Ceylon
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from colonial Hong Kong.34 As a product that, unlike black tea, had not been
appropriated to emblemize British nationhood and domesticity, green tea maintains its
aura of Orientalism in Le Fanu’s text. The mingled exoticism and threat of contamination
is clear when Hesselius guesses that Jennings once drank green tea “extravagantly” (11),
when Lady Mary admits that Jennings’s controversial habit of taking “Green tea was a
subject on which [they] used almost to quarrel” (11), and of course when Hesselius refers
to this habit as one of many “abuses” of which to be wary (39). As the linchpin of the
material and spiritual collapse in an ecology of indigestion, green tea is emblematic of
colonial cultural products that refuse to be consumed—to be the product of careless
British cosmopolitanism. These latent tensions surrounding the British Imperial tea trade
might, therefore, also be extended to make room for a new materialisms reading.35
A new ecology emerges out of these intertwinings of food, studies, faith, and empire. As
Bennett might observe, its emergent properties are unpredictable and uncontrolled.
Jennings’s involvement with food involves him with empire; his studies of ancient
theology involve his capacity for belief. As these interrelate, they threaten his stable
position as an embodied consumer in a Victorian context. His studies in metaphysical
paganism—a nineteenth century euphemism for the occult—are bound to his
physiological habit of ingesting green tea. From these parallel practices, his physical,
mental, and perhaps even spiritual senses are at once heightened and intertwined. To
adopt some of Hesselius’s language, we might even explain the process as a kind of
sensory exposure, the degree of which was much more extensive than Jennings was
prepared for. This is how he creates and entangles himself in a new ecology of the
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Fromer’s A Necessary Luxury contains a detailed historical account of the British imperial tea trading
industry, including the differences of cultural capital invested into black tea and green tea. The former was
co-opted as an emblem of British domesticity, in stark contrast to the less known and more heavily
Orientalized green tea.
35

Chen’s semantic schema of toxicity, for instance, is well-suited to examine the implications of
rhetorically casting green tea, the subject, as a threat to Jennings’s body, the object. The spectral monkey
shows an increasing animation over the course of haunting Jennings. The monkey develops, in stages, an
increasing physical animation, going from “surly languor” (27), to jumping on a lectern and squatting over
an open Bible, to speaking “with a perfect coherence and articulation” (31). According to Jennings’s
description, the monkey gradually moves through what Chen would call “gradations of lifeliness” (167).
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material and the spiritual, two sensory realms joined by the ingestion of food. Jennings
explains the gradual worsening of his condition in terms we would normally associate
with consumption:
For two years in my direful case that limitation prevailed.
But as food is taken in softly at the lips, and then brought
under the teeth, as the tip of the little finger caught in a mill
crank will draw in the hand, and the arm, and the whole
body, so the miserable mortal who has been once caught
firmly by the end of the finest fibre of his nerve, is drawn in
and in, by the enormous machinery of hell, until he is as I
am. (31)
Jennings offers two analogies to his condition here: one of a person gradually ingesting
food; and the other of one who becomes trapped into an inexorable mechanism to be
ground like wheat grains into flour. Figuring himself, then, as both one who eats and one
who will be eaten, Jennings’s language takes on the contradictory classification of
Macfarlane’s reading of the Imperial Gothic. Jennings offers food consumption as the
material parallel for his spiritual entrapment “by the enormous machinery of hell.”
Ingestion initiates the process of Jennings’s predicament, and presents a vivid illustration
of the predation of which he is victim.
While it is Jennings’s addiction to green tea that often captures critical attention in this
story, this passage figures his consumption of and consumption by knowledge and study
of pagan theology as similarly obsessive. Pagan knowledge and stimulants that permit
occult learning entwine in this impulsive, addictive, and self-destructive engagement. We
can see this destabilizing of Jennings as an embodied consumer in the way that studying
ancient European paganism connects him to imperial paganism. The text elides the
distinctions between the ancient paganism that Jennings studies and the contemporary
Victorian fascination with all things occult. These unruly categories emerge during
Jennings’s first encounter with the monkey on an omnibus:
I had observed in the corner opposite to me . . . two small
circular reflections, as it seemed to me of a reddish light.
They were about two inches apart, and about the size of
those small brass buttons that yachting men used to put
upon their jackets. I began to speculate, as listless men will,
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upon this trifle, as it seemed. From what centre did that
faint but deep red light come, and from what—glass beads,
buttons, toy decorations—was it reflected? . . . I had not
solved the puzzle, and it became in another minute more
odd, for these two luminous points, with a sudden jerk,
descended nearer the floor, keeping still their relative
distance and horizontal position, and then, as suddenly, they
rose to the level of the seat on which I was sitting, and I saw
them no more.
‘My curiosity was now really excited, and, before I had
time to think, I saw again these two dull lamps, again
together near the floor; again they disappeared, and again in
their old corner I saw them. (23)
Jennings notices the monkey in a careless, “listless” way, considering it a mere “trifle.”
His early speculations grasp at the trivial, accordingly—light reflected by ephemera, or
“glass beads, buttons, toy decorations.” Not realizing what he sees, Jennings treats the
spectre as a game, an intellectual exercise, a “puzzle” to excite his “curiosity” and which
requires “time to think.” This puzzle resists being known; it baffles him, becoming “more
odd” by the minute. Jennings’s idleness is contrasted against the monkey, which shows
the alacrity and awareness of a predator. Its movements—implied by its eyes dropping
down slightly, jumping up onto the seat opposite Jennings, and reappearing at a distance
in their original place—suggest strategic investigation through cautious advances and
retreats. This monkey sizes up its prey carefully and deliberately, in spite of what
Jennings says about its initial sullenness or languor.
Jennings’s trivial speculations link his behaviour to an imperialist stereotype of the
manner and work ethic of colonized peoples. He is not the fearless and enterprising
adventurer of Imperial Gothic novels. In this encounter, Jennings is oddly “listless,” idle,
and even indolent—prejudicial terms that were pointedly applied to the Chinese labourers
who worked for British colonial tea plantations; these descriptors fall within the broader
discourse of racialized labour that Syed Hussein Alatas famously called the myth of the
lazy native. In his interactions with the monkey, in other words, Jennings rehearses the
mannerisms that imperialist discourses held to be intrinsic to the colonized. In doing so,
Jennings falls into a holistic realm of dissolving and slippery categories in which not even
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the imperialist’s reductive distinctions between colonizer and colonized may be
maintained.
This is how imperialism recurs in Le Fanu’s tale. It weaves subtly into an ecology of
relations that speak to colonial involvement. Beyond their most apparent emblems—
imported tea and a tropical mammal—contemporary imperialist anxieties surface
throughout the story as spectral impressions. Le Fanu’s text is less a tale of overt
imperialist language than it is one punctuated by subtle pulses of imperialist sensibility—
racialized language, gothic exoticism, and fantasies of incursion. Jennings exists as an
imperial contemporary, inextricably a man of his colonial time; not only does he exhibit
an intellectual colonization of ancient paganism, but he also habituates himself to a
thoughtless and avid consumption of a colonial product—green tea—in the service of that
intellectual colonization. Jennings regularly takes green tea, having found that “it cleared
and intensified the power of thought so” (22). As we have already seen, Jennings believes
that the work of intellection demands that the scholar operate “on something” and that his
chosen “companion” is tea (22). He begins with black tea, steadily increases its strength,
and then moves on to green tea, presumably because the strongest black tea no longer
answers his purposes. As with the black tea—and, indeed, as if he were beginning a
course of medication—Jennings begins with a small dosage, with only “a little green
tea,” until he is brewing kettles of tea two or three times during his final three hours of
study before bed (22). He admits this to mean he took green tea “frequently,” but insists
that his tea was “not stronger than one might take it for pleasure” (22). The process by
which Jennings develops his tea-drinking habit follows the trajectory of encroachment—
the same encroachment that he later uses as an analogy for his own case, when he
describes being unaccountably “drawn in and in” just “as food is taken in softly at the
lips, and then brought under the teeth” (31). Thus we find Jennings’s acquisition of occult
knowledge doubly imperial—imperial in its accumulation of knowledge that is other, and
in its ingestion of an imperial product.
But in both cases, that which Jennings has consumed is indigestible. The green tea sits in
his spiritual/mesmeric fluid while his occult, theological hobby seems to distract the
clergyman. Each invigorates Jennings, but neither can be easily incorporated into the
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ascetic Christian ideal of a figure like Saint Dominic. In coining the term “Imperial
Gothic” in his 1988 book, Rule of Darkness, Patrick Brantlinger observes that:
Imperial Gothic expresses anxieties about the waning of
religious orthodoxy, but even more clearly it expresses
anxieties about the ease with which civilization can revert
to barbarism or savagery and thus about the weakening of
Britain’s imperial hegemony. The atavistic descents into the
primitive experienced by fictional characters seem often to
be allegories of the larger regressive movement of
civilization, British progress transformed into British
backsliding. (229)
“Green Tea” is particularly concerned with the “waning of religious orthodoxy.” The
story reflects critically upon Jennings’s studies into paganism and upon their
unwholesome influence on his “Christian mind” (21). For his part, Brantlinger identifies
three primary motifs of the Imperial Gothic: “individual regression or going native; an
invasion of civilization by the forces of barbarism or demonism; and the diminution of
opportunities for adventure and heroism in the modern world” (230). It is further
characteristic, he suggests, of many late Victorian Imperial Gothic stories for “occult
phenomena [to] follow characters from imperial settings home to Britain” (231). Le
Fanu’s text maps readily onto this schema of the Imperial Gothic. Jennings treats of his
own condition as one such regression into the so-called primitive, situating his studies of
ancient pagan metaphysics as he does as beautiful and yet unwholesome for “the
Christian mind” (21). Dickson argues that the spectral monkey parallels other Victorian
texts that racialize primates as colonial Others. If the colonial returns to haunt Jennings, it
does so in the form of a demonic black monkey—a Darwinian nightmare of the primitive,
an occult event overturning the evidence of science, and a heavily racialized emblem of
the regression of a white British imperial body. “Green Tea,” in other words, stages
Brantlinger’s Imperial Gothic in its depictions of both the decline of religious orthodoxy
and Victorian anxieties surrounding the colonial Other, racialized bodies, and eugenic
regression.
Brantlinger’s schema for the Imperial Gothic genre implies two canonical possibilities.
First, the narrative of an imperial adventurer who leaves England and is defeated,
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overcome, or irrevocably altered by the occult forces of the land he was sent to conquer;
second, the narrative of colonial penetration into the heart of empire, often a curse
brought back to England by some globe-trotter. This broad category of texts—which
might range from H. Rider Haggard’s adventure novels, to Bram Stoker’s Dracula
(1897), and to H. G. Wells’s The Time Machine (1895)—often depict unsuspecting
British imperialists who wander into and are irrevocably altered by a given colonial
landscape. Le Fanu’s imperial landscape, however, is an England whose worldly
involvement realizes a spiritual malaise. Indeed, the story seems to waver between these
two possibilities. It is the tale of an explorer into an obscure pagan past, lost ultimately to
his revelations. At once, it is an account of an imported impurity, which curses the moral
heart of a God-fearing empire – an emblematic Anglican minister. Each reading is
complicated by the ecology of the indigestible that emerges out of Jennings’s green tea
habit. Jennings seems less to have returned from the borderlands of the British Empire,
and more to have initiated a process that quickly grows into an ecology and which he
himself is not equipped to survive. “Green Tea” sits uneasily between the two standard
narratives of Imperial Gothic; it is a point of canonical collapse.
Local and ancient and, at once, foreign and current, paganism interrelates these two
canons. When Jennings complains that the ancient paganism he studies is disturbingly
holistic, he is more correct than he knows. Jennings’s studies pull Brantlinger’s two
Imperial Gothic narratives—of the lost imperialist and of the colonial incursion—
together in uneasy tension, not by virtue of his own work but by the ecological structure
of paganism itself. The story imagines an underlying association between the two—
between loss and incursion, between historic and foreign paganism. As an umbrella term
for the occult, the spiritual, and the racialized, paganism is a suitably ambiguous concept
to be at the centre of what Jennings calls “essential unity” (21). Green tea, monkeys, and
spectres are all connected by their associative relations to paganism. Paganism functions
as an ecology; it is at once the history of ancient European paganism that Jennings
pursues, the sensory space that he is forced to explore, and the colonial presence that
incurs—is imported, is ingested—into the heart of the empire. It is paganism that stands
as a cultural artefact of ancient Europe and that in true gothic fashion has returned as the
still indigestible other.
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At the beginning of this section, I wrote of Jennings’s experience as a new environment,
one that revealed a spiritual involvement with the physical world. The space that Jennings
opens up through his studies and his habits is imbued with political and theological
associations, combined into the “essential unity” (21) of an ecology revealed through the
indigestible. The omnibus scene marks Jennings’s first indication that he has been
enmeshed in this new ecology—his first exposure to the consequences of both his teadrinking and his studies. His horror upon moving his umbrella “towards it . . . up to it—
through it!” (23-24) is an epistemological horror; Jennings cannot comprehend the new
terrain, nor its spiritual incursions. Worse, he cannot comprehend its fundamental
connection, and this will be his undoing. When Jennings returns home from the omnibus
with his new companion following beside, he decides to stop his habitual green tea usage:
“My idea was that I should act upon my material system, and by living for a while in
sensation apart from thought, send myself forcibly, as it were, into a new groove” (26).
He tries to comfort himself with the judgments of his intellectual contemporaries, who
might attribute these events to “physical affection,” “sitting up too late,” and his
“digestion” (25), though knowing even then that it was a fruitless exercise and a weak
attempt at “bullying [him]self into a false courage” (26).
Jennings decides that evening to abandon his occult studies as well but these are not so
easily forsaken. When Jennings first meets Hesselius, he eagerly asks after the doctor’s
monograph “Essays on Metaphysical Medicine,” a long-out-of-print text that he has not
read for twelve years (9). The two occultists discuss the strange way some books have of
lingering in the mind and returning unbidden: “[t]hose revivals of interest in a subject
happen to me often; one book suggests another, and often sends me back a wild-goose
chase over an interval of twenty years” (10). Just as Jennings cannot filter the impure,
indigestible waste left behind by green tea from his spiritual system, neither man can
seem to filter pagan study from their minds. Nor can they seem, ultimately, to control the
strange connections it makes with new knowing. Pagan understanding lingers, still hyperproductive, still potent, and, it seems, still tempting. When Hesselius calls upon Jennings
in the coming days, he finds a luxurious, complete set of the first edition of
Swedenborg’s metaphysical writings and visionary descriptions. Jennings has been able
to quit his tea habit but his interest in the arcane, the occult, and the metaphysical cannot
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be so easily dismissed. It recurs insidiously in his attempts to contextualize his visions
through Hesselius’s metaphysical medicine, in his studies of Biblical interpretation
through Swedenborg, in his very thoughts as they are altered by his knowledge. When
Hesselius meets him for the last time, he offers the vicar a specific warning: “You must
promise me, my dear sir, not to trouble yourself with unnecessarily exciting thoughts;
confine yourself strictly to the narrative of facts” (31). Jennings’s attempt to give up tea is
ultimately fruitless because it fails to acknowledge the more complicated interrelations of
paganism. He cannot accept that his life and his intellect have become bound to paganism
at multiple points. Each of these connections to this occult knowledge is hyperproductive
of further associations, careening wildly out of control. Similar to the toxin that is
Jennings’s green tea, knowledge is difficult to discard as waste once imbibed. Jennings,
inattentive to and distracted from the import of his actions, consistently underestimates
the harmful practices that open him up to a waste ecology.
Hesselius’s acceptance of this spiritual plane implies that the Victorian British Empire
has always been contiguous with the spiritual, outside the knowledge of its people. The
horror of this text, then, lies in Jennings’s revelatory access to that spiritual plane, to that
which humans ought never have access, and to gain the attention of a claiming influence.
The consequence of this exposure is that Jennings is sacrificed, physically and spiritually;
his body and soul alike end up as waste. His body becomes the waste product within the
new material-spiritual ecology formed by the green tea; his identity as an imperial subject
is wasted; his turn to paganism and despair renders his soul, in Christian terms, to waste.
We may also consider this sequence in reverse; becoming waste in these imperial and
Anglican senses is what makes possible a new ecology that redefines Jennings as yet
another form of waste.
If Saint Dominic’s legend is one of fervent focus, a zealous ability to turn from
temptation toward the word of God, Le Fanu’s tragic account dramatizes the failed
negotiation of such a focus in a more modern age. Jennings’s “waning of religious
orthodoxy,” to use Brantlinger’s term, is not a turn to atheism but a difficulty in
managing his attention in a modern, infinitely interrelated world. That his attention is no
longer at his own command becomes clear when we consider Jennings’s inconsistent
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accounts of himself—inconsistencies of which he seems entirely unaware. He wavers
between descriptions of his habits. His work routine, for instance, is one moment only
“an hour or two in a library” and in another is to sit up “between eleven o’clock and two
or three in the morning, my hours of going to bed” (22). He drinks green tea “frequently,”
“every now and then as my work proceeded,” and enough to brew a kettle “two or three
times” during his midnight vigil (22). This is the waste ecology in its cruellest and most
ironic form. Jennings’s focus on his study of theology—here, pagan—requires a
stimulant, which will ultimately remove his ability to focus on theology—here, Christian.
Jennings’s distracted attention reaches its height when the monkey follows him into his
pulpit. As he recounts to Hesselius, whenever he addresses his congregation, the monkey
“would spring upon the open book and squat there, so that [he] was unable to see the
page” (29). This episode in the pulpit appears in stark contrast to Saint Dominic, who
also reads a devotional book when the devil tries to disrupt his work. In Le Fanu’s
modern parallel, however, the monkey no longer speaks simply to satanic temptation, but
also to the broader distractions, best intentions, and complex interrelations of a world
outside of religious devotion. Jennings cannot perform the saint’s trick. The monkey halts
his reading thoroughly and publicly.

3.3
Ultimately, the original legend of Saint Dominic is as much a tale of absorption and
incorporation as it is of attention. When an outré element permeates into Saint Dominic’s
religious practice, he is capable of incorporating that spiritual other into his mortal
devotion. He makes use of these creatures in order to further his studies. The flea is
converted to a bookmark, the monkey to a lamp. Jennings attempts a similar
incorporation of an outside element—green tea—into his own studies. It proves,
however, to be indigestible, too stubbornly outré and too interrelated into its context to be
incorporated. Instead, it merely passes through ecological interrelations: from the outside
world to his interior; from his digestive system to his nervous system; from his nervous
system to his sensorium and his spiritual circulation. Green tea consistently works to
disrupt and even redefine these subsystems. The indigestible, then, is that which can
permeate an ecology, a body, but cannot be successfully incorporated into it. Le Fanu
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imagines this as an ironically productive material relation, with each layer entangled in a
weave of associations.
In this chapter, I have attempted a Dominican focus on a few small connections within a
larger ecology, discussing the text’s theological analogue to green tea’s indigestible,
recalcitrant components: occult paganism. At first, the story seems to connect green tea, a
product of empire, and the monkey, emblematic of foreign environments, to the threat of
foreign paganism. However, this is not a story of an Anglican vicar distracted by a pagan
demon or imperial hallucinogen from his bible studies. Jennings spends his time studying
ancient European pagan practices. His experience implies that occult paganism is
global—at once foreign and ever present. For the dutiful Victorian Christian, occult
paganism is the indigestible that has long since permeated European history and culture
and yet remains unincorporated. Like the tea itself, occult paganism is long lasting and
productive of new experiences, ecologies, and material relations.
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Chapter 4

4

Waste, in Bloom: William Robinson’s Garden Waste
Ecologies

By the mid-nineteenth century, the English garden was a celebration of human
contrivance. Approximately between 1820 and 1880, the dominant gardening aesthetic
employed in public and private gardens was the Victorian gardenesque,36 which valued
perfectly symmetrical designs, decorative tiling, grid-like paved walkways, and brightly
coloured imported annuals laid out in carpet beds or geometric parterres.37 John C.
Loudon, one of the gardenesque’s most public advocates, held that plants should be
arranged to facilitate examination and admiration, as if the garden were a museum. In
effect, the philosophy of the gardenesque was to heighten rather than to disguise the signs
of artifice. In 1870, however, William Robinson—Irish horticultural correspondent,
former gardener at the National Botanic Garden in Dublin, and foreman of the Royal
Botanic Society’s Garden in Regent Park—responded with his own vision of horticultural
design and practice in a monograph titled The Wild Garden (1870). This work posited the
wild garden (also known as the cottage garden) aesthetic as a rebuttal of the ostentatious
artifice of the gardenesque. Fuelled by a nostalgic longing in the latter half of the
nineteenth century for the rural landscapes and gardens displaced by urbanization and
industrialization,38 wild gardens favoured naturalized garden designs and tended to
disguise or to minimize the appearance of human intervention and labour. And while
Robinson was not the first to express some dissatisfaction with the gardenesque, his
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Maria Ignatieva dates the influence of the gardenesque to approximately 1820 to 1880 and describes this
particular horticultural aesthetic as an important precedent for what would become an increasingly
globalized pattern of Western garden landscaping practices.
37

Parterres refer generally to the ornamental division of the garden into discrete, visually defined spaces.
This visual definition can take the form of flowerbeds bordered with stone or low hedges such as boxwood,
or can be achieved by cement or gravel pathways. In formal gardens, parterres favour evenly distributed
and grid-like spacing, as well as geometrically-shaped flower beds, and an overall symmetrical design.
38

Anne Helmreich’s “Re-presenting Nature” offers further discussion of the reimagined nationalism of
Robinson’s wild garden (88–111).
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publications are particularly memorable for leveraging conflicting definitions of
horticultural waste in order to advance a new garden aesthetic.
Under the gardenesque philosophy, waste was synonymous with irregularity and
disorder. Loudon’s The Villa Gardener (1850) insists that the “artist-like” flower-bed
must be arranged with unerring symmetry, featuring or guided by “a line perfectly
straight,” arranged as though on a grid (22). To break with this system of rigid symmetry
would result “in an unartist-like” design or an appearance of naturalism in the garden,
with flowerbeds “thrown down in a natural manner, some in one direction and some in
another, as if they had dropped off from a dried specimen in a herbarium” (22). In other
words, the gardenesque considered organic structures, whether visual composition or the
inevitable decay of plant matter, as waste. Robinson, by contrast, found the inflexible
precision and artificiality of Loudon’s designs intolerable and held that the designs found
in nature set the highest possible standard of beauty in horticultural arrangement. His
preference for more organic design composition is evident in his critique of midVictorian lawn-mowing methods:
Surely it is enough to have the lawn as smooth as a carpet at
all times, without sending the mower to shave the ‘long and
pleasant grass’ of the remoter parts of the grounds. It would
indeed be well worth while to leave many parts of the grass
unmown for the sake of growing Spring Bulbs. Observe
how the poet’s eye is caught by the buttercups that ‘shine
like gold’ there; and we, who are continually talking of our
‘horticultural skill and progress,’ never so much as get near
the effect produced by this very glinting field of buttercups,
or attain to anything which at all equals it in beauty,
although our opportunities to do so are unrivalled! (WG 2223)
As Robinson laments the excessive lawn-mowing in large English estates, he idealizes
that which would effectively be waste-plants and waste-lands in the eyes of the
gardenesque. Common wildflowers and freely growing meadows might well be
antithetical to climate-sensitive sub-tropical flowers and the exacting neatness of raised
flowerbeds, boxed hedges, and closely trimmed lawns. Yet, the value that Robinson
places in a “glinting field of buttercups” or long grasses is not only aesthetic, but also
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botanical. Meadows both have pastoral beauty and offer botanical advantages for spring
bulbs—advantages which in Robinson’s mind nineteenth-century “horticultural skill and
progress” had yet to be able to reproduce artificially.
While the gardenesque, then, determined what was valuable and what was waste by
prioritizing human systems of order and the experience of the human observer,
Robinson’s wild garden defined waste according to the needs of a botanical ecology. For
instance, Robinson took issue with the gardenesque’s tradition of designing gardens
“from the point of view of the ‘decorator,’ i.e. beds without the slightest relation to
garden use, difficult to plant, and very costly to form and to keep in order” (EFG 243).
“The greatest waste of all,” he writes, “is owing to frivolous and thoughtless ‘design’ as
to plan and shapes of the beds in the flower-garden” (EFG 243). More offensive still is
the inorganic design of carpet bedding and parterres, which he describes as “showy
masses of decided colour” (WG 4), “repulsively gaudy” (WG 5), and “base and frightfully
opposed to every law of nature’s own arrangement of living things” (WG 6). With its
rigid and inorganic designs, the gardenesque would see lilies planted “in isolated showy
masses” and “in rigid unrelieved tufts in borders” (WG 13) and would result in
“scattering things one likes all over the beds at equal distances” (EFG 247). Instead of
“‘squaring” them in any stupid way,” however, Robinson prefers keeping plants
“together in natural groups and colonies, where they are many times more effective to the
eye” (EFG 247). The gardenesque structures and organizes the landscape to excess; its
“gardens are laid out in a too complex way” (EFG 235), and that complexity is frequently
achieved at the expense of plant life. Robinson, by contrast, argues that to impose such
ordered designs and geometric shapes denies the beauty of more organic arrangements
and threatens the botanical productivity of the garden.
These historical tensions between horticultural methodologies suggest that the Victorian
garden was an attempt to realize a specific idealization of an ecology. Gardens were and
are, in a sense, texts that reflect the gardener’s notions of value and of waste. What sets
Robinson’s horticultural writings apart, and brings them within the purview of this
dissertation, is their treatment of waste as an integral part of a garden ecology, as well as
their rhetoric of ecological integrity. Examining his more famous The Wild Garden and
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The English Flower Garden (1883), the comparatively lesser-known Mushroom Culture
(1870), God’s Acre Beautiful (1880), and select pieces from his horticultural magazine
The Garden, this chapter considers how Robinson’s notions of horticultural beauty and
design advance a deeper philosophical argument about the value of waste ecologies and
of restraining the impulse to impose order. This chapter takes up a subversive strain of
Robinson’s rhetoric, in both his horticultural books and in his horticultural journalism,
that challenges the definitional limits of waste and advocates an ecologically-oriented
gardening aesthetic that privileges the botanical over the human. Whereas the previous
chapters of this dissertation deal with ecologies in a metaphorical and structural sense,
this chapter argues that Robinson’s work unites the figurative ecologies with which this
dissertation has so far been concerned to the literal ecologies of the Victorian garden. In
his rhetorical attempts to reintegrate waste back into a productive, non-anthropocentric
ecology, Robinson’s work champions the waste ecologies that get naturalized in the
garden, the horticultural designs that promote botanical self-sufficiency, and an aesthetic
philosophy that embraces the death of the human.
As I stipulated in my introduction, much of this dissertation is devoted to the idea that
waste for Victorians undermined or revealed the fault lines of human systems of order. I
have also mentioned, however, that there ran in the late-nineteenth century a parallel
view of waste as vital to human subsistence. Darwin’s The Formation of Vegetable
Mould through the Action of Worms with Observations on their Habits teases out the
surprising material connections between worms and human culture, worm castings and
agriculture, rudimentary organisms and archaeological ruins. As they aerate the soil,
earthworms digest animal, vegetable, and mineral matter, “mingl[ing] the whole
intimately together, like a gardener who prepares fine soil for his choicest plants” (309310). This hidden process of intermingling wastes is, as Darwin suggests, immensely
important to botanical, animal, and geological ecosystems. Donald Ulin was first to
observe Darwin’s rhetorical links between high culture (culture, archeology, taste) to the
material conditions in which that culture appears (worms, excrement, decay). The activity
and excrement of worms are vital and culturally relevant to humanity, and not to be
dismissed as abject. If Darwin’s worms exemplify the potential vitality of waste,
Robinson’s texts are equally subversive in reimagining horticultural wastes and waste
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ecologies as sites of renewal and growth. Like the waste ecologies that we have seen
throughout this dissertation, like Darwin’s study of worms, Robinson situates the human
within the material intimacies that exist among all things and that belie systems of
classification and distinction. Robinson’s gardening philosophy attempts to replicate the
structural conditions of spontaneous, self-sustaining plant ecologies within the Victorian
garden.
In order to understand Robinson’s philosophy of horticultural waste ecologies, I begin
with his examples of smaller-scale wastes—individual plants, fertilizers, or mulch—and
how these forgotten or undesirable corners of the garden occupy a central position in his
horticultural vision. Wastes take on unusual forms in Robinson’s work, partly because he
was responding to the value system that dominated Victorian horticultural practice during
the middle decades of the nineteenth century, and which came with its own classifications
of waste. At this time, native English wildflowers “as hardy as our weeds” (WG 3) were
often treated as such and dug up in favour of brightly coloured annuals. Weed-like
wildflowers were generally held as the horticultural waste of the Victorian flower garden
to be swept away, as dirt from a carpet. Robinson responds to these repudiations of
wilderness with his own counterarguments for what should be considered waste in the
opening chapter of The Wild Garden:
To most people a pretty plant in the wild state is more
attractive than any garden denizen. It is free, and taking care
of itself, it has had to contend with and has overcome weeds
which, left to their own sweet will in a garden, would soon
leave very small trace of the plants therein; and, moreover,
it is usually surrounded by some degree of graceful wild
spray—the green above, and the moss and brambles and
grass around. (WG 11)
The notion that “a pretty plant in the wild state” is more beautiful than “any garden
denizen” was a bold departure from the popular Victorian gardenesque, which exulted in
feats of horticultural artifice. Wild and unfrequented terrain such as woods and meadows
were as much the waste of landscape design as wildflowers were the waste of the
garden—a wildflower growing in wild terrain doubly so. Though Robinson claims to
invoke a popular view, he also asserts an extremely unpopular view for proponents of the
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formal garden and the contemporary architects usually hired to design private gardens.
Following his apparently popular claim, therefore, are three points of justification for the
aesthetic beauty of wasted flowers growing in wasted lands. Firstly, the wild plant is selfreliant; it is “free” and “tak[es] care of itself.” Secondly, Robinson suggests that the wild
plant’s hardiness is a point in its favour; it is more admirable for having “had to contend
with and [to] overcome weeds.” Thirdly, the wild plant is more beautiful because of the
compositional interest afforded by the colour and diverse textures of the wild growth
around it; it is framed visually by the “graceful wild spray,” “the green above, and the
moss and brambles and grass around.” What may appear to be neglected wilderness, a
stubborn weed, and chaotic overgrowth can be understood as exemplars of independence,
strength, and nuanced taste. Robinson, in other words, offers a combination of moral,
biological, and aesthetic reasons for valuing so-called waste.
For Robinson, wilderness is inextricably involved in horticultural beauty. The author
calls upon the reader to engage fully with the wild as an aesthetic entity, to incorporate
and to embrace the wild as a foundational principle of garden design.
Select a wild rough slope, and embellish it with the
handsomest and hardiest climbing plants . . . time would but
add to its attractions, and the owner might go away for ten
years, and find it more beautiful than ever on his return. As
much may be said of all the other combinations which I
suggest. (WG 16-17)
Robinson evinces a clear aesthetic preference for the wilderness that results from
horticultural neglect; the “wild rough slope” has aesthetic merit in its own right that
renders it a worthy medium for “the handsomest and hardiest climbing plants.” The
garden can be “more beautiful than ever” left untended for ten years instead of being
maintained continually. While Robinson’s proposed method might be taken as an
aesthetics of neglect, it also seems that his aesthetic is consistently oriented toward the
longevity and self-sufficiency of plant ecologies. Certain areas of the garden can become
yet more beautiful if the gardener attends to the ecological needs of plant species in
arranging them. Robinson observes the visual advantage that plants may have when they
are mixed with other verdure, and how the alternating growth cycles of different plant
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species both heighten the beauty of blooms and conceal the natural compost of plants
outside their blooming season: “In a wild or semi-wild state, the beauty of individual
species will proclaim itself when at its height; and when passed out of bloom, they will
be succeeded by other kinds, or lost among the numerous objects around” (WG 13).
Aesthetic prowess in the garden, in other words, requires the gardener to manage the
botanical and ecological needs of the plant life therein. With his emphasis on efficiency
in the garden and interest in the long-term viability of botanical life, ecological
sustainability is not only necessary to horticultural design—it is also beautiful. By
showing how the diverse characteristics and needs of plants can be turned to aesthetic
advantage, Robinson conceives of an aesthetic practice that relies on the health of
botanical ecologies.
To take a representative example of the importance of ecological structure in Robinson’s
work, we may turn to his objections to the carpet bedding method. The bedding method
was a defining feature of the gardenesque and afterward of what would be known as the
formal or architectural garden. Carpet bedding was and is still an expensive and labourintensive method; each year, it requires a fresh supply of annuals to be purchased,
matured in greenhouses, transplanted in the summer, and dug up and discarded after they
are killed by the first frosts. The popularity of the gardenesque secured a consistently
high demand for a limited supply of subtropical flowers, which had to be imported and
matured in greenhouses, adding to the overall extravagance of cost and labour of the
bedding system. Robinson, however, condemns carpet bedding as a waste both of
resources and of plant life in The Wild Garden and The English Flower Garden. He
resents the repetitive cycles of cost and labour sunk into carpet beds. The fragility of subtropical annuals and the necessity of buying and planting a fresh supply each spring in
order to maintain the uniformity of the bed means that “the expense for this system is an
annual one” (WG 5). Worse still, the gardenesque as a whole wastes the gardener’s time
and labour; “the never-ending and wearisome scratchings of autumn and spring” (EFG
235) that gardeners must devote to “many needless walks and edgings” prevent them
from “work[ing] in a simple way” because “half the time is lost in cleaning the feet, and
taking care of useless or frivolous things” (EFG 235). Yet Robinson’s problem is not
with expenditure and labour within the garden so much as with the fact that, under the
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bedding system, neither contributes to the growing ecologies of the garden. “If we ruin
ourselves through extravagance in gardening,” he writes, “let it be for living and beautiful
things” (EFG 240). Indeed, the carpet bedding method does not improve or prolong plant
life, but rather systematizes its decay. Robinson’s work treats the Victorian garden as an
ecology of waste ecologies—of coordinated biospheres with which the human gardener
may respectfully fall into step or upon which the gardener might impose a rigid
framework and so make true waste of ecologies. And it was this latter practice that
formed Robinson’s main objection to the gardenesque and to the formal or architectural
garden style that succeeded it.
Several years after Robinson and his contributors (including Gertrude Jekyll) began
publishing on the cottage gardening aesthetic, Reginald Blomfield and Francis Inigo
Thomas released a competing horticultural treatise, The Formal Garden in England
(1892). This rival aesthetic, which was a mid- to late-nineteenth-century successor to the
gardenesque, considered the surrounding spaces of a building, including the design and
layout of the gardens, to fall within the province of the architect. The subsequent feud
that developed between the formal gardening school and that of the cottage garden was
essentially a philosophical dispute over the relative prominence in the garden given to
human artifice and to the integrity of the garden’s waste ecologies. The public
disagreements between Robinson and both Blomfield and Sedding—a debate which
spanned books, periodicals, and pamphlets—became emblematic of the widespread
tensions between their respective schools of horticultural design, the wild garden and the
formal garden. Anne Helmreich refers to both sides of this feud as “landscape gardeners”
and “garden designers” (“Re-presenting Nature” 111). For a landscape gardener like
Robinson, all outdoor landscaping should be arranged around the ecological needs of the
garden and should therefore fall under the province of the gardener. Garden designers
like Blomfield and Thomas, by contrast, viewed the garden as a structural extension of a
house or building and therefore as that which should be guided by architectural precepts
and designs. Yet, this tension suggests more than the struggles between two professions
vying for pre-eminence within landscaping. Both ends of this dispute evoke a deeper
philosophical debate over the extent to which the human, and human systems of order,
should hold sway within the garden.
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In their preface to the first edition of The Formal Garden, Blomfield and Thomas argue
that the “straight lines and geometrical curves” of architecture are not artificial
constraints so much as an amplification of the “premeditated form” that human labour
cannot help but bring to a given work. The authors insist that “[t]here is order everywhere
and there is no escaping it” (FGE 3). They accuse the landscape or wild gardener,
however, of a “studied avoidance of all order” inherent to human endeavour by
“systematically dispens[ing] with any kind of system whatever” (FGE 3, 2) and
favouring instead the spontaneity of nature. The formal garden, in other words, held the
“studied avoidance of all order” as a waste of human contrivance. Some of Blomfield and
Thomas’s choicest attacks against Robinson employ memorable metaphors of waste. In
one example, the authors explain that formal gardening seeks harmony between the house
and its grounds and to prevent the house becoming, as cottage gardeners would have it,
“an excrescence on the face of nature” (FGE 2). Instead of making a distasteful attempt
to reconcile human contrivance and ecologies in nature, Blomfield and Thomas argue
that both the building and the surrounding grounds should announce themselves as
human interventions in nature. The cottage gardener’s attempt to embrace ecological
design is a “trick of imitation” when the business of landscaping should be
anthropocentric or “an affair of a dominant idea which stamps its impress on house and
grounds alike” (FGE 3). In maintaining that “[t]he building cannot resemble anything in
nature, unless you are content with a mud-hut and cover it with grass” (FGE 2), the
authors equate ecological structure and design with waste.
Robinson, unsurprisingly, held an entirely different view and made no attempt to disguise
his incensed critiques of this formal gardening approach. In an 1892 pamphlet review of
The Formal Garden, Robinson bluntly sums up his views on the authors’ proposed
horticultural aesthetic:
The good sense of English writers and landscape gardeners
refused to accept as right or reasonable the architect’s
garden, a thing set out as bricks and stones are, and the very
trees of which were mutilated to meet his views as to
‘design,’ or rather to prove his not being able to see the
simplest elements of design in landscape beauty or natural
form. (Garden Design and Architects’ Gardens vii-viii)
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Setting aside his aspersions on the lack of “good sense” or of the “right or reasonable” in
the architect’s garden, however, Robinson objects to Blomfield and Thomas’s orderly
designs and their emphasis of human artifice over “natural form” and botanical ecologies.
His issue is with garden designers using the garden as a vehicle for their own
architectural ingenuity—as “a thing set out as bricks and stones are”—and “mutilat[ing]”
nature in the process.
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Robinson’s passing gestures to design composition imply more

than a difference of aesthetic; his work follows a deeper impetus to suppress or restrain
human endeavour and anthropocentric systems of order when he accuses Blomfield and
Thomas of failing to notice “the simplest elements of design in landscape beauty or
natural form.” We see this, as well, when Robinson later expresses a wish that some of
the more picturesque houses may not be “disfigured by the fashions in formality the
authors wish to see revived” or by “the architect’s senseless craving for ‘order and
balance’” (GD xii). These remarks echo his earlier critique of the gardenesque bedding
system as “base and frightfully opposed to every law of nature’s own arrangement of
living things” (WG 6). The strength of Blomfield’s and Thomas’s subsequent objections
to the wild garden suggests that Robinson’s philosophy of opposing human interference,
of subordinating human life and endeavour to plant life, was well understood. This
vitriolic pamphlet most likely caused Blomfield to release a second edition of The
Formal Garden only nine months after the first in order to include a preface responding
to Robinson’s attacks.
Whether Robinson’s critiques of his contemporaries are directed to the gardenesque or
the formal garden, his responses to both call for a reorientation toward an ecological
design composition. At its core, Robinson’s issue with the gardenesque and the formal
garden are issues with the fundamental error of making waste of functional ecologies and
ignoring botanically productive waste. The clearest examples of Robinson’s indignant
attitude toward ecological neglect appear in a chapter of The English Flower Garden
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Aurélien Wasilewski suggests that social class tensions were also at play Robinson’s aesthetic
opposition to the architectural garden, since Victorian architects enjoyed a social prestige that did not
extend to gardeners.
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titled “Some Sources of Waste”. This chapter enumerates waste that interferes with the
botanical ecologies of the garden. “Fancy Edgings of cast stone or tile ware to beds and
walks” (EFG 239), for instance, are one such type of waste that is incompatible with the
long-term needs and longevity of the garden. Robinson calls these edgings “costly, ugly,
needless, and a great source of waste” (EFG 239)—characteristics that seem discrete but
are ultimately bound up in waste. Edgings become a waste of money and a waste of
aesthetic endeavour only when they interfere with the potential plant life that might have
grown in their place. Robinson tolerates costliness to a certain extent, provided that the
expenditures in some way enable thriving plant life. However, as Robinson observes, the
“money spent on [edgings] in a single county (now and then, indeed, in a single place)
would form many lovely gardens” (EFG 240). Where expense and endeavour might
otherwise support “good plants and good ways of growing them,” costly “stone rubbish”
is clearly seen by him to be waste (EFG 240).
Waste may be redistributed and need not remain in the exact ecologies that produced
them, as long as their new ecology continues to function with aesthetic and botanical
harmony. Robinson, in short, engages with competing horticultural aesthetics on the basis
that a garden’s beauty comes from the structural integrity of its waste ecologies. Nature,
for Robinson, was an aesthetic end in itself—one which hinged on waste. In a set of
remarks for which he would become famous—and which often would get cited by critics
such as Blomfield40—Robinson describes nature’s unique compositional merits:
Nature in puris naturalibus we cannot have in our gardens,
but Nature’s laws should not be violated; and few human
beings have contravened them more than our flowergardeners during the past twenty years. We should compose
from Nature, as landscape artists do. We may have in our
gardens—and without making wildernesses of them
either—all the shade, the relief, the grace, the beauty, and
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Blomfield cites a distorted version of the following quotation in The Formal Garden, but it is not clear
whether or not Blomfield misquoted Robinson. Given Robinson’s proclivity for recycling his own phrases
across his many publications, it is entirely possible that Blomfield was using an obscure edition of either
The Parks and Gardens of Paris or The Subtropical Garden.
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nearly all the irregularity of Nature. (The Subtropical
41
Garden 5)
By referring to “landscape artists,” Robinson invokes the naturalism of fine arts—and the
beauty that comes of imitating nature—to validate “Nature’s laws” or an ecological
structure as an aesthetic principle. This principle, however, does not extend only to the
decorative. Robinson gives the same grammatical importance to “shade,” “relief,” and
“irregularity” as he does to more conventional “grace” and “beauty.” Rather than trying
to abnegate all traces of waste, as the formal garden does, Robinson aestheticizes waste—
be it waste matter such as manure and weeds, or a compositional waste in the sense of
negative space—as a foil, or contrasting agent, to bring the central object of attraction
into greater relief.
Not only does Robinson insist upon the untapped potential of the local wilderness, his
practical, spatial, and aesthetic objections are inextricably linked to his moral concern for
the welfare of plant life. He represents the annual waste of plant life necessitated by the
bedding system as acts of cruelty. The sub-tropical “tender plants” or “subjects” are
ruthlessly “cut down” by gardeners and winter frosts alike (WG 4). He expostulates with
gardeners who dig up borders around their shrubberies or “make war upon the roots of
everything” therein (WG 34). The author creates a sense of pathos for those plants that
are “mutilate[d],” “disturbed,” “destroyed,” “displaced,” and “injured” (WG 34). In one
instance, he describes the turned soil in the borders of London parks as a spectacle on par
with the aftermath of some violent disaster:
Instead of finding the earth covered, or nearly covered, with
vegetation close to the margin, and each individual
developed into something like a respectable specimen of its
kind, we find a spread of recently-dug ground, and the
plants upon it with an air of having recently suffered from a
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Robinson occasionally combines these sentences with the following remarks, which appear in the third
edition of The Parks, Promenades, and Gardens of Paris: “it is his [the gardener’s] privilege to make everchanging pictures out of Nature’s own materials—sky and trees, and water and flowers and grass. If he
would not prefer this to painting in pigments, he has no business to be a landscape-gardener” (76).
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whirlwind, or some calamity that necessitated the removal
of mutilated branches. Rough-pruners precede the diggers,
who sweep along from margin to back, plunging deeply
round and about plants, shrubs, or trees. . . . There is no
relief to the spectacle; the same thing occurs everywhere . . .
(WG 35)
Through his rhetoric, Robinson sensationalizes the common practice in formal gardens of
creating a border of bare soil around flowerbeds by digging up anything growing
immediately around the beds. His objections to this practice are that it not only damages
the roots, bulbs, or branches of nearby plants, but it is also less aesthetically pleasing than
“vegetation close to the margin” that exhibits a healthy, “respectable” growth. Robinson
also uses natural disasters as metaphors for overbearing or unrestrained human artifice.
The excessive systematization of formal gardening, he suggests, destroys and mutilates
life as much as the “whirlwind” or “calamity.” What he observes, ultimately, is the
gardener’s (and the human’s) failure to curb a frenetic impulse toward dominion and
order.
We see further the comingling of Robinson’s ecological and aesthetic interests as he
observes bitterly that the result of such wastefulness is “a sparse depopulated aspect” and
little more than “the annual darkening of the surface by the upturned earth” (WG 34).
Robinson’s works celebrate one understanding of waste at the expense of others—the
unfashionable hardy wildflowers relegated to the status of weeds for that which is
economically, aesthetically, and ecologically extravagant. Both his garden books and his
journalism rely on the rhetorical tensions and grammatical comparisons between
competing definitions of waste in order to argue that the economic and aesthetic
limitations of the gardenesque do not account for the ecological dimensions of
horticulture. As he normalizes the waste that is serviceable to plant growth and
recharacterizes solely decorative practices as the more problematic waste, Robinson
effectively aestheticizes one form of waste over another.
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Robinson was not unique in eulogizing the natural landscape or his nostalgic longing for
a pre-industrial English garden.42 Helmreich suggests that the cottage garden and native
wildflowers were often invoked to express an English romantic nationalism, or “the
adaptation of folk or other indigenous cultures to express a country’s identity” (47).
Romantic nationalism was a late-nineteenth-century European phenomenon that
represented both “a nostalgic reaction to industrialization and a means to negotiate the
rapid and abrupt transmutations of modernity” (47). According to Helmreich, some link
English romantic nationalism to the origins of the Arts and Crafts movement, some key
figures of which held romantic nationalist views. William Morris and John Ruskin43 both
opposed bedded-out gardens, associating them with the commercial/industrial, and
Morris was one of those who expressed nostalgic longings for native English flowers and
plants (and which he featured in his prints and designs).44 Perhaps the popularity of
Robinson’s aesthetic was due in part to its compatibility with this larger vein of romantic
nationalism. This chapter, however, is less interested in Robinson’s contribution to this
movement, which is already dealt with extensively in Helmreich’s The English Garden
and National Identity, and focuses instead upon the implications of Robinson’s rhetoric
of structural ecologies.

42

While scholars note that Shirley Hibberd had been advocating a return to hardy flowers at least a decade
before Robinson published The Wild Garden (1870), the latter was nonetheless instrumental in
popularizing this method, not least because of the fierce debates in which he engaged through his various
publishing outlets. These alternately horticultural, aesthetic, and ideological debates had a broad canvas of
readers. As Helmreich as observed, garden literature—whether books, periodicals, or pamphlets—became a
relatively accessible genre due to the thriving print and illustration industries from the 1870s onward
(English Garden, 40). The ready supply of raw materials and improved printing methods opened the genre
to a readership that ranged from socio-economic elites to educated labourers. Robinson could therefore be
certain of a readership across classes for both his widely sold books and the issues of his horticultural
magazine, The Garden.
43

Ruskin held particularly disdainful views of bedded-out gardens: “A flower-garden is an ugly thing, even
when best managed: it is an assembly of unfortunate beings, pampered and bloated above their natural size,
stewed and heated into diseased growth; corrupted by evil communication into speckled and in harmonious
colours; torn from the soil which they loved, and of which they were the spirit and the glory, to glare away
their term of tormented life among the mixed and incongruous essences of each other, in earth they know
not, and in air that is poison to them. The florist may delight in this: the true lover of flowers never will.”
(“The British Villa,” p. 156-157).
44

While Morris does not explicitly endorse a specific horticultural style, he nonetheless suggests that
garden design is a tonic to industrialization and describes urban garden spaces architectural extensions of
the house (Hemlreich, English Garden 96).
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4.1
Anna L. Tsing’s The Mushroom at the End of the World contains a lucid account of the
kinds of antithetical combinations brought together within ecologies, which we can apply
productively to the wastes and waste-spaces in Robinson’s aesthetic. The premise of
Tsing’s book—which centres on the prized matsutake mushroom somehow able to grow
in human-disturbed forests and in the nuclear ruins of post-Second-World-War
Hiroshima—is to analyze “disturbance-based ecologies in which many species
sometimes live together without either harmony or conquest” (5). While Tsing’s case
studies for “disturbance-based ecologies” are set in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries, her method relies on an understanding of the alienation produced by capitalist
economies that has important implications for my discussion of Victorian waste
ecologies. Tsing suggests that capitalist investors have historically treated ecologically
enmeshed matter as resources, which effectively “imbue[s] both people and things with
alienation, that is, the ability to stand alone, as if the entanglements of living did not
matter” (5). This neglect of the material entanglements among animal, vegetable, and
mineral is precisely Robinson’s issue with the horticultural aesthetic movements that
competed against his own.
Alienation presumes the transferability of the components of an ecology; “people and
things become mobile assets; they can be removed from their life worlds in distancedefying transport to be exchanged with other assets from other life worlds, elsewhere”
(5). In presuming this transferability or mobility of living and nonliving things, Tsing
writes that alienation denies the ecological relations that bind all things in a specific
ecology:
Alienation obviates living-space entanglement. The dream
of alienation inspires landscape modification in which only
one stand-alone asset matters; everything else becomes
weeds or waste. Here, attending to living-space
entanglements seems inefficient, and perhaps archaic. When
its singular asset can no longer be produced, a place can be
abandoned. The timber has been cut; the oil has run out; the
plantation soil no longer supports crops. The search for
assets resumes elsewhere. Thus, simplification for
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alienation produces ruins, spaces of abandonment for asset
45
production. (5-6)
Before the landscape is run through crude filters of economic resources and alienation,
everything within it is assigned to one of two categories—“singular asset” and “weeds or
waste.” This sweeping categorization of non-resources as waste recalls Robinson’s
complaint over the selective attention given to certain flowers and plants deemed
fashionable. He laments that this unmitigated preference for “repulsively gaudy” (WG 5)
sub-tropical flowerbeds has destroyed the hardy “sweet old border flowers” that once
characterized Elizabethan mixed-border gardens. He takes issue, in other words, with the
horticultural economy’s fixation on a singular asset at the expense of horticultural
ecologies—or the “living-space entanglement” that involves all plant life. Robinson’s
aesthetic foreshadows Tsing’s critique of alienated landscapes—or alienated gardens, in
this case, which under the gardenesque are devoted to successively producing a singular
asset of sub-tropical annuals. In both cases, whether the singular asset is timber, oil,
crops, or seasonal flowers, alienation, or the careless transplantation from one livingspace entanglement to another, still overlooks the complex interrelations of both
ecologies.
Robinson exhorts readers to turn our attention to the necessary material interaction
between waste—i.e., waste in the sense of decomposed organic matter such as manure,
fertilizer, and compost—and beautiful garden flowers. His language routinely
undermines the pejorative connotations of these wastes:
Cocoa-fibre refuse is the neatest mulch, being so clean to
use. The next best material is decayed leaf-soil: this, sifted,
also looks neat, but under sunshine it soon shrinks away,
and requires renewing. Well-rotted stable-manure is another
good mulch, particularly for plants we wish to feed well,
like Dahlias. The mowings of lawn Grass is a good mulch

45

When Tsing declares her refusal “to reduce either economy or ecology to the other,” she seems to imply
a general tendency in critical discourses to treat the terms interchangeably—one from which Tsing is
evidently anxious to distance her work (5). With this caution, Tsing introduces alienation as a concept that
intersects both economy and ecology.
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for beds, and should not be wasted, especially where there
are recently transplanted shrubs. (EFG 237)
The garden ecology has a holistic, integrated structure, which means that even manure
and waste are involved in the garden’s beauty. It is not that manure itself is beautiful so
much as that which we find beautiful in the garden necessarily exists in close proximity
to that which we find repulsive. From the first sentence of this passage, Robinson
demands that we attend to “refuse,” as well as to its degrees of variation, as subjects
worthy of examination, and renders a compelling portrait of waste as tidy, nutritious, and
stimulating growth. “Cocoa-fibre refuse” stands in high stead for being “the neatest
mulch” and “so clean to use.” He reminds us that, for the gardener, decay signifies
increased value and not its depletion. Mulch or compost is useful enough that its
disappearance by decomposition is regrettable. The “neat” blend of “decayed leaf-soil”
too “soon shrinks away.” All the while, the author conveys his taking this set of waste
beliefs for granted, making no explanatory concessions to readers who do not share his
perspective. He speaks of how the leaf-soil frequently “requires renewing,” freely
associating an image of decay with a notion of replenishment. The stable manure is not
simply rotted, but “[w]ell-rotted”; greater decay corresponds to greater value. Robinson
also implies a sustainability to this plant ecology, where that which is “[w]ell-rotted”
tends to “feed well” other plants that may in turn rot well; the digested food of one
organism becomes a new food source for other plants living in the same ecology.
Replenishment thus begets more replenishment. Even the lawn clippings play a central
role. The garden is an ecology of waste and growth that is both natural and aesthetic. This
is a domain where refuse and decay bear degrees of neatness and cleanliness, where the
rotten is not pejorative and the “[w]ell-rotted” is desirable, and where waste itself “should
not be wasted.” Robinson’s discussion of mulch, however, is not only remarkable for
subverting the stigma attached to garden wastes; it also applies to these wastes a language
of aesthetic appraisal. The neatness that he observes in cocoa-fibre and decayed-leaf
compost has to do with visual organization—an appearance of tidiness. To the modern
reader, the idea of weighing decay or debris by its neatness or cleanliness borders on
parody, and yet the gardener necessarily does so to keep the garden beautiful.
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As we have already seen, Robinson believes that “a pretty plant in the wild state is more
attractive than any garden denizen” (WG 11). Although Robinson encourages the
cultivation of one kind of abandoned space which he finds in itself worthwhile, these
colonies of newly naturalized wildflowers are not to be converted into another landscape
to be alienated for another singular asset. When Robinson recommends wild spaces for
naturalizing imported plants, he does not mean for the wild garden to become a sort of
production apparatus for furnishing the flower garden with new hardy plants. He is clear,
therefore, that the imported flowers that he proposes to naturalize in these wild spaces
should remain within those spaces. We see further proof against the notion that Robinson
is merely constructing another landscape to alienate when he returns to the subject of unmown grass in The English Flower Garden:
A flowering meadow is one of the most beautiful things in
Nature, and our park or garden lawns might be lovely with
the Grass growing long and with many flowers in it. The
Grass itself should be a beautiful garden. We should see in
it, as we often see in an alpine meadow, fair flowers which
grow in English as well as in alpine turf. By allowing the
Grass to grow in spring and till maturity, this phase of the
wild garden will be enjoyed, and plants will come up year
after year to reward us. (EFG 236)
Robinson’s statement that “Grass itself should be a beautiful garden” is suggestive. He
finds value in the abandoned space that cannot be reduced to a singular resource, that is
based on its strength and complexity as an ecology. What he suggests in other words is
not the rehearsal of landscape alienation. The long grass and flowers that Robinson
recommends for parks and garden lawns are meant to imitate the aesthetic and ecological
beauty of the meadow, which “is one of the most beautiful things in Nature.” The “fair
flowers” whose perennial reappearance is a “reward” for resisting the temptation to
intervene can only do so in their ecological situatedness. In short, the ways in which
Tsing intersects capitalist rhetoric with ecological structures help us to articulate the
complexity of Robinson’s treatment of waste and waste-spaces in the garden.
Robinson’s ecological thinking is not restricted to the botanical life within gardens; it
extends also to the interrelations among the diverse spatial locations in a garden.

132

Visually, spaces are structured and defined by other contrasting spaces. Botanically, the
organic waste produced by one space, such as clippings from lawns, nourish and fertilize
the shrubs of another space. Maintaining spatial diversity is important to Robinson’s
aesthetic and ecological philosophies, and the gardener plays a pivotal role in
coordinating those spaces to their visual and botanical benefit. Achieving this spatial
diversity means accepting certain parts of even the bedding system. In the same moment
that he criticizes the geometric design principles of the gardenesque, he acknowledges
“[i]t is also clear that, base and frightfully opposed to every law of nature’s own
arrangement of living things as is the bedding system, it has yet some features which
deserve to be retained on a small scale” (WG 6). Robinson does meditate on the superior
beauty of wildflowers, untouched grass meadows, and even large expanses of bog with
such rapturous hyperbole in a manner that made it easy for his critics to misinterpret this
alternative approach to an extreme. As Helmreich points out, however, it would be a
mistake to assume from Robinson’s passionate hyperbole on the beauty of wild plants
that the author is calling for the garden to become a total and uniform wilderness.
Robinson was in practice more willing to incorporate geometric designs than one would
expect from his published opinions, and did not in practice insist on this organicism of
design as dogmatically as his language might suggest. Gertrude Jekyll evidently “used to
relate with great glee the fact that Robinson designed himself a garden all squares, and
Reggy [i.e., Reginald Blomfield] a garden on a cliff with not a straight line in it” (qtd. in
Massingham 75).46
My previous chapters have dealt with waste ecologies dominated or redefined by one
type of waste that proliferates—whether contagious dust, transformative river sludge,
hyper-productive papers, vaporized human bodies, or indigestible colonial spectres. This
final chapter does consider individual types of waste to an extent, such as weeds and
manure, and these come together as an ecology in the most traditional sense. The draw of
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Original source missing. Massingham quotes this comment, which was reportedly made by Arts and
Crafts architect Harold Falkner, but no source text or further information about the primary source appears
in the article.
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Robinson’s texts, however, lies in their exploration of several waste ecologies in
coordination. The large estate garden contains many different ecologies productive of
their own form of waste, and Robinson in large measure holds the gardener responsible
for connecting and coordinating those dispersed ecological spaces through that waste.
Waste from one part of the grounds—such as cocoa-fibre or grass clippings—is essential
mulch or fertilizer for other parts. The gardener always has this capacity to integrate
waste back into a garden ecology, and only in neglecting this work does the garden
produce true waste.
The primary aim of The Wild Garden is to propose a compositional balance for the
garden that incorporates elements of both the bedding and mixed-border methods, not to
argue for the elimination of all gardenesque elements; only by maintaining this balance of
contrasting spaces, of wild and semi-wild spaces as well as lawns and flower-beds, can
the horticultural landscape become “paradises of vernal beauty” (WG 10). For Robinson,
waste matter becomes productive in an ecology of diverse garden spaces that themselves
form ecologies. Robinson holds the gardener responsible for coordinating and
interrelating all of these ecologies—manicured lawns, wild and neglected gardens,
aesthetic wastes, and productive decay, alike. The work of the gardener, as the artist of
landscaping, is to manage an ecology of ecologies. A diversity of landscaping terrain, as
we have already seen, suits Robinson’s ideas of visual design composition.
Locational variety also carries botanical benefits; the garden’s flowerbeds and “recently
transplanted shrubs” need to be fertilized. And, considering the value of lawn clippings as
mulch, locational variety is key to the survival of the garden ecology. Robinson imitates
this balancing work in his prose, continually interrelating the different components of the
horticultural canvas. And this coordination can involve plants from entirely different
regions; The Wild Garden is primarily an argument about how gardeners and landowners
should import hardy wildflowers from around the world and naturalize them in the
unfrequented stretches of wilderness and the meadows scattered throughout public and
private grounds. Robinson suggests this method as a way of diversifying and multiplying
the plant species hardy enough to withstand English winters, and which were ostensibly
driven to near-extinction as a result of the vogue for sub-tropical annuals. Because there
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are yet “no attractions in semi-wild places compared to what it is within our power to
create” (WG 10), landscape and garden ecologies suffer a permanent loss when such
opportunities for beauty and biodiversity are wasted. Robinson’s waste-spaces allow us to
consider what happens to large-scale wastes—specifically, what happens to waste when it
forms the connective tissue between the garden’s diverse spaces. In a sense, the
Robinsonian garden is one large ecology of smaller ecologies—the lawn, the meadow,
the flower bed, the mushroom bed—and the role of the gardener is to manage and to
coordinate the wastes that need to move between them. We may move away from
individual waste ecologies, in other words, in order to comprehend the broader ecology
that combines them.
This method of coordinating and repurposing the waste of different locations appears in
Mushroom Culture, in which Robinson instructs readers on how to build their own
mushroom beds by repurposing stables, disused sheds, or empty cellars. Given the ready
availability of horse manure, especially in cities like London with large networks of
carriage-drivers, Robinson imagines rapturously how “every cart of stable-manure
produced in this great horse-keeping country may, on its way towards decomposition and
replenishing the earth, be made a nidus for furnishing many dishes of [mushrooms]” (MC
vii). Here, as with mulch, Robinson’s rhetoric makes a virtue of nourishment or
replenishment through decay and decomposition. His aestheticization of waste, however,
is more subtle: manure is the point of origin for mushrooms not in and of themselves, but
as “many dishes”—as that which will be given culinary arrangement and presentation.
Waste is a nidus for culinary artistry; sustainable consumption can be beautiful,
presentable.
The nexus of relations between the various wastes and garden ecologies in Robinson’s
work suggests that waste is location-specific. The manure that enables mushrooms and
flowers to proliferate ceases to be waste within the garden ecology. By contrast, carpet
bedding is antithetical to the sustainable garden ecology. Carpet and wallpaper might
belong in the house, but their stasis and botanical non-productivity make them waste in
the garden. For Robinson, including such wastes into the garden brings aesthetic
consequences:
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. . . a person naturally rests his eyes a shorter time on the
ordinary bedding arrangement or ribbon border than on the
new wall paper in his bed-room. And this is no mere ‘matter
of taste’ as it is very often thoughtlessly said to be. It is
utterly impossible for any person with any knowledge of the
glorious richness and infinite variety of the garden flora
now within our reach to take any real interest in the
geometrical colouring of the ground with plants, which is
called bedding out! Hence it is to a great extent simply a
question of intelligence as regards plants and also of mental
growth. (“Bedding Out,” 334)
This excerpt from Robinson’s horticultural magazine, The Garden, draws a comparison
between plant life and interior decoration that recurs several times throughout his works.
Robinson takes issue with garden designs driven by architectural display not only for
their neglect of plant ecologies, but also for their limited appeal in terms of visual
composition. He disparages the designer who willingly substitutes “glorious richness and
infinite variety” for “ordinary” arrangements and “geometrical colouring.” We see the
same critique implied in his repeated comparisons of the formal garden to wallpaper,
furniture, and carpets. In Wild Garden, for instance, he remarks rather snidely that part of
the appeal of an uncultivated field is the absence of “man and his muddlings in the earth,
or his exceeding weakness for tracing wall-paper patterns” (WG 23). When he returns to
the same comparison in The English Flower Garden, however, Robinson offers some
explanation for the logic behind his critique:
Designs that were well enough for furniture or walls or
panels when applied to the garden gave us a new set of
difficulties. Carried out in wood or in the carpet they answer
their purpose, if we like them; but a flower bed is a thing for
continual work, both in cultivating and in arranging and
keeping it, and therefore it is best to see that we are not
bothered by needless complexities in dealing with the
ground. (EFG 245)
In recreating the effect of wallpaper in the context of the garden, the gardenesque and the
formal garden aesthetic treat three-dimensional garden spaces as flat, two-dimensional
surfaces. By failing to discriminate between those wastes that fuel garden ecologies and
those that undermine them, the garden designer is at a fundamental disadvantage. By
forcing inorganic designs—the “ribbon border,” the quotidian “wall paper,” and the
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monotonous geometry—onto organic matter and ecological spaces, garden designers
show their limited judgment in spatial arrangement, as well as disrupt the foundational
ecologies of the garden. Robinson demonstrates how, in their attempts to renovate what
the gardenesque and the formal garden consider to be waste, both aesthetics transform the
garden from a space reliant on wastes to one so wasteful that even waste itself goes to
waste.
The spatial dimension to Robinson’s critique and aesthetic brings us to a locational
understanding of waste. On the one hand, there are waste-spaces that are neglected,
abandoned, or for some reason deemed undesirable. As with Tsing’s abandoned
landscapes, these alienated spaces are characterized by a singular asset, and their
structures understood two-dimensionally. On the other hand, Robinson suggests that
waste is location-specific; what is waste in the home ceases to be waste in the garden.
Ruins and moss-covered walls cease to be wasted land when they are repurposed for
naturalizing and showcasing alpine and rock plants. “Any species of out-house” (MC
43)47 is a potential shelter for mushroom cultures rather than a superfluous structure;
“[o]ne of the best crops [Robinson] ha[d] ever seen was grown in a dry and unused
coach-house” (MC 43). Spaces cease to be metaphoric waste lands when they are
reoriented toward an ecology. The designation of waste spaces, for him, should be
determined by their compatibility or incompatibility with botanical ecologies.
The most dramatic example of Robinson’s vision of spatial waste redeemed by its
ecological structure appears in his plans for bog-gardens—plans which take for granted
the unique botanical beauty found in fallow land. By proposing ways of artificially
flooding English gardens to imitate the growing conditions of North American bogs,
Robinson reassesses literal waste-lands as aesthetically viable spaces worthy of imitation.
He wonders with concern:
. . . who shall record the beauty and interest of the flowers
of the wide-spreading marsh-lands of this little globe of
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That is, in the sense of a subsidiary building such as a shed or stable, and not of a lavatory (OED).
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ours, from those of the vast wet woods of America, dark
and brown, and hidden from sunbeams, where the fair
flowers only meet the eyes of water-snakes and frogs, to
those of the breezy uplands of the high Alps, far above the
woods, where the little bogs teem with Nature’s most vivid
jewellery, joyous in a bright sun, and dancing in the breeze?
No one worthily, for no one knows.
(“The Bog-Garden” 7)
The “beauty and interest” of these plants must not be witnessed only by “the eyes of
water-snakes and frogs” or remain hidden in the Alps. These specimens are “joyous” and
“dancing” performance, as well as “Nature’s most vivid jewellery” and most worthy of
display. Besides these ornamental flowers, Robinson also recommends “Vigorous Marsh
and Water-Side Plants”—a “group of the boldest” of which “is strikingly effective in the
picturesque garden” (“Bog-Garden” 24). The flowers that do grow in marshy ground are
more beautiful for it; “even by the margins of the railroads, one sees the vivid blooms of
the Cardinal Flower spring erect from the wet peaty hollows” (“Bog-Garden” 7).
Robinson finds the bog itself beautiful enough that, “[i]t should only be made in a
picturesque part of the grounds” (“Bog-Garden” 7). Attuned to both the ecological needs
and organic beauty of waste-land, Robinson reclaims wasted lands by imposing new
ecologies onto them. This method is limited, of course, by the fact that it displaces and
disrupts plant ecologies all over the world. However, Robinson is at least aware enough
of the living-space entanglements of plants—and the role of waste therein—to
recommend numerous steps by which readers might recreate these ecological conditions.
The author goes so far as to bind the care and maintenance of the artificial bog-garden to
parenthood. He exhorts the English gardener to supply “a home for the numerous
children of the world that will not thrive on our harsh, bare, and dry garden-borders, but
must be cushioned on moss, and associated with their own relatives in moist peat soil”
(“Bog-Garden” 7), implying a parallel between the gardener’s concern for the ecological
needs of his plants to parents’ concern for the wellbeing of their children.
Waste may also come from the gardener’s mismanagement of the diversity of plant
species. While Robinson’s ideal garden is “very beautiful and interesting with a varied
life,” he complains of the public taste for monotony and imitation in garden design,
which causes nurseries to “only grow few stereotyped things” rather than risk introducing
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new or rare species (EFG 242). This pattern of supply and demand leads to a further
tendency for growers to stock “shrubs of little or no beauty” that “have overrun and killed
far more precious things. And this nursery rubbish having eaten up every good thing
begins to eat up itself, and hence we see so many shrubberies worn out” (EFG 242). This
“nursery rubbish” is a rare instance in which Robinson names a form of waste-plant—one
that exhibits a partly cannibalistic, partly autophagic violence within the garden. The
author advises some precautionary measures against this violence, too, as he observes
“that the success of the bog-garden will depend on the continuous care bestowed in
preventing rapidly-growing or coarse plants from exterminating others, or from taking
such a hold in the soil that it becomes impossible to grow any delicate or minute plant in
it” (“Bog-Garden” 24). The gardener’s work, in other words, is to serve as a caretaker of
plant life and of the overall ecological health of the garden.
For Robinson, beautiful gardens should harmonize with their surrounding landscape and
accommodate thriving plant life—that is, they should be “sensibly laid out to suit the
ground, the plants” (EFG 247). This view contains a subtle orientation toward ecologies
that privileges the botanical over the human. In a sense, the gardener’s work is to
prioritize the garden beyond human life and interests—to help it become hardy and
independent, rather like the wildflower—so that the garden as a whole may become a
permanent, self-sustaining ecology. This ethos is frequently manifest in the many garden
reforms that Robinson recommends in The Wild Garden. In one such reform, Robinson
recommends naturalizing imported alpine flowers in English woods, meadows, and
unfrequented semi-wild areas. This suggestion shows the naturalization method in the
context of its potential to create a self-sustaining wild garden out of stray outdoor spaces.
The wild garden created by naturalizing “the handsomest and hardiest climbing plants”
upon a “wild rough slope” has “the great merit of permanence” (WG 16). “Arranged with
some judgment at first,” he writes, “such a colony might be left to take care of itself; time
would but add to its attractions, and the owner might go away for ten years, and find it
more beautiful than ever on his return” (WG 16-17). Robinson thus challenges the readergardener to build new ecologies out of existing and disregarded ones—to make aesthetic
choices under the expectation of eventually having to relinquish control of the garden.
Once the garden is “[a]rranged,” the gardener may allow ten years’ of wilderness and the

139

accumulation of waste to take over in order to complete the aesthetic work. The source of
attraction in this arrangement is the way in which human cultivation eventually
relinquishes its interference to the wild, which transforms the slope into a self-sustaining
plant ecology. As a practice that necessitates human labour and design, gardening is
anthropocentric, certainly. Even the self-sufficient ten-year garden that Robinson
proposes relies in its early years on the gardener to plant and to maintain it “with some
judgment at first.” And yet, though an anthropocentric bias is inevitable, Robinson’s
uncompromising focus upon ecologies almost approaches the posthuman. The gardener
seeks to develop the self-sufficiency of a garden ecology enough that it could eventually
exist without the labour and arrangement of that gardener. The aim of the gardener’s
work—to develop the self-sufficiency, permanence, and botanical strength of the garden
ecology—in other words, is to make human labour obsolete.
There is a similar abandonment of design at play when Robinson discusses horticultural
uses of decayed architecture. In both Alpine Flowers for English Gardens (1870) and The
Wild Garden, Robinson recommends “ruins and old walls” for naturalizing certain alpine
plants, not only because these imitate the physical conditions of the plants’ native
environment, but also because the plants will “be seen to greater advantage on them than
in any other positions” (WG 33, emphasis added). There is aesthetic merit in the decay of
a wall. Indeed, for Robinson, ruins or partially decayed walls outperform any constructs
expressly made for the purpose; “A mossy old wall, or an old ruin, would afford a
position for many dwarf rock-plants which no specially prepared situation could rival”
(AF 34). The wilderness has effectively improved upon the architectural and horticultural
work begun by human endeavour. Being both useful to plant life and beautiful, these
mossy walls and ruins exemplify the central argument of The Wild Garden: neglected
spaces that simultaneously integrate the refuse of different garden spaces into new waste
ecologies and diminish the presence of the human have ideal ecological value.

4.2
For Robinson, there is one excusable form of extravagance: the expenditure of resources
to secure and to maintain a large variety of thriving plant life. As he playfully remarks,
“[i]f we ruin ourselves through extravagance in gardening, let it be for living and
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beautiful things” (EFG 240). Robinson does not object to expenditure unless it interferes
with the propagation of “living and beautiful things.” We see the logic of this one
exception at play in a paragraph on “Stucco and Stone Waste” or the excessive terracing
in gardens (EFG 240):
It is a costly folly to make a flower garden like a cemetery,
with costly terracing work—where terraces are not required,
and where the natural form of the earth is far fitter than any
other form for a beautiful flower garden,—vases, fountain
basins, sculpture of the poorer sort, and, lastly, pounded
stones and gravel, set out instead of flowers,—these are
wasteful and ugly. (EFG 240)
The true offence—what makes stucco and stone terraces “waste,” in this case—is that
these building materials supplant the rightful domain of “a beautiful flower garden.”
Robinson prioritizes plant life over human convenience and usage when he suggests that
the resources directed toward “stone rubbish” be redirected toward “good plants and good
ways of growing them.” In service of this larger argument, the author relies on
redefinitions of waste. Invoking the image of a cemetery to figure garden pavement and
decoration as waste, Robinson fuses his economic, aesthetic, and ecological objections.
The practical obstacles of this “costly folly,” “where terraces are not required,” merge
with that aesthetic bent which prefers “the natural form of the earth” to “sculpture of the
poorer sort,” as well as with his plant-centric animosity to the “pounded stones and
gravel, set out instead of flowers.” And while these competing images of waste
demonstrate how Robinson weaves economic, aesthetic, and ecological wastes together
in his own horticultural methods, they rely on the foundational assumption that
aestheticized botanical life is more valuable than an aestheticized human experience.
Whatever role they might serve, humans do not take precedence in the Robinsonian
garden. They are a temporary stay during the garden’s early development, a transient
benefactor of sorts, but ultimately cannot join the garden ecology except in death, or as
decay.
Robinson’s approach to the garden was scandalous and provocative because of the way in
which he consistently undermined the value of human systems of order, just as his
gardening method resisted the impulse toward dominion over the landscape. It is entirely
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appropriate, therefore, that he adopts a language of waste when positing an ecological
ethos that idealizes the receding of human agency and presence. Robinson’s stance
toward the place of the human in the garden is deeply ambivalent. At times, the garden’s
ecologies depend on human labour and management; at other times, there is an
apocalyptic strain to his language that suggests the only proper place for the human in the
garden is in death. There is a certain posthuman perspective implied by botanical beauty
in that it is visible only to “the eyes of water-snakes and frogs.” The remainder of this
chapter considers Robinson’s ultimately morbid conception of the appropriate place of
the human in the garden, beginning with some particulars of how he prioritizes ecological
development and ending with an examination of the cemetery-garden.
Robinson engages with this grim, inevitable conclusion by recommending urn
cemeteries, which double as flower gardens. This is the central concept of God’s Acre
Beautiful; Or, the Cemeteries of the Future, in which Robinson argues for adopting
cremation as the dominant mode of burying human remains. It is fitting that Robinson
should prefer cremation, which accelerates the decomposition of human remains and
hastens toward the point at which these remains might be serviceable to garden cemetery
ecology. Cremation was a relatively uncommon practice in 1880s England, and with
urban real estate becoming increasingly scarce, spaces for full casket burials in large
cities like London were at a premium. Cemetery over-crowding and its dangers to
sanitation were a well-publicized issue by the time that Robinson wrote God’s Acre
Beautiful, such that Robinson spends less time dwelling on these issues and focuses
instead on the unique horticultural and aesthetic opportunities afforded by urn cemeteries.
While others have already supplied the sanitary arguments for urn-burial, his book
examines such cemeteries from the perspective “of the beauty of nature and art, which an
improved system of burial would make possible in all that relates to the resting-place of
the dead” (GAB 1).
Robinson suggests that the responsibility of cultivating the garden ecology is much
stronger for its being a cemetery: “[t]he cemetery of the future must not only be a garden
in the best sense of the word, but the most beautiful and best cared-for of all gardens”
(GAB 6-7). Through the interment of ashes, human remains may enable further garden
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spaces to exist. Of course, Robinson is not proposing to use human ashes to fertilize
gardens; however, he does intend for urn cemeteries to secure spaces for more flower
gardens. He imagines that, because “the place for urn-burials need not occupy more than
a fourth of the space of a large cemetery, the whole central or main part would be free
space for gardens and groves of trees” (GAB 6). With the urns occupying at most a
quarter of the space, this imagined cemetery would be far more garden and grove than
burial ground. Though three years later Robinson would write that it is “a costly folly to
make a flower garden like a cemetery” (EFG 240), he evidently thinks it worthwhile to
make a cemetery like a flower garden.
Human remains cease to be “waste” or to be wasted in joining the garden-cemetery, in
which they are the prerequisites for that garden’s existence. In the casket burial cemetery,
however, human remains not only create waste ab initio by making otherwise valuable
land useless; they also become organic waste as they decompose and, perhaps eventually,
they are dug up and discarded as refuse in order to accommodate new buildings for the
living. Robinson evokes the full force these layered cycles of waste when he describes
urban casket cemeteries as “the very image of decay” (GAB 8)—as waste that bars
garden-cemeteries from being realized. Robinson is referring to the impossibility of longterm maintenance where the conventional cemetery of interred caskets is concerned. The
author goes on for some length to describe what is effectively the unsustainability of
these cemeteries:
The history of many graveyards in crowded cities is this:
Comparatively few years’ accumulation of bodies, say from
one to two generations, then finally closing from
overcrowding. A generation or two passes away; many
changes occur among those interested in preserving the graves,
and soon their voice is heard no more in the matter. Then, at
the will of some one or more persons desirous of disposing of
a place which, frequently, is extremely valuable, at any
moment the remains of every person buried therein are liable
to be subjected to the utmost degradation; to be carted away as
secretly as may be by some contractor, whose only object is to
find a convenient shoot for them. (GAB 2-3)

143

This nightmarish vision of bodies irreverently “carted away” and thrown, as rubbish, into
“a convenient shoot” is one of a plundered landscape. Reading these concerns for the
“disposing” or disruption of historic burial grounds occupying desirable real estate, we
may recall Tsing’s schema of the abandoned landscape. The abandoned landscape,
alienated as a space valued narrowly for a single resource, is depleted of that resource and
left in a state of seeming ruin—“subjected to the utmost degradation,” perhaps. This
comparison, of course, is not complete. Stolen cemetery grounds might be alienated, but
with the result of being occupied by new bodies rather than being abandoned; the act of
appropriation here would not lead directly to the depletion of the cemetery’s value as an
economic commodity (i.e., as real estate). Tsing, moreover, is interested in the
unexpected ecologies that assert themselves out of such ruins. Robinson’s cautionary
examples are less radical, and possibly constrained by a subtle form of alienation. It is
worth noting that Robinson, who views the cemetery as a potential botanical resource,
might simply be exchanging one form of alienation for another.
Robinson judges the cemetery as he would the garden ecology; one might go so far as to
say that he is an ecological thinker, assessing the long-term sustainability of the gardencemetery. We can see in both his references to the history of graveyards, and to
graveyards multiple generations in the future, that Robinson’s assessment of cemeteries is
based on its longevity. Robinson’s underlying concerns are the inevitable result of a logic
that views the cemetery as a sacred space for botanical life that would maximize the
cemetery’s ecological potential. When he complains that the “frequent disturbance of the
ground for interments is against any good work in such art as the place invites” (GAB 9),
Robinson makes clear that he sees both casket-interment and the forms of robbery that
casket cemeteries attract as unnecessary interruptions to the growth cycles of what could
be a thriving garden ecology. There are limits, in other words, to Robinson’s appreciation
for decay. Decay is acceptable in the garden-cemetery if it supports or enables a
functional ecology, just as plant decay is also kept from being waste as long as it
contributes to the botanical ecologies of the flower garden. A closed cemetery in London,
with little vegetation and whose “memorial stones are crumbling away, although this is
one of the best cared for of closed cemeteries” (GAB 9), is a waste of what should be both
a sacred and a botanical space.
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For Robinson, what distinguishes objectionable waste from decay is something like an
ecological entropy—its movement from a state of complexity to a state of simplicity. The
types of human artifice that Robinson opposes—carpet bedding, gravel paving, ceramic
edgings, dug-up borders, even interred bodies—involve a similar structural interference
that exchanges complex ecological structures for simplistic ones. Plant decay, by
contrast, brings more structural complexity to ecological spaces of which it is a part; it
nourishes the soil and assists new growth. The gardener’s work is to try to approximate
that structural complexity between the diverse spaces of landscapes. Instead of
surrendering the space of the cemetery to gravestones, God’s Acre Beautiful proposes to
increase the cemetery’s ecological complexity, minimizing the space needed for burials
and maximizing the area devoted to botanical growth.
What preserves urn cemeteries from the fate of interred-casket cemeteries is the longevity
enabled by a sustainable integration of human remains into the garden-cemetery ecology.
“While long duration is not possible under our present system,” Robinson observes, “with
urn-burial the simplest stone inscription may be in as good order a thousand years hence
as today. With it also there would be a satisfactory realisation of the meaning conveyed
by the word cemetery—a resting-place, or place of sleep, for the dead” (GAB 8). Not
least of the urn cemetery’s benefits is its jointly ecological and aesthetic appeal. The
ecological strength, the fecundity of the garden-cemetery, is beautiful. Robinson assures
us that “[w]ith urn-burial everything we can desire for the artist is not only possible but
easily attained. Soft, green, undisturbed lawns; stately and beautiful trees in many forms;
ground undisturbed, except in certain small parts” (GAB 13-14). The garden-cemetery is
yet another ecology of ecologies, balancing diverse “small parts,” from decorative
columbarium, to grove, and to “soft, green, undisturbed lawns”—the last of which, we
may hope, the caretaker would presume to mow only on occasion.
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Conclusion

5
It seems fitting to devote the ending of this dissertation on waste ecologies to a discussion
of endings themselves. Critics and readers alike are apt to imagine waste as an ending.
And to do so is reasonable; waste tends to refer to an outcome of a set of processes.
Within a logic of linear progression, waste appears to be the inevitable end point of living
and nonliving things. Once-valuable commodities are thrown out in dust-heaps and
bodies end up as (occasionally charred) remains. Where the waste-land once meant
uncultivated land, the industrial nineteenth century shifted our idea of a waste-land to
resemble Anna Tsing’s alienated landscape, which, as she points out, emerges as depleted
land or a landscape whose primary use value has been spent. In many ways, waste stands
for material and teleological endings. Yet, for Victorians, waste stood for beginnings, as
well. Over the course of my four chapters I have been working against these assumptions
of waste as mere by-product, as capitalist residue. Instead, I have examined some of the
ways in which Victorian fiction and prose explore the narrative possibilities that emerge
from imagining waste as the slippery substances that elude our carefully constructed
systems, as well as from conceiving waste ecologies as the thoroughly interrelated
structural organization of that waste. Waste in the sense of detritus becomes the centre of
families’ existence (the Harmons, the Boffins, and the Hexams) in the first chapter; it is a
resource that can be mined. Even more strangely, waste can be so rampantly productive
that, as we see in the second chapter, it appears to proliferate endlessly and often at the
expense of the individual. Perhaps most importantly of all, however, waste gives rise to
new growth—whether of industrial matter, of organic life, or of narrative possibility.
Waste offers itself as a potential narrative point of origin. A Christmas Carol, for
instance, opens with an image of spectral waste: “Marley was dead: to begin with” (1).
The narrative begins with the fact of Marley’s dead, decaying body. The corpse, as we
have seen throughout this dissertation, is the ultimate form of human waste. The syntax
and punctuation of this sentence, moreover, situate this waste in a productively unusual
way. The syntactic deferral of the initiatory “to begin with” places the incitement of the
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story after a death. The colon visually separates the two clauses, a demarcation of death
and of life (i.e., a beginning) that Marley will later cross in ambiguous passage to
communicate with the living. Yet, this colon is unnecessary. It bridges two clauses in no
danger of grammatical separation, or which might just as easily be joined by a comma.
As it is, the colon implies that there was a separation between the clauses that needed to
be joined, and generates a semantic tension between the notions of death and of
beginning. The strategic punctuation construes the incitement as a logical progression
from that death and promises a future narrative development of this motif. Here, death
and waste do not mark the close of a narrative, but an opening. A figure of waste, then,
initiates the main narrative arcs of A Christmas Carol. Marley’s redemption, his attempts
to escape the purgatorial space within which he finds himself only begins after his death;
his attempts to help Scrooge redeem himself must still begin with Marley’s death as well.
Waste, like death, gets associated with the conclusion of a linear progression, and yet in
Dickens’s short narrative it marks the starting point of spiritual phenomena. Even
Scrooge’s flippant remark that Marley’s ghost “may be an undigested bit of beef, a blot
of mustard, a crumb of cheese, a fragment of an underdone potato,” and has an air “more
of gravy than of grave” (27), conjures the rather absurd image of digestive waste as the
source of—if not a ghost, then at least some alternate sensory state of awareness.
Literary genres throughout the nineteenth century recognized waste’s capacity to produce
and to organize narrative. Victorian detective and sensation fiction, for instance, rapidly
developed a convention that associated apparent insignificance and hidden meaning.
Waste, which included everything from the overlooked to the disgusting, was a natural fit
for this convention. Wilkie Collins uses this tactic in The Moonstone (1868). A pivotal
clue in the disappearance of the diamond—which Sergeant Cuff, Gabriel Betteredge, and
Franklin Blake go to many lengths to track down and which Rosanna Spearman takes
even more pains to secure—is a vestment of no practical value and which ruins the
decorative value of Rachel’s painted bedroom door: Franklin Blake’s paint-smeared
nightgown. Collins also resorts to this device in several of his shorter tales, including
“The Diary of Anne Rodway” (1856). In this story, the narrator spots the central clue of
the mystery at a local rag-and-bottle shop. She notices a torn cravat among a pile of rags,
and correctly matches it to a torn strip of fabric found in her dead friend’s hand:
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Glancing about me here at the worthless-looking things by
which I was surrounded, my eye was caught by a bundle of
rags lying on the counter, as if they had just been brought in
and left there. From mere idle curiosity, I looked close at
the rags, and saw among them something like an old cravat.
. . . I looked at the ends: one of them was torn off. (32)
Anne Rodway stumbles upon pivotal evidence as a result of her attentiveness to waste.
That attention is more significant as “mere idle curiosity” for suggesting that her gaze is
drawn to waste for its own sake, without ulterior motive. A disposition toward waste (the
“idle curiosity” that wastes time) leads her to look closely at waste (“worthless-looking
things”), which in turn allows her to discover a type of waste (an unusable, torn cravat)
that turns out to be all-important. Arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes stories are
even better known for immortalizing this device of placing immense narrative value in
the discarded or discardable. Of the many stories in which discarded rubbish or stained
items prove invaluable as evidence, some include: the dirt-stained knees of Vincent
Spaulding’s trousers in “The Adventure of the Red-Headed League” (1892); and the
“dregs of beeswing” (330) that alert Holmes to Lady Brackenstall’s attempt to screen the
man who killed her husband in “The Abbey Grange” (1905). These familiar tropes of
detective fiction rely on waste’s interconnectedness; waste has the double advantage of
appearing too insignificant to the criminal to be preserved, and of retaining the material
traces of a crime that can be legible for the attentive investigator. There are also instances
in this genre of waste begetting more waste. In Conan Doyle’s “The Musgrave Ritual”
(1894), for instance, the mystery begins with a paper copy of questions and answers that
Reginald Musgrave describes as “nothing of any importance at all” (107). This “absurd
business” (110) leads to a series of events over which Holmes accrues material clues that
he later keeps as souvenirs. He shows Watson these relics at the beginning of the story,
years after he had solved the case, and they appear to Watson as rubbish: “a crumpled
piece of paper, an old-fashioned brass key, a peg of wood with a ball of string attached to
it, and three rusty old discs of metal” (101). The rubbish or waste in question has grown
in number from the beginning to the end of Holmes’s involvement in this case. Moreover,
they still carry on as waste. Holmes shows these relics to Watson to distract the latter
from his desire that Holmes should tidy his documents. Watson remarks on Holmes’s
habit of hoarding evidence, remarking: “his papers were my great crux. He had a horror
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of destroying documents, especially those which were connected with his past cases”
(99). And, indeed, instead of putting papers away, Holmes persuades Watson to let him
take other significant papers out. Even here, in the context of genre fiction, waste is
hyper-productive of new meaning.
Ghost stories and detective fiction are not the only genres to put the generative potential
of waste to narrative uses. Social problem novels also feature narrative structures that
make waste productive. Within a genre “defined by its dirtiness,” texts like Elizabeth
Gaskell’s Mary Barton (1848) rely on “transgressively graphic accounts of filth and
waste” as impetuses for reform (Freeland 799). If dirt was emblematic of the social
conditions which Gaskell and fellow Condition of England authors wished to see
resolved, it was because their Victorian readership recognized waste as a formidable
argument for social and political change. In addition, there was a further dimension to the
productive influence of literal waste such as dirt and dust. Richard H. Horne’s short story,
“Dust; or Ugliness Redeemed” (1850), which most critics agree inspired the Harmon
dust-heaps in Our Mutual Friend,48 offers a vivid account of how dust-heaps are
productive of both financial gain and a folkloric, restorative power. Catherine Gallagher,
comparing the transformative capacity of revitalizing dryness and life-threatening
wetness, reads both Horne’s and Dickens’s dust-heaps as emblems of “the revivifying
potential of all of life’s remains” (108). Karen Chase and Michael Levenson also notice
the vitality underlying Dickens’s portrayals of waste, finding that the “primal matter” of
grit, dust, and mud throughout Dickensian London “give a startling specificity to his
engagement with the environment; they also place the question of material regeneration
in stark and urgent terms” (144). This current of generative, productive literary waste
reveals the structural complexity of Victorian waste more broadly. Waste was and is a
point of origin that accommodates a surprising range of relations, including and beyond
that which we hold abject. While Horne’s dust-heaps do feature in Our Mutual Friend,
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According to Catherine Gallagher, critics have generally agreed that Horne’s story was the original
inspiration for Our Mutual Friend at least as early as the 1980s, when the similarity was first by noted
Humphrey House and then developed more fully by Frank Gibbon.

149

they were historically productive of agricultural fields, parks, and even of building
materials for the reconstruction of Moscow, if Horne’s “authentic information” (384)
about a dust-heap sold for forty-thousand pounds to Russia for that purpose is to be
believed.
The four chapters of this dissertation rely on a foundational view of waste as
productive—productive of cyclical, complex, interrelated structures that I have been
calling waste ecologies. Each chapter not only explores a different set of scenarios
wherein waste produces new and unpredictable relations, but also devotes considerable
space to the ways in which Victorian individuals and populaces, real and imagined, have
navigated and negotiated their agency within waste ecologies. In Our Mutual Friend,
Lizzie Hexam and Pleasant Riderhood manage to negotiate their own respective places in
harmony with waste ecologies, free from the encroachment of either the deadly influence
of the Thames or of Venus’s emporium of miscellanies. Bleak House, by contrast,
presents a decidedly morbid view of individuals’ endeavour to create value or meaning
within waste ecologies in the form of Richard’s psychological decline, Krook’s bodily
fusion to his wares, and Jo’s forced and even contagious inability to find situatedness.
“Green Tea” offers still bleaker prospects in Jennings, whose body and soul become the
waste at the mercy of ecologies of indigestible tea, knowledge, and colonial revenge.
Only after this decimation and receding of the human do Robinson’s gardens offer some
possibility of individuals’ reintegration into generative waste ecologies—that is, in
horticultural labour and in death. And yet, in spite of the apocalyptic tenor of these
literary waste ecologies, my hope is that this dissertation on waste nevertheless marks a
beginning and not an end. I offer these chapters as openings into further discussions of
Victorian waste as productive, as fascinating, and as rich sites of analysis. Waste is a
beginning that promises more—future narrative developments, rampant new material
relations, and strange ecologies of waste.

150

Bibliography
Ackroyd, Peter. London Under. Doubleday, 2011.
---. Thames: Sacred River. Chatto & Windus, 2007.
Alaimo, Stacy. Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self. Indiana UP,
2008.
Alatas, Syed Hussein. The Myth of the Lazy Native: A Study of the Image of the Malays,
Filipinos and Javanese form the 16th to the 20th century and its function in the
ideology of colonial capitalism. F. Cass, 1977.
Allan, Mea. William Robinson, 1838–1935: Father of the English Flower Garden. Faber
& Faber, 1982.
Allen, Michelle. Cleansing the City: Sanitary Geographies in Victorian London. Ohio
UP, 2008.
Ashton, Rosemary. One Hot Summer: Dickens, Darwin, Disraeli, and the Great Stink of
1858. Yale UP, 2017.
Banks, W. L. “Gardening in the Age of William Robinson: Hergest Croft, Kington,
1896–1910.” Radnorshire Society Transactions, vol. 69, 1999, pp. 34–47.
Bennett, Jane. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Duke UP, 2010.
Blomfield, Reginald, and F. Inigo Thomas. The Formal Garden in England. Macmillan,
1892. Internet Archive, www.archive.org/details/formalgardenine02thomgoog/.
Accessed 1 June 2020.
Boscagli, Maurizia. Stuff Theory: Everyday Objects, Radical Materialism. Bloomsbury,
2014.
Brantlinger, Patrick. Rule of Darkness: British Literature and Imperialisn, 1830–1914.
Cornell UP, 1988.
Brown, Bill. “Thing Theory.” Critical Inquiry, vol. 28, no. 1, 2001, pp. 1-22.
---. Other Things. U of Chicago P, 2015.
Burns, Mary. “Printing and Publishing the Illustrated Botanical Book in NineteenthCentury Great Britain.” Cogent Arts & Humanities, vol. 4, 2017,
doi:10.1080/23311983.2017.1364058. Accessed 1 April 2020.
Cadwallader, Jen. Spirits and Spirituality in Victorian Fiction. Palgrave, 2016.
Carter, Tom. The Victorian Garden. Bell & Hyman, 1984.
Chappell, Patrick. “Paper Routes: Bleak House, Rubbish Theory, and the Character
Economy of Realism.” ELH, vol. 80, no. 3, Fall 2013, pp. 783–810. Accessed 1
April 2020.
Chase, Karen, and Michael Levenson. “Green Dickens.” Contemporary Dickens, edited
by Eileen Gillooly and Deirdre David, Ohio State UP, 2009, pp. 131–151.

151

Chen, Mel Y. Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect. Duke UP,
2012.
Choi, Tina Y. “Forms of Closure: The First Law of Thermodynamics and Victorian
Narrative.” ELH, vol. 74, no. 2, 2007, pp. 301–322.
Cleere, Eileen. The Sanitary Arts: Aesthetic Culture and the Victorian Cleanliness
Campaigns. Ohio State UP, 2014.
Collins, Wilkie. “The Diary of Anne Rodway.” Household Words, vol. 14, no. 330, 19
July 1856, pp. 1–6. Dickens Journals Online, www.djo.org.uk/householdwords/volume-xiv/page-1.html. Accessed 1 December 2020.
---. “The Diary of Anne Rodway (II).” Household Words, vol. 14, no. 331, 26 July 1856,
pp. 30–37. Dickens Journals Online, www.djo.org.uk/household-words/volumexiv/page-30.html. Accessed 1 December 2020.
---. The Moonstone, edited by Francis O’Gorman, 3rd ed., Oxford UP, 2019.
“The Collision In The Thames.” The Times, no. 29353, 6 September 1878, pp. 7-8.
Darwin, Charles. The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. 2 vols., John
Murray, 1871. The Internet Archive,
archive.org/details/descentofmansele11871darw. Accessed 1 Dec 2020.
---. The Formation of Vegetable Mould through the Action of Worms with Observations
on Their Habits. John Murray, 1881. The Internet Archive,
www.archive.org/details/b21901818. Accessed 1 August 2020.
---. On the Origin of Species. Edited by Gillian Beer, revised ed., Oxford, 2009.
---. ‘To William Robinson [29 April 1866].’ The Correspondence of Charles Darwin,
Vol. 14, 1866. Cambridge UP, 2004, pp. 150-151. Google Books,
books.google.ca/books?id=jTON1MPaa6IC&pg=PA154&lpg=PA154&dq=willia
m+robinson+correspondence&source=bl&ots=Nwv65zkpx1&sig=ACfU3U1MM
Q9AHSrVBdNlADLTsYANqDGXg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiDiIyJ5OvpAhUHJDQIHXtHDmcQ6
AEwAnoECAcQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false. Accessed 1 April 2020.
De Quincey, Thomas. Confessions of an English Opium-Eater and Other Writings.
Penguin, 2003.
Delgado, L. Anne. “Ectoplasm and Spirits in the Material World.” Victorian Review, vol.
45, no. 1, Spring 2019, pp. 33–38.
della Vecchia, Pietro. St. Dominic and the Devil. 1630. Indianapolis Museum of Art,
collection.imamuseum.org/artwork/41069.
Dickens, Charles. Bleak House. Edited by Nicola Bradbury, Penguin, 2003.
---. A Christmas Carol; In Prose; Being a Ghost Story of Christmas, 1843, London.
Facsimile of the first edition, Little, Brown, 1920, Boston. The Internet Archive,
archive.org/details/christmascarolin20dick/page/n23/mode/2up. Accessed 1 July
2020.

152

---. “Great Expectations by Charles Dickens: Chapter XX.” All the Year Round, vol. iv,
pp. 457-461. Dickens Journals Online, www.djo.org.uk/all-the-yearround/volume-iv/page-457.html. Accessed 1 September 2020.
---. Our Mutual Friend. Oxford, 2008.
Dickson, Melissa. “Confessions of an English Tea Drinker: Sheridan Le Fanu and the
Medical and Metaphysical Dangers of Green Tea.” Victorian Literature and
Culture, vol. 45, no. 1, 2017, pp. 77–94.
Douglas, Mary. Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo.
1966. Routledge, 2002.
Doyle, Arthur Conan. “The Abbey Grange.” The Return of Sherlock Holmes. First
American edition, McClure, Phillips & Co., 1905, pp. 319–348. The Internet
Archive, www.archive.org/details/returnofsherlock00doyliala/page/318/mode/2up.
Accessed 1 December 2020.
---. “The Adventure of the Red-Headed League.” The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes,
George Newnes, 1892, pp. 29–56. The Internet Archive,
www.archive.org/details/adventuresofsher001892doyl/page/28/mode/2up?q=Leag
ue. Accessed 1 December 2020.
---. “The Musgrave Ritual.” The Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes, pp. 99–120. The Internet
Archive, www.archive.org/details/ost-englishmemoirsofsherloc00doylrich/page/n109/mode/2up. Accessed 1 December 2020.
---. A Study in Scarlet. Street & Smith, 1887. The Internet Archive,
www.archive.org/details/ost-english-studyinscarletno00doyl/. Accessed 1
September 2020.
Duthie, Ruth E. “Some Notes on William Robinson.” Garden History, vol. 2, no. 3, 1974,
pp. 12–21.
“excrement.” The New Sydenham Society’s Lexicon of Medicine and the Allied Sciences,
vol. 2, 1882. The Internet Archive,
www.archive.org/details/b24758231_0002/page/n309. Accessed 1 September
2020.
“food, n.” Oxford English Dictionary (OED) Online, Oxford UP, 2020,
www.oed.com/view/Entry/72632. Accessed 19 March 2020.
Freeland, Natalka. “The Politics of Dirt in Mary Barton and Ruth.” SEL, vol. 42, no. 4,
2002, pp. 799–818.
Fromer, Julie E. A Necessary Luxury: Tea in Victorian England. Ohio UP, 2008.
Gallagher, Catherine. The Body Economic: Life, Death, and Sensation in Political
Economy and the Victorian Novel. Princeton UP, 2006.
Gaskell, Elizabeth. Mary Barton: A Tale of Manchester Life. 2 vols., Chapman and Hall,
1848. The Internet Archive,
www.archive.org/details/marybartonbyecg01bartgoog. Accessed 1 December
2020.

153

Gates, Barbara. “Blue Devils and Green Tea: Sheridan Le Fanu’s Haunted Suicides.”
Studies in Short Fiction, vol. 24, no. 1, 1987, pp. 15–23.
Gold, Barri J. “The Consolation of Physics: Tennyson’s Thermodynamic Solution.”
PMLA, vol. 117, no. 3, 2002, pp. 449–464.
---. ThermoPoetics: Energy in Victorian Literature and Science. MIT P, 2010.
Goodlad, Lauren M. E. “Is There a Pastor in the House? Sanitary Reform and Governing
Agency in Bleak House.” Victorian Literature and the Victorian State: Character
and Governance in a Liberal Society, John’s Hopkins UP, 2003, pp. 86–118.
Griffiths, Devin, and Deanna K. Kreisel. “Introduction: Open Ecologies.” Victorian
Literature and Culture, vol. 48, no. 1, 2020, pp. 1–28.
Hack, Daniel. The Material Interests of the Victorian Novel, U of Virginia P, 2005.
Hammack, Brenda Mann. “Phantastica: The Chemically Inspired Intellectual in Occult
Fiction.” Mosaic, vol. 37, no. 1, 2004, pp. 83–99.
Hawkins, Gay. The Ethics of Waste: How We Relate to Rubbish. Rowman & Littlefield,
2006.
Heise, Ursula K. Review of Hyperobjects. Critical Inquiry, vol. 41, no. 2, Winter 2015,
pp. 460-61.
Helmreich, Anne. The English Garden and National Identity: the Competing Styles of
Garden Design, 1870–1914. Cambridge UP, 2002.
---. “Re-presenting Nature: Ideology, Art, and Science in William Robinson’s ‘Wild
Garden.’” Nature and Ideology: Natural Garden Design in the Twentieth Century,
edited by Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn. Dumbarton Oaks, 1997, pp. 81-111.
Horne, Richard H. “Dust; or Ugliness Redeemed.” Household Words, vol. 1, no. 16, 13
July 1850, pp. 379–384. Dickens Journals Online, www.djo.org.uk/householdwords/volume-i/page-379.html. Accessed 1 December 2020.
Hughes, William. “The Origins and Implications of J. S. Le Fanu’s ‘Green Tea.’” Irish
Studies Review, vol. 13, no. 1, 2005, pp. 45–54.
Ignatieva, Maria. Applied Urban Ecology: A Global Framework. John Wiley, 2011.
Iovino, Serenella and Serpil Oppermann. “Theorizing Material Ecocriticism: A Diptych.”
Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment, vol. 19, no. 3, Summer
2012.
---. Material Ecocriticism. Indiana UP, 2014.
Jackson, Lee. Dirty Old London: The Victorian Fight Against Filth. Yale UP, 2014.
Kneitz, Agnes. “Polluted Thames, Declining City: London as an Ecosystem in Charles
Dickens’s Our Mutual Friend.” Rivers Lost, Rivers Regained: Rethinking CityRiver Relations, edited by Martin Knoll, Uwe Lübken, and Dieter Schott. U of
Pittsburgh P, 2017.
Kristeva, Julia. Translated by Leon S. Roudiez. Powers of Horror: An Essay on
Abjection. Columbia UP, 1982.

154

Langan, John. “Conversations in a Shadowed Room: the Blank Spaces in ‘Green Tea.’”
Reflections in A Glass Darkly: Essays on J. Sheridan Le Fanu, edited by Gary
William Crawford, Jim Rickhill, and Brian J. Showers, Hippocampus, 2011, pp.
313–334.
Le Fanu, Joseph Sheridan. “Green Tea.” In A Glass Darkly, edited by Robert Tracy,
Oxford UP, 2008, pp. 5–40.
“Literary Waste.” Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science, and Art, vol. 24, no.
629, 16 Nov. 1867, pp. 627-628.
“London, Saturday, Dec. 27, 1856.” Morning Post, 27 Dec. 1856, p. 4. British Library
Newspapers. Accessed 1 Sept. 2020.
Loudon, John Claudius. The Villa Gardener; Comprising the Choice of a Suburban Villa
Residence; . . . W. S. Orr, 1850. Internet Archive,
www.archive.org/details/villagardenerco02loudgoog/. Accessed 1 May 2020.
Lougy, Robert E. “Filth, Liminality, and Abjection in Charles Dickens’s Bleak House.”
ELH, vol. 69, no. 2, 2002, pp. 473–500.
MacDuffie, Allen. Victorian Literature, Energy, and the Ecological Imagination. 2014.
---. “Victorian Thermodynamics and the Novel: Problems and Prospects.” Literature
Compass, vol. 8, no. 4, 2011, pp. 206–213.
Macfarlane, Karen. “Here Be Monsters: Imperialism, Knowledge and the Limits of
Empire.” Text Matters, vol. 6, no. 6, 2016, pp. 74–95. doi:10.1515/texmat-20160005
Maidment, Brian. Dusty Bob: A Cultural History of Dustmen, 1780–1870, Manchester
UP, 2007.
Massingham, Betty. “William Robinson: A Portrait.” Garden History, vol. 6, no. 1, 1978,
pp. 61–85.
Mayhew, Henry. London Labour and the London Poor: A Cyclopaedia of the Condition
and Earnings of Those that Will Work, Those that Cannot Work, and Those that
Will Not Work. Vol. 2, G. Newbold, 1851. The Internet Archive,
www.archive.org/details/b20415606_002/. Accessed 1 Aug 2020.
McCormack, W. J. Dissolute Characters: Irish Literary History through Balzac,
Sheridan Le Fanu, Yeats, and Bowen. Manchester UP, 1993.
Menely, Tobias, and Jesse Oak Taylor. Anthropocene Reading: Literary History in
Geologic Times, Pennsylvania State UP, 2017.
Menke, Richard. “New Grub Street’s Ecologies of Paper.” Victorian Studies, 2018, vol.
61, no. 1, pp. 60–82.
---. Telegraphic Realism: Victorian Fiction and Other Information Systems. Stanford UP,
2008.
Metz, Nancy Aycock. “The Artistic Reclamation of Waste in Our Mutual Friend.”
Nineteenth-Century Fiction, vol. 34, no. 1, 1979, pp. 59–72.

155

Miller, D. A. The Novel and the Police. U of California P, 1988.
Miller, Elizabeth Carolyn, editor. Climate Change and Victorian Studies. Victorian
Studies, vol. 60, no. 4, 2010.
Miller, J. Hillis. “Interpretation in Dickens’ Bleak House.” Victorian Subjects, Duke UP,
1990.
Morrison, Susan S. The Literature of Waste: Material Ecopoetics and Ethical Matter.
Palgrave, 2015.
Morton, Timothy. The Ecological Thought. Harvard UP, 2010.
---. Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics. Harvard UP, 2007.
---. Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World. U of Minnesota P,
2013.
---. “Victorian Hyperobjects.” Nineteenth-Century Contexts, Oct. 2014, vol. 36, no. 5, pp.
489–500.
Mufti, Nasser. “Walking in Bleak House.” Novel, vol. 49, no. 1, 2016, pp. 65–81.
Neilsen, Kate. “Dirty Fires: Cosmic Pollution and the Solar Storm of 1850.” 19:
Interdisciplinary Studies in the Long Nineteenth Century, no. 25, 2017. Directory
of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), doi:10.16995/ntn.788. Accessed 1 September
2020.
Nelson, Harland S. “Dickens’s Our Mutual Friend and Henry Mayhew’s London Labour
and the London Poor.” Nineteenth-Century Fiction, vol. 20, no. 3, 1965, pp. 207–
222.
“outhouse, n. 1.” OED Online, www.oed.com/view/Entry/133688. Accessed 1 December
2020.
Parham, John. “Bleak Intra-Actions: Dickens, Turbulence, Material Ecology.” Victorian
Writers and the Environment, Routledge, 2016, pp. 114–129.
Phillips, Dana and Heather I. Sullivan. “Material Ecocriticism: Dirt, Waste, Bodies,
Food, and Other Matter.” Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment,
vol. 19, no. 3, Summer 2013.
Pritchett, V. S. Introduction. In A Glass Darkly, by J. S. Le Fanu, John Lehmann, 1947,
pp. 7–11.
Proctor, Richard A. The Sun: Ruler, Fire, Light and Life of the Planetary System.
Longman, 1871. The Internet Archive, www.archive.org/details/dli.granth.87077.
Accessed 1 September 2020.
Robinson, William. Alpine Flowers for English Gardens. Murray, 1870. The Internet
Archive, www.archive.org/details/alpineflowersfo00robigoog/. Accessed 1 May
2020.
---. “Bedding Out. A Defence and a Reply.” The Garden, vol. 2, 19 Oct. 1872, pp. 333334.

156

---. “The Bog-Garden.” The Garden: An Illustrated Weekly Journal of Gardening in All
Its Branches, vol. 1, 20 Nov. 1871, pp. 7, 23-24. www-biodiversitylibraryorg.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/item/100776#page/31/mode/1up
---. The English Flower Garden: Design, Arrangement, and Plans; . . . 4th ed., Murray,
1895. Google Books,
books.google.ca/books/about/The_English_Flower_Garden.html?id=Tj8AAAAA
YAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&
q&f=false. Accessed 1 April 2020.
---. Garden Design and Architects’ Gardens: Two Reviews . . . Murray, 1892. Internet
Archive, www.archive.org/details/gardendesignarch00robi. Accessed 1 May 2020.
---. God’s Acre Beautiful; Or, the Cemeteries of the Future. Garden Office, 1880.
Archive.org, www.archive.org/details/godsacrebeautifu00robiuoft. Accessed 1
April 2020.
---. Mushroom Culture: Its Extension and Improvement. Murray, 1870. Applewood,
2008. Google Books,
books.google.ca/books?id=HaDavXTUPLkC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q
&f=false. Accessed 1 April 2020.
---. The Parks and Gardens of Paris; Described and Considered in Relation to the Wants
of our Own Cities . . . 1st ed., Murray, 1869. Internet Archive,
archive.org/details/parkspromenades00Robi. Accessed 1 May 2020.
---. The Parks and Gardens of Paris; Described and Considered in Relation to the Wants
of our Own Cities . . . 3rd ed., Murray, 1883. Internet Archive,
archive.org/details/parksandgardens00robigoog/. Accessed 1 May 2020.
---. The Subtropical Garden; Or, Beauty of Form in the Flower Garden. Murray, 1871.
Internet Archive, archive.org/details/subtropicalgarde00robi. Accessed 1 May
2020.
---. The Wild Garden; Or, Our Groves & Shrubberies Made Beautiful by the
Naturalization of Hardy Exotic Plants. . . . Murray, 1870. Google Books,
books.google.ca/books/about/The_Wild_Garden_Or_Our_Groves_Shrubberie.ht
ml?id=eU5HAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&redir_
esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false. Accessed 1 April 2020.
Ruskin, John. “The British Villa.” The Works of John Ruskin, Vol. 1: Early Prose
Writings, 1834 to 1843, George Allen, 1903. The Internet Archive,
archive.org/details/worksjohnruskin76ruskgoog/ . Accessed 1 June 2020.
Schülting, Sabine. Dirt in Victorian Literature and Culture: Writing Materiality.
Routledge, 2016. Routledge Studies in Nineteenth-Century Literature.
Schwenger, Peter. The Tears of Things: Melancholy and Physical Objects. U of
Minnesota P, 2006.
Scrimshaw, Peter. IMG_5932_3_4_5_6. 19 August 2012, Flickr,
www.flickr.com/photos/nathusius/8258209299/in/album-72157632161063608/.
Crossness Engines Trust, www.crossness.org.uk.

157

Sedding, John D. Garden Craft: Old and New. New edition, Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trübner, 1895. Google Books,
books.google.ca/books/about/Garden_craft_Old_and_New.html?id=ZXlZAAAA
YAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&
q&f=false. Accessed 1 May 2020.
Sicher, Efraim. “Bleak Homes and Symbolic Houses: At-homeness in Dickens and the
Victorian Imagination.” Homes and Homelessness in the Victorian Imagination,
edited by Murray Baumgarten and H. M. Daleski, AMS, 1998, pp. 33–50.
---. “Reanimation, Regeneration, Re-evaluation: Rereading Our Mutual Friend.”
Connotations, 2009/2010, vol. 19, no. 1-3, pp. 36–44.
---. Rereading the City / Rereading Dickens: Representation, the Novel, and Urban
Realism. AMS, 2003.
Smajić, Srdjan. Ghost-Seers, Detectives, and Spiritualists: Theories of Vision in Victorian
Literature and Science. Cambridge UP, 2010.
Smith, Ralph F. “Narratives of Public Health in Dickens’s Journalism: The Trouble with
Sanitary Reform.” Literature and Medicine, vol. 33, no. 1, 2015, pp. 157-183.
Southey, Robert. “Art. I. The History of the Inquisitions; including the Secret of those
Horrific Tribunals.” Quarterly Review, vol. 6, no. 12, Dec 1811, pp. 313–357.
Steinlight, Emily. “Dickens’s Supernumeraries and the Biopolitical Imagination of
Victorian Fiction.” Novel, vol. 43, no. 2, 2010, pp. 227-250.
---. Populating the Novel: Literary Form and the Politics of Surplus Life. Cornell UP,
2018.
Stevenson, Robert Louis. The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Edited by Martin
A. Danahay, Broadview, 2005.
Stewart, Balfour. Conservation of Energy: Being an Elementary Treatise on Energy and
Its Laws. King, 1873. The Internet Archive,
www.archive.org/details/conservationene02stewgoog. Accessed 1 September
2020.
Steyne, Hanna Louise. “Stinking Foreshore to Tree Lined Avenue: Investigating the
Riverine Lives Impacted by the Construction of the Thames Embankments in
Victorian London.” Papers from the Institute of Archaeology, vol. 23, no. 1, 2013,
pp. 1-13.
Stoddart, Helen. “‘The precautions of nervous people are infectious’: Sheridan Le Fanu’s
Symptomatic Gothic.” The Modern Language Review, vol. 86, no. 1, 1991, pp.
19–34.
Stoker, Bram. Dracula. Edited by Glennis Byron, Broadview, 2000.
Sullivan, Heather. “Dirt Theory and Material Ecocriticism.” Interdisciplinary Studies in
Literature and Environment, vol. 19, no. 3, 2012, pp. 515–531.

158

Taylor, Jesse Oak. The Sky of Our Manufacture: The London Fog and British Fiction
from Dickens to Woolf. U of Virginia P, 2016. Under the Sign of Nature:
Explorations in Ecocriticism.
Tennyson, Alfred. In Memoriam. Bradbury & Evans, 1850. The Internet Archive,
www.archive.org/details/inmemoriam00tennrich. Accessed 11 August 2020.
That Great Expedition for Ireland; By Way of Underwriting Proposed, by both Houses of
Parliament . . . . Ioseph Hunscott, 1642. ProQuest.
Thompson, Michael. Rubbish Theory: The Creation and Destruction of Value. Oxford
UP, 1979.
Trotter, David. Cooking with Mud: The Idea of Mess in Nineteenth-Century Art and
Fiction. Oxford UP, 2000.
Tsing, Anna Lowenhaupt. The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of
Life in Capitalist Ruins. Princeton UP, 2015.
Tyler, Daniel, editor. Dickens’s Style. Cambridge UP, 2013.
Ulin, Donald. “A Clerisy of Worms in Darwin’s Inverted World.” Victorian Studies, vol.
35, no. 3, 1992, pp. 294–308.
Voskuil, Lynn. “From Specimen to System: Botanical Scale and the Environmental
Sublime in Joseph Dalton Hooker’s Himalayas.” Ecological Form: System and
Aesthetics in the Age of Empire, edited by Nathan K. Hensley and Philip Steed,
Fordham UP, 2019, pp. 161–181.
Wallum, Charlotte. “William Robinson: 1838–1935.” Landscape Architecture Magazine,
vol. 26, no. 1, 1935, pp. 12–19.
Warren, Samuel. Passages from the Diary of a Late Physician. 2 vols., Blackwood, 1832.
The Internet Archive, www.archive.org/details/passagesfromdiar01war. Accessed
1 Dec 2020.
Wasilewski, Aurélien. “Social Undertones in William Robinson’s Crusade Against
‘Architects’ Gardens’: a ‘Costly Ugliness to Our Beautiful Home-landscapes.’”
Cahiers victoriens et édouardiens, vol. 89, 2019, pp. 1–18.
“waste, n. 12c.” OED Online, www.oed.com/view/Entry/226027. Accessed 1 September
2020.
Wells, H. G. The Time Machine: An Invention. H. Holt, 1895. The Internet Archive,
www.archive.org/details/timemachineinven00well. Accessed 1 Sept. 2020.
Whorton, James C. The Arsenic Century: How Victorian Britain Was Poisoned at Home,
Work, and Play. Oxford UP, 2011.
Wilde, Oscar. “The Decay of Lying: An Observation.” Intentions: The Decay of Lying;
Pen, Pencil, and Poison; The Critic as Artist; The Truth of Masks, edited by
Percival Pollard, Brentano’s, 1905, pp. 1-55. The Internet Archive,
www.archive.org/details/cu31924079601617. Accessed 1 September 2020.

159

Wise, M. Norton, and Crosbie Smith. “Work and Waste: Political Economy and Natural
Philosophy in Nineteenth Century Britain,” History of Science, vol. 27, no. 3,
1989, pp. 263–301.
Wolfreys, Julian. Victorian Hauntings: Spectrality, Gothic, the Uncanny, and Literature.
Palgrave, 2002.
Wolschke-Bulmahn, Joachim. “The ‘Wild Garden’ and the ‘Nature Garden’—Aspects of
the Garden Ideology of William Robinson and Willy Lange.” The Journal of
Garden History, vol. 12, no. 3, 1992, pp. 183–206.
Yaeger, Patricia. “Editor’s Column: The Death of Nature and the Apotheosis of Trash; or,
Rubbish Ecology.” PMLA, vol. 123, no. 2, pp. 321–339.

160

Curriculum Vitae
Name:

Nahmi Lee

Post-secondary
Education and
Degrees:

University of Ottawa
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
2008-2012 B.A.
Western University
London, Ontario, Canada
2012-2013 M.A.
Western University
London, Ontario, Canada
2013-2021 Ph.D.

Honours and
Awards:

Ontario Graduate Scholarship
2013-2014, 2015-2016, 2016-2017

Related Work
Experience

Teaching Assistant
Western University
2012-2016
Research Assistant
Western University
2016-2017, 2018-2019
Sessional Instructor
University of Victoria
2019-2021

